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CHAPTER 5
THE PRIVATISATION OF THE JNR
On 28 November 1986, a package of eight Bills to break-up and 
privatise the Japanese National Railway was voted into law in a 
plenary session of the Upper House (Sangiin) of the Japanese 
National Diet. The enactment of the eight JNR Privatisation Laws 
formally brought to an end the  ^14 year history of the state-run  
railway service, and paved the way for the commencement of 
operations in April 1987 by the newly-formed privatised 
enterprises known as the JR Group of companies. This Chapter 
describes the political process by which the privatisation of the 
JNR was achieved, and examines the role of the key participants in 
the development of the policies for the reform of the national 
railway.
Chapter 3 of this study, which had evaluated the operation of the 
national railway in its lossmaking phase, had concluded by 
analysing the JNR’s financial results in its final years adjusted for 
the ‘social’ costs of its operation. In now examining the process of 
establishing the JNR reform policies it would, however, be
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reasonable to acknowledge that this form of financial analysis of 
adjusting the JNR’s costs for its social responsibilities would 
have seemed, for those faced with the reality of devising policies 
to restructure the national railway corporation, something of an 
academic exercise. The reality faced by the national exchequer in 
financing the JNR was not of ‘adjusted’ losses but of a colossal 
‘real’ annual operating deficit, and of an accumulated level of 
indebtedness which ultimately represented a very substantial 
burden on the Japanese people. It was against the background of 
these real losses and debt that policies for the reform of the JNR 
had to be devised, a process which finally led to the division and 
privatisation of the national railway operation.
Examination of the actual losses of the JNR, and of its debt levels 
built up by 1980 (by the equivalent to the combined national debts 
of at least two South American countries) would have concluded 
that the time for a thorough overhaul of the financial structure of 
the national railway was due, if not long overdue. Such an overhaul 
was to comprise a key constituent of the national administrative 
reform programme of 1981 - 87 and, it could be argued, itç enosK 
tangible achievement. A description of the process of JNR reform
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now follows, in which the role played in the development and 
Implementation of the policies breaking up and privatising the 
national railway by the various key participants, will be examined 
in detail.
A Brief Historical Background to the A d m in is tra tiv e  
Reform Movement
In 1981 a government policy initiative was launched to deal w ith  
the funding of the Japanese public sector, triggered by an 
impending national financial crisis. Aimed at producing measures 
which would reduce the public sector deficit, the strategy set out 
to cut the spending budgets of government departments, and to 
make public service organisations more efficient. The movement, 
generally known as administrative reform (Gyôsei Kaikaku) , also 
introduced for the first time the concept of the privatisation of 
major public sector organisations, among which the JNR was of 
course an important constituenf.
The administrative reform movement of the early 1980s appeared 
at the time to be innovative government policy. In reality, 
however, the administration which promoted it - under PM Suzuki 
Zenko - actually revived a principle first mooted over 30 years
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before, during the post-War SCAP regime. Reform of the 
bureaucracy was an integral part of the Occupation’s in itia l 
objective of democratising Japan2. However, partly because of the 
SCAP administration’s re-definition of its policy objectives for 
Japan - an economically strong and politically stable ally for 
America in the Pacific - and partly because of successful 
opposition to change by the bureaucracy itself, the original SCAP 
policies were not fully implemented. As discussed at length in 
Chapter 1, the position of the bureaucracy in Japan - highly 
influential (but unaccountable) in shaping national policy - was 
even more entrenched at the end of the Occupation in 1952 that It  
had been when the SCAP authorities had embarked on its quest for 
a ‘US-style democracy’ seven years previously.
The spirit of administrative reform lived on In official Japanese 
government policy after the end of the Occupation, but 
governments formed after the departure of the Allies - 
particularly the first Liberal Democratic (LDP) administrations, 
retained only a nominal commitment to produce measures to 
increase the efficiency of the administrative structure. With 
other more immediate priorities, particularly rebuilding the
338
Japanese industrial structure and improving living standards to the 
fore, the administrative reform lamp burned very low. The firs t 
Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Rinji Gyôsei 
Chôsakai or Rinchô) was finally established by the Ikeda Hayato 
Administrations in 1961, but its powers were limited by its status 
as a mere advisory body. Its ‘advice’ of the First Rînchô was 
contained in its Report presented to the government in September 
1964, in which it recommended the rationalisation of the number 
of administrative agencies, the limitation of the practice of 
Amakudari (Descent from Heaven) - in which civil servants on 
retirement obtain positions in public corporations or related 
private enterprises - and related measures to make the public 
sector more responsive to national needs' .^
The recommendations of the first Rinchô fared little better than 
had the SCAP proposals to reform the bureaucratic structure in the 
late 1940s. A significant factor was the opposition from rank and 
file politicians both In the ruling government party, the LDP, and 
the opposition Socialist (Shakaitô) partys. Members of the LDP 
were reluctant to support measures which would result in reduced 
government spending, particularly as that expenditure - such as
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the rural line construction by the JNR - conferred clear benefits on 
the politicians who were party to its implementation. Socialist 
members, with an interest in preserving employment levels in 
public sector organisations were similarly opposed to an in itiative  
which would reduce the scale of the government sectors.
The first Rincho thus had little tangible impact on the structure of 
the Japanese public sector or on its financing. The policies failed 
primarily because of a lack of governmental will to impose them in 
the face of what the writer Eunbong Choi describes pertinently as 
“bureaucratic protectionism”  ^and because their implementation 
would have upset the established system of vested interests i n 
which the operation of public sector enterprises was used to 
benefit pressure groups whose support was required particularly 
by the LDP administration. The lack of will was also significantly 
affected by the replacement in late 1964 of PM Ikeda Hayato - who 
resigned because of ill health - by Sato Eisaku, - a former 
bureaucrat with little aspiration to challenge the status quo in the 
public sector.
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The question of trying to make unelected bureaucrats more 
accountable to the people they were supposed to serve thus 
remained a political issue only in the abstract through the 1970s. 
Administrative reform as a pro-active policy in the government’s 
manifesto did not resurface until the very end of that decade. That 
it was then revived was, moreover, much less concerned with  
public sector restructuring as a point of principle, and much more 
as a practical reaction to the serious deterioration in the state of 
the government’s financial position. Deficit financing to stimulate 
the domestic economy had produced a massive public sector deficit 
and, by 1980, the scale of deficit-covering Government Bonds was 
such that they amounted to more than double the amount raised 
from national taxation revenuesS.
Adm inistrative Reform Revived
The nettle of resolving the public sector financing crisis was 
grasped by the government of PM Suzuki Zenko, established after 
the LDP’s General Election victory in June 1980. Suzuki had won 
the position of Prime Minister ahead of other contenders including 
Nakasone Yasuhiro. Nakasone was perceived by Suzuki to be a clear 
threat to his authority and consequently was ‘rewarded’ with a
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Cabinet post in the new administration in the relative backwater 
area of the Administrative Management Agency (Gyôsei Kanri 
Kyoku) . The AMA as then constituted was responsible for 
overseeing the structure and efficient operation of government 
organisations but, prior to Nakasone taking up the position of 
Director General (Gyôsei Kanhchô) , had little appreciable effect in 
the carrying out of these duties^.
Nakasone’s appointment, however, coincided with PM Suzuki’s wish 
to consolidate the support of the business sector for the LDP by 
tackling the reform of government bodies in a manner which would 
avoid the need to raise taxation. The official endorsement of the 
principle of ‘administrative reform’ of the Suzuki government thus 
gave Nakasone the opportunity, as the new Cabinet minister 
responsible for such reform, to establish a power base from which 
to launch a future campaign to  secure the Prime Ministership. As 
James Elliott put it “Although able and one of the most senior LDP 
politicians, he (Nakasone) had failed to become Prime Minister. He 
thought the reform efforts would prove he was not just a ‘political 
weathervane’ and would give him the necessary ‘thick pipeline’ to 
the business leadership”io.
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Under the mantle of the Suzuki administration’s pledge to reform 
the structure of public sector organisations Nakasone therefore 
nailed his colours to the mast of making inroads into the level of 
government subsidies which were a major burden on the state’s 
finance. Under his auspices, a Bill to establish the Second Ad Hoc 
Administrative Reform Commission (Daini Rinji Gyôsei Chôsakai) 
was approved by the Cabinet within four months of the 
establishment of the Suzuki Government, and passed by the Upper 
House of the Diet on 28 November IBSOn.
This Second Commission (the Second Rinchô) on Administrative 
Reform began its deliberations in March 198112 charged with the 
duty of coming up with proposals to improve the national 
administrative and finance systems in order that the public sector 
finances be rehabilitated. In this context the JNR had, at the time, 
the dubious double honour of being a constituent of what were 
commonly referred to as the San Kôsha (the JNR, NTT, and the 
Tobacco and Salt Monopoly)^ 3 as well as of the Three K’si^. The 
other two K’s were the government’s system for subsidising 
uneconomic domestic rice cultivation (Kome), and the national 
health service (Kenkô Hoken) . As a group, the Three K’s were seen
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as the critical factors in the national financing deficit, and as the 
areas of public subsidy which Nakasone would seek to reduce.
Government spending on welfare had risen sharply in the 1970s, 
reflecting the Increased needs of an aging population and also 
measures taken to improve benefits In medical care and state 
pensions. The commitment to supporting the country’s symbolic, i f 
uneconomic, rice farmers also put a rising burden on public sector 
finances. These two areas of government expenditure met with 
considerable criticism from the business sector which saw the 
rising public sector deficit as a major barrier to national economic 
growth! 5. As such, the opposition to the government’s policy on 
public sector spending marked a revisionist attitude to the welfare  
society approach which had begun with the post War SCAP 
démocratisation ideology.
The Kome and Kenkô K’s, however, also had entrenched support 
groups which made the task of reversing established policies a 
less than easy task even for the ‘reformist’ Suzuki administration. 
The welfare system was faced with the practical problem of the 
upwardly changing age structure of the population, and there was
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substantial criticism ie from the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
supported by the political opposition in the National Diet - to 
proposals which were viewed as taking Japan back in time to more 
harsh social conditions. The opposition to changes in the subsidy 
system for rice growing was also vociferous and, more 
importantly, politically strong. The opposition was based on the 
significance of the tradition of rice cultivation, and its  
fundamental position in Japanese culture. It was, moreover, 
backed by an agricultural lobby represented by the Nörin Zoku 
(agricultural specialists) in the Diet of crucial importance to the 
Liberal Democratic Party which formed the government. The LDP 
was then, as now, heavily dependent on rural supportiv, and its  
policies of substantial financial aid for agriculture were crucial to 
its electoral results. The government was therefore fully aware 
that any radical alteration to the mutually beneficial system of 
rice subsidisation could be very damaging to its political power.
The difficulty of making Inroads into spending on health and on the 
agricultural sector would have been less significant had it been 
the case that increasing the level of business and personal 
taxation was a straightforward alternative form of government
345
Tfunding. Resistance to higher corporate taxation was, however, 
strong, and was backed by the government’s natural antipathy to 
what would have been a reversal of the LDP’s intrinsic policy of 
supporting the business sector as the engine of economic growth. 
The general public were also, not unnaturally, against an increased 
burden of personal taxation, particularly in the form of the LDP 
government’s proposal to levy an indirect consumption taxis. 
Attempts to force through the Diet an increase in the corporate tax 
rate in the 1981 budget, in fact, foundered in the face of 
Opposition party hostility, and the intended consumption tax was 
not introduced until 1989 - and even then at the rate of 3% rather 
than the 5% sales tax originally proposedis.
In the absence of political freedom to levy higher taxes to balance 
the public sector budget, the onus was on the government, and 
particularly on the AMA of Nakasone Yasuhiro to  devise policies 
which would succeed in cutting government expenditure. As has 
been seen, however, even this approach faced practical 
difficulties, there being little support for it either in the 
bureaucracy, whose position of autonomy was in jeopardy, or
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amongst politicians who feared that cuts in financial support for 
the public sector would threaten a loss of votes from a disaffected 
electorate.
The Suzuki administration was thus faced with bureaucratic and 
Diet resistance (from both its own party, the LDP, and the main 
opposition party, the Socialists) to proposals which had negative 
implication for the vested interests which supported the 
established political system in Japan. The establishment of the 
Second Rinchô in April 1981 was therefore in a climate of 
opposition to measures which would have achieved Nakasone 
Yasuhiro’s aim of cutting government subsidies. For that reason 
the character of the Daini Rinchô was shaped in a way far removed 
from the original concept of reforming the government sector to 
remove the undemocratic excesses of unaccountable power and of 
bureaucratic influence20. instead, with pragmatism becoming the 
watchword of the administrative reform policy, it developed with  
a mind to what was realistically achievable, in order that its  
proponents could still take from it some sense of achievement, one 
which would still mollify the Japanese electorate.
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The Organisation of the Second Rinchô
On behalf of Nakasone Yasuhiro, the Director General of the AMA,
PM Suzuki appointed DokôToshio2i to Chair the Second Commission 
on Administrative Reform (the Daini Rinchô ). Dokô, by then in his 
80s, was President of the Keidanren (Federation of Economic 
Organisations) and had been a successful businessman in his own 
right. He brought to the Daini Rinchô a telling conviction that a 
wide ranging administrative reform of central and local 
government organisations was possible without the need to raise 
taxation, and particularly that improved state financing could be 
achieved while avoiding an increased tax burden on the business 
sector.
Under Dokô’s Chairmanship22, the Second Rinchô comprised 8 
members chosen from the business sector, the bureaucracy, the 
labour movement, academia, and journalism. Reflective of the 
policies of the LDP administration which appointed it, the  
membership was leaned towards conservative interests, the three 
business and two civil service representatives, together with a 
Journalist from a right wing newspaper (the Nikkei Shinbun ), 
outweighing the two labour union delegates23.
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The Initial brief given by government to the Second RInchô (often 
referred to as the Dokô Rinchô ) was to concentrate on the 
financial aspects of administrative reform, and to report in haste 
on proposals to effect substantial cutbacks in public sector 
spending24. This it did in a mere four months, its First Report 
being submitted to the government in July 1981; It called for 
emergency surgery in the form of cuts in central government 
welfare spending, in local authority services, and in subsidies to 
be made with immediate effect25. its recommendations were 
accepted in outline by the Cabinet and passed into law by the Diet 
in November 1981 in time to be incorporated in the government’s 
1982 financial budget.
The short term concentration of the Second Rinchô was therefore 
on measures to resolve the Government’s budgetary problems. This 
preoccupation with economic realities need not have involved the 
Rinchô in any conflict with the ideological core of the 
administrative reform movement. In practice, however, as the 
Rinchô deliberations progressed the focus of the activities of the 
Administrative Reform Commission moved away from the broad 
principles of breaking down the power of the bureaucracy and of
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promoting a more open style of government towards the singular 
objective of ‘repairing’ the national finances through a 
restructuring of the public corporations.
That this was so reflected the real practical problems encountered 
by the Dokd Rinchd in dealing with the entrenched position of the 
bureaucracy in the Japanese political process, a battle which, as 
outlined above and in Chapterl, had also been lost by the Allied 
Occupation SCAP administration. The change in emphasis was also, 
significantly, a recognition by Nakasone Yasuhiro that he was not 
able to ‘deliver’ - because of entrenched political opposition - the  
promise that as Director General of the AMA he would break down 
the system of public subsidies which, in particular, supported the 
social welfare payments, and those made to preserve the country’s 
uneconomic rice productlon26. Nakasone instead required, to 
satisfy the electorate, another target for the administrative 
reform policies, and he realised that If the Rinchd could succeed 
in devising firm recommendations for a far-reaching 
reorganisation of the three main public corporations (the San 
Kdsha ) it would still attain considerable political credit. A 
resolution of the operational inefficiencies inherent in the
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operation of the San Kôsha , and therefore of their financing 
‘difficulties’, was therefore identified as a potential 
accomplishment which would earn Nakasone plaudits as the 
policies’ architect27.
It should be noted that two out of three public corporations 
involved - NTT and the Tobacco and Salt Corporation - actually 
remained in profit up to the time of their privatisation (in April 
1985), and their financial reform might therefore still be seen as 
an insufficient explanation for the ‘new’ motivation of the Second 
Rinchô. A critical extra objective for the new ‘administrative 
reform’ policies was, however, provided by the identification of 
the labour unions in the public sector, whose conclusive decline in 
influence could be achieved by the privatisation of the San Kôsha . 
The eventual accomplishment of the San Kôsha privatisation 
policies would thus mark, in itself, a political ‘success’ from 
which its proponents (Nakasone Yasuhiro in particular) could take 
credit not only for a ‘solution’ to the outstanding financial 
problems but also for the breaking of the ‘radical’ public 
corporation labour unions28.
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The redefinition of the priorities amongst the original objectives 
for the Second Rinchô was not an overt political process, but signs 
of the changed aims were apparent even from the constitution of 
the Administrative Reform Commission in its initial year of 
operation29. As already outlined, the Rinchô activities had begun 
with the urgent task of recommending short term policies to help 
repair the finances of central government, which it had 
accomplished in its First Report in July 1981. For its  
deliberations the Dokô Rinchô established a Committee structure, 
comprising a Technical Sub-Committee to focus on the broader 
issues of government administration, and two Special Sub­
committees (Chaired respectively by Kamei Masao - President of 
Sumitomo Electric Corporation - and by Professor Katô Hiroshi30 of 
Keio University) to deal with the government’s budgeting system, 
and with increasing the efficiency of the operation of the public 
sector.
The foundation of these Committees was still consistent with the 
areas of responsibility laid down on the setting up of the Second 
Rinchô. The framework began to change, however, with a 
restructuring of its Committee organisation by the Rinchô Members
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in September 1981. This took place shortly after the delivery to 
government of its First Report, and resulted in the replacement of 
the previous Committees by four new Sub-Committees whose 
responsibilities were as follows:
The First Sub-Committee: The Ideology of Government 
Administration
The Second Sub-Committee: The Organisation and Structure of 
Government Administration
The Third Sub-Committee: The Division of Administrative 
Functions between Central and Local Governments
The Fourth Sub-Committee: The Three Public Corporations (the 
San Kôsha ) and other National Enterprises
In its reorganised state, the composition of the Rinchô Committee 
structure began to move away from the broader initial aims of the 
administrative reform movement3i. From the establishment of the 
new Sub-Committee system the star of the public corporation 
reform issue (as evaluated by the Fourth Sub-Committee) waxed 
steadily brighter while that of the three other topics (involving 
the wider examination of government administration) waned 
almost to invisibility.
A significant factor in this covert change in the influence of the 
Rinchô deliberations on the issues with which it had been given
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responsibility by government was the recognition of the continuing 
power of the bureaucratic establishment (notably In MITI and the 
Ministry of Finance). Nevertheless, that problem was not a 
significant impediment to the public corporation considerations of 
the Fourth Sub-Committee, which was dealing with weaker 
Ministries - those of Posts and Telecommunications and Transport. 
The later positive role of the Ministry of Transport (MoT) in the 
JNR privatisation process is further examined in this Chapter In 
the analysis of the ‘main players’ in the implementation of the 
reform policies. In any case, it can be stated here that the MoT’s 
then position (in the 1981 - 82 period) of opposition to the JNR 
reform proposals was not, because of the Ministry’s low status in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy, a major hindrance to the activities of 
the Fourth Sub-Committee which was addressing the Issue of the 
restructuring the San Kdsha 32,
JNR Restructuring - The First Phase
The Rinchd Fourth Sub-Committee was appointed to address the 
specific issue of the ‘problem’ of the three public corporations, 
and its membership was as selective as had been the Second Rinchd 
Itself. In Its Chair was Kat6 Hiroshi, the former Chairman of the
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Second Special Sub-Committee which met between April and 
August 1981. Under Katô’s jurisdiction sat Deputies Sumita Shôji 
(former Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Transport) and Iwamura 
Seiichi (representing the Yomiuri Shinbun Research Foundation) 
and a membership and advisory personnel whose collective 
leanings were positive to the public corporation privatisation 
proposals33. These pro-privatisation views were reinforced in 
Committee hearings in which expert witnesses attested to the 
failings in particular of the JNR. The most prominent of these 
‘independent’ observers - and an individual who had an Important 
bearing on the process by which the plan to privatise the JNR 
moved from the drawing board to reality - was Kakumoto Ryôhei, 
whose opinions on the short sightedness of the JNR senior 
management and on the need to rationalise its freight business 
have already been documented In this study34.
Kakumoto’s contribution to the debate was directly reflected i n 
the Report recommending a definite schedule for the restructuring 
of the JNR which the Fourth Sub-Committee submitted to the 
Second RInchô in April 1982. In it was the proposal that the JNR 
should be divided into sectional companies in preparation for its
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privatisation. Urgent measures for the stabilisation of the JNR’s 
financial position, such as reviewing the corporation’s capital 
investment and putting a stop on ail new recruitment of staff, 
were to be implemented immediately. It further recommended that 
the privatisation proposals be produced in concrete form by the 
establishment of a JNR Reform Commission with a status as a 
Shingikai 35 (Deliberation Council) at least comparable to that of 
the Rinchô itself.
The Fourth Sub-Committee’s recommendations were embodied in 
the overall Third or Basic Report of its Recommendations which 
was issued by the Second Rinchô on 30 July 198236. While this 
Report did not specifically mention the break-up of the JNR, it  
gave official confirmation of the Rinchô’s firm recommendation 
for the policy of privatising the national railway37. As had been 
proposed by Its Fourth Sub-Committee the privatisation plans were 
to be produced in a form which could be enacted In legislation by a 
new JNR Reform Supervisory Commission (Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri 
linkai) .
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The government responded quickly to the Rincho Basic Report, the 
Cabinet forming a Preparatory Office for the Establishment of the 
JNR Reform Commission (Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri linkai Junbi 
Shitsu) on 27 August 1982. This Office consisted of thirteen 
members of the bureaucracy, a majority representing the Ministry 
of Transport. Its deliberations led directly to the announcement, 
on 24 September 1982, of the government’s firm plans (Gydkaku 
Taikd) to realise the reconstruction of the JNR within five
years38.
On 1 November 1982, the LDP In general meeting (Somukai) 
approved the resulting draft Bill (Saiken H6an) for the Special Law 
for the Promotion of JNR Business Rehabilitation (Kokuyu Tetsudo 
Saiken Kanri linkai Sechi Ho), which incorporated the measures for 
the establishment of the JNR Reform Commission. The Reform Bill 
was then given formal sanction by the Cabinet on 19 November 
1982, and the government’s proposals presented, for the firs t  
time, in Committee (Unyu linkai) to the Diet39.
Despite the mechanics for Its establishment having thus been 
prepared by November 1982 the JNR Reform Commission was not
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itself formally ratified until May 1983. In the interim, PM Suzuki 
had resigned unexpectedly (on 12 October 1982) and was replaced a 
month later by Nakasone Yasuhiro. Although Nakasone 
immediately, in his new position as Prime Minister, repeated his 
commitment to the administrative reform policies he had 
championed while the director General of the Administrative 
Management Agency, the formation of a new administration 
effectively delayed the introduction of new legislation. The 
legislative programme of the 98th Diet was further impeded by 
further consideration of the so-called ‘Lockheed Scandal’ Involving 
former PM Tanaka Kakuei, and, consequently, it took until 13 May 
198340 for the Special Law for the Promotion of JNR Business 
Rehabilitation (KokuyCt Tetsudô Saiken Kanri linkai Sechi Ho) to be 
voted through the Upper House of the Diet.
Nevertheless, the new Commission was then formulated w ith  
alacrity, beginning its deliberations on 10 June 1983. Thereafter, 
the new JNR Reform Commission became the key organisation i n 
the national railway privatisation process. It took over the reform 
proposals of the Second RInchô which had been disbanded on 15 
March 1983, Its task far from complete if measured against the
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public’s initial expectations and, indeed, against its Chairman Dokô 
Toshio’s philosophy of reducing bureaucratic power and influence 
in the political system^i. The Rinchô’s narrower target of 
privatising the public corporations was now the real focus of the 
administrative reform movement, and the break-up of the JNR its  
core - to be carried through by means of firm proposals from the 
JNR Reform Commission.
The Main Players in the JNR Reform Process
The process of the establishment of the Second Rinchô, its  
deliberations and findings, and its replacement by the JNR Reform 
Commission charged with the duty of producing concrete proposals 
for the privatisation of the JNR is shown in Figure I. This, in fact, 
shows the entire chronology of the administrative reform  
programme from its broad initial principles of 1980/81 to its  
more prosaic achievements of 1984- 86. It thereby illustrates  
the transformation of what began as an ideologically driven policy 
initiative to effect a wide-ranging reform of those public sector 
organisations which continued to exercise political power without 
accountability, to a narrow - but achievable - strategy of targeting 
San Kôsha for privatisation. Central to that metamorphosis in
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government policy was the JNR, the Kôsha which offered up the 
tantalising prospect of reform ‘against the odds’.
The chronology thus covers the development of the administrative 
reform policies from the general to the particular, and outlines the 
process by which the JNR reconstruction proposals took shape, and 
were finally enacted in November 1986 to effect the national 
railway’s dissolution and privatisation. However, even if the 
timetable illustrates that the administrative reform programme 
obtained its justification though the achievement of less exalted 
targets than the initial aims of making government organisations 
more accountable to the people and more efficient in operation, the 
chronology on its own does not explain how the JNR privatisation 
policy itself was accomplished. In particular, it does not explain 
how an initiative to reform the national railway succeeded in the 
face of opposition from the JNR executive and labour unions, both 
anxious to preserve their respective ‘empires’, from the Ministry 
of Transport determined to maintain its sphere of influence on 
national transport matters, and from Members of Parliament of 
both left and right wing parties to whom national railway policy 
was an opportunity to secure political advantage.
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F i g u r e  I
P R O C E S S  OF  J N R  R E F O R M  -  T H E  R O L E  OF T H E  K E Y  P A R T I C I P A N T S
1980 1981
GOVERNMENT
Cabinet Approval On 
Law Concerning 
Establishment Of 
Ad Hoc Commission 
[’ Rincho Setchi Ho' ] 
(■ 80.10.24)
PM Appoints 
Doko As 
Chairman Of 
Rincho 
C81.3.16)
COMMITTEES
DIET
4 Requests From Doko To PM Suzuki Upon 
Taking the Chairman's Post 
(81.3. II)
- Recovery Of State Finance Without 
Tax Hikes
- Elimination Of Debt In 3Ks (Kokutetsu. 
Kome [Rice] And Kenko Hoken [Health 
Insurance])
- Administrative Reform In Central And 
Local Governments
- Guarantee For Implementation Of Proposals 
Included In Reports
Law Concerning Establishment Of 
Ad Hoc Commission Passes 
('80.11.28. 93)
Second Ad Hoc Commission On Submission Of Do
Administrative Reform First Report
[’ Rincho’ ] (Urgent Measures) (’
(’81.3. 16) (’81.7.10) -
M 0 T
JNR
Draft of JNR Management Improvement Plan [Keiei Kaizen Keikaku] 
('81.4.1)
- Plan Based On JNR Reconstruction Law [’Tokubetsu Sochi Ho' ]
- Features Specific Achievement Targets 
For Each Fiscal Year
- Called 'The Last Resort’ Plan
LDP Political Affairs Research Committee 
Transport Section’s Subcommittee On 
JNR Reform Holds First Meeting 
[’Mitsuzuka Sho linkai;’
Mitsuzuka Committee]
(’ 82. 2.5)
OPPOSITION
UNIONS

1982 1983
Formation Of Nakasone Cabinet 
(■ 82.11.27)
izuki Submission Of 
Second Report 
(• 82. 2.10)
Fourth Section Submits 
Report On 3 Pubiic 
Corporations Etc. To 
the Commission 
(’ 82. 5.17)
Submission Of 
Third Report 
(Basic Proposais) 
(• 82.7. 30)
- Proposai For 
Privatisation 
And Division
DokO'Nakasone Meeting 
(83.2.9)
- Ensure ’ Recovery Of 
State Finance Without 
Tax Hikes’
Finai Report From 
Second Rincho 
(’ 83. 3.14)
- PM Expresses 
’Full Respect’
To Its Proposals
Ministry Of Transport’s Proposal [’Kosaka Shian 1 
(’ 82. 4. 23)
- Transport Minister Kosaka’s 
Proposal
- Reported In Asahi Shinbun
Mitsuzuka Committee 
(’ 82. 6. 25) , ,
- Theory Of The Exit [’Deguchi Ron J
Tetsuro And Doro Agree To 
Revised Genba Kyogl Seldo 
[Workplace Practices]; 
Kokuro Does Not Accept 
The New System 
(’ 82.12.1)
1983 1984
GOVERNMENT
PM Nakasone Discusses 
JNR Reform At Press 
Conference 
(■ 85.1. 6)
C 0 ^ W I ^ E E S
Establishment Of 
JNR Reform Commission 
[' Kokutetsu Saiken 
Kanri linkai’ ]
(’ 83. 6.10)
JNR Reform Commission 
Submits Emergency 
Proposal To Divide And 
Privatise JNR 
[Dai Ni Ji Kinkyu Teigen] 
(' 84. 8. 10)
DIET
Bill Concerning Ad Hoc Measures On 
Promoting Reconstruction Of JNR 
Passes
[’ Rinj i Sochi Ho’ ]
(’ 83. 5. 13. 98)
- Bill To Establish JNR Reform Commission
- Not Determined Whether Privatisation And 
Division Are a Precondition
5 Laws On 3 Laws On
JT Pass NTT Pass
(’84.8.3. 101) (’84.12.20. 102)
Abandonment Of 
JNR Freight System 
(’ 84. 2. 1)
MoT Minister Hosoda 
Discusses Division Of 
JNR At Press Conference 
(’ 84.10.19)
JNR Announces Own Ref on 
Plan [Keiei Kaikaku No 
Kihon Hosaku]
(’ 85.1.10)
M 0 T
JNR
NTT. JT Begin Operation 
(’ 85.4.1)
LDP
Transport Section/Mitsuzuka Committee 
(’ 85.1. 23)
- Last Meeting Held
OPPOSITION
UNIONS
Tetsuro Announces 
’Opinions And Proposals On 
JNR Reconstruction’ [Kokutetsu 
Keiei Saiken Ni Kansuru Iken 
To Teigen] (’84.6.26)
SDP Announces Draft Of Their 
Reform Plan [’Kokutetsu Kaikaku An] 
(’84.8.9. Finalised On ’86.3.6)
Source:Adapted from data in Rincho GyOkakushin OB Kai(Formerly Members of the Second Ad Hoc Commisa 
Nihon 0 Kaeta Jyunen: RinchO To GyOkakushin(The Decade That Changed Japan; The Second Ad Hoc 
1991. p. 1007-1040. Kdtsu Tokei Kenkyujyo(Institute of Transportation Statistics). KOtsu To I 
Kaikaku No Seika To Genkai(Political Process of Privatisation: Achievements and Limitation 
p. 240. 249.
1985 1986
cusses Cabinet Approval On Basic Policy Cabinet Approval On Measures Cabinet Approval On 1
ress For JNR Reform (’85.10.11) Concerning Management Of - 5 Laws Relating To JNR
[’ Kihonteki Hoshin’ ] JNR’s Long-term Liabilities Reform (’ 86. 2. 28)
- Division And Privatisation (’ 86. 1. 28) - 3 Laws Relating To JNR
Of JNR into 6 Passenger 
Companies
[Kokutetsu Choki Saimu To 
No Shori Hosaku Ni Tsuite]
Reform (’ 86. 3. 14)
- Scheduled For ’87.4.1
JNR Reform Commission Submits Finai 
Report
- Opinions On JNR Reform 
(For the Future Of Raiiways) 
[Kokutesu Kaikaku Ni Kansuru 
Iken]
(• 85. 7. 26)
Submission Of
- 5 Laws On JNR Reform 
(’86.3.3. 104)
- 3 Laws On JNR Reform House Of Represen
(’86.3.18. 104) Special Commil
Diet Session Ends Kaikaku TokubI
Before Passing (’86.9.25. -
(’86.5.21) House Of Counci ill
Bill Dropped Due To Special Commi]
Dissolution Of Lower House (’86.10.30 - 
(’86.6.2. 105)
Resubmission Of 8 Bills 
(’86.9.11. 107)
es Own Reform 
Kaikaku No 
u]
in Operation
20 Reformists Wi thin 
JNR Management Send 
’What We Think About 
■JNR Reform’ [Kokutetsu 
Kaiaku No Tame Ni Wareware 
Wa Tsugi No Yoni Kangaeru]
- To Mitsuzuka (’85.6.14)
- To Kamei (’85.6. 16)
JNR President Changes 
From Nisugi To Sugiura 
(’ 85. 6. 24)
Mitsuzuka Becomes 
MoT Minister 
(’ 85. 12. 28 
- ’86.7.21)
Commi t tee Election Of Both Houses (’86.7.6)
- LDP’s Historical Landslide Victory
- House Of Representatives: 304 Seats [0| 
House Of Councillors: 74 Seats 
[Out Of 126 Seats Reelected; Total. 14|
An]
Declaration On Cooperative 
Labour Relations Between 
Management And Tetsuro. 
Doro And Zenshiro 
[Roshi Kyodo Sengen]
(’ 86. 1. 13)
Kokuro Holds Special 
Decides To Oppose 
(• 86.10. 9 - 10)
Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform and the Ad Hoc Council on Promotion of Administrative Reform), ed. 
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Reform (’86.2.28)
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Reform (’ 86. 3. 14)
1987
Cabinet Approvai On 
Removal Of Freeze On 
Construction Of 
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Submission Of
- 5 Laws On JNR Reform 
(’86.3.3. 104)
- 3 Laws On JNR Reform 
(’86.3.18. 104)
Diet Session Ends 
Before Passing 
(’ 86. 5.21)
Bill Dropped Due To
House Of Representatives
Special Committee On JNR [Kokutetsu 
Kaikaku Tokubetsu linkai]
(’86.9.25. - 10.24)
House Of Counci 1lors
Special Committee On JNR
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Operation 
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Election Of Both Houses (’86.7.6)
- LDP’s Historical Landslide Victory
- House Of Representatives: 304 Seats [Out Of 512] 
House Of Councillors: 74 Seats
[Out Of 126 Seats Reelected: Total. 140 Out Of 252]
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Labour Relations Between 
Management And Tetsuro, 
Doro And Zenshiro 
[Roshi Kyodo Sengen]
(’ 86. 1. 13)
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(’ 86.10. 9 - 10)
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To accomplish this task, the chronology must be supplemented by 
an analysis of the role of the ‘main players’ in the JNR reform 
process, in order that an adequate appreciation be obtained of the 
significance of the ultimate accomplishment of the division and 
privatisation of the national railway as a policy which set its face 
against so many vested interest groups in Japan.
The description of the chronology of the privatisation process has, 
so far, paused at the juncture in which the Second Rinchô was 
replaced by the newly appointed JNR Reform Commission. The 
decision to select that particular event as a break-point in the 
discussion of the process of restructuring the national railway 
reflects the significance of the approval of the National Diet (in 
May 1983) for the establishment of a government appointed 
committee (the JNR Reform Commission) to carry forward the 
reform proposals42. Not only had the Diet vote, through the 
democratic parliamentary process, officially sanctioned the 
government’s plans to privatise the San Kôsha , the Japanese 
Parliament had accepted that the mechanics of the division and 
privatisation of the national railway would, from then on, be 
devised by an unelected body responsible only to the Cabinet.
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It is therefore pertinent to take the timing of the formation of the 
JNR Reform Commission as a specific point in the national railway 
reform process - the end of the first phase of the reconstruction 
of the JNR - to examine the position to that date of the various 
participants in the drama.
The JNR Mainstream Position
It might be said that the party with the greatest direct interest in 
the Rinchô discussions was the JNR itself. As it became clear 
that administrative reform in the wider sense had become a lost 
cause, that the real target was to privatise the San Kôsha and 
that, in particular, it was proposed that only the JNR of the three 
public corporations was to be broken up, the JNR executive had to 
come to terms with the increasing reality of its impending 
dissolution and privatisation. This realisation was, however, slow 
in dawning in the JNR Boardroom, the Directors of the national 
railway having shown a high degree of complacency and lack of 
concern about the threat which the establishment of the Second 
Rinchô might have for the JNR’s continuing existence's.
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The ‘official’ pre-Rinch6 JNR approach to the required 
reorganisation of its activities was contained in its Management 
Improvement Plan (Keiei Kaizen Keikaku) prepared as a constituent 
of the JNR Reconstruction Act (Kokutetsu Keiei Saiken Sokushin 
Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) of December 1980. While acquiring from the 
LDP the nickname of the “Ato no Nai Keikaku’' (The Plan With No 
Successor) this plan was voted into legislation by the Diet and was 
officially approved by the Ministry of Transport in May 198144.
The Management Improvement Plan - which reflected the JNR 
Board’s wish to secure the retention of the national railway as a 
single, nationwide corporation - was thus, at the time of the 
commencement of the deliberations of the Second Rincho, official 
policy not only of the JNR but also of the MoT and the government. 
Given the legislative framework of the time, therefore, the JNR 
Board’s relative complacency might be understood more clearly, 
particularly as even the Rinchd’s First Report (the Emergency 
Proposals of July 1981) dealt with the national railway only at the 
conceptual leveKs and were still consistent with the JNR as a 
continuing national operation.
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The sum of the position of the mainstream JNR executive was then, 
as the Second Rinchô began to examine the prospects of achieving 
‘administrative reform’, that the state railway should be 
maintained as a national organisation and, moreover, that the 
Board could counter any restructuring proposals with the support 
of the LDP Diet membership to whom the continuance of the system 
of ‘mutual benefits’ from the operation of the JNR was so 
beneficial.
The complacency of this standpoint was first exposed, not by the 
Rinchô proposals - which took another year to crystallise into 
their ‘divide and privatise’ form - but by internal dissension 
within the JNR itself. The effect of development of a pro-reform  
movement in the national railway executive was, moreover, 
augmented subsequently by a change in the official LDP position 
towards the restructuring of the JNR, and by the impact on public 
opinion of the appearance of administrative reform - and 
particularly of ‘JNR reform’ - as a high profile topic for discussion 
in the mass media. In the period from mid 1981, the climate in 
which the Rinchô was conducting its investigations into the 
restructuring of government organisations thus changed
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imperceptibly towards a pro-reform ‘consensus’, such that its  
Basic Proposals of July 1982 that the JNR should be not only 
privatised but broken up could be made secure against the 
continuing opposition of the JNR Board, its labour unions, the 
Ministry of Transport, and the Opposition parties in the Diet^e.
The San Nin Gumi
The growing pro-reform grouping was spearheaded by the 
establishment, albeit unofficially, of a group inside the JNR 
management which took a positive line on the embryonic plans to 
divide up the national railway and recreate it as a group of 
privatised enterprises. The starting point for the development of 
the pro JNR reform ideas was reconsideration by JNR managers of 
the corporation’s 1 980 Management Improvement Plan, which had 
proposed the rationalisation of unprofitable lines and the 
imposition of substantial cuts in the national railway’s labour 
force in order to restore the JNR trunk line operation to 
profitability by fiscal 198547. Taking the view that the 
Management Improvement Plan would not deal with what was 
considered to be a key issue in the national railway, that of the 
position of the labour unions, and mindful that it had in any case
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been dubbed the JNR’s Last Plan - or the Plan With No Successor - a 
group of managers inside the JNR began to examine alternative  
means of reforming the national railway's.
The core of the pro-reform faction inside the JNR was a group of 
three national railway executives who later collectively became 
known as the San Nin Gumi (Group of Three). Their formation as a 
pressure group to question the status-quo position of the JNR 
Board of Directors has no formal starting date but their activities  
are thought to have commenced in mid- 1  98149. The San Nin Gumi 
‘Membership’ comprised Ide Masataka, Matsuda Masatake, and Kasai 
Takayukiso, who were all mid-ranking managers - below main 
Board level - of the JNR. Although lower in rank than those holding 
the status quo position in the JNR hierarchy, their ‘courage’ in 
stating non-establishment views might have alerted the Board of 
the national railway to the fact that there was a growing band of 
people who favoured a more radical solution than the ‘mainstream’ 
management to the problems of the JNR. The following is a quote 
from a former JNR management executive on the atmosphere 
within the JNR at the time of the setting-up of the San Nin Gumi , 
and the promotion of a pro-JNR reform cause.
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Senior managers in the JNR head office met at that time and 
unofficially discussed how JNR should cope with the Second 
Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform, During the 
meeting, people who were In charge of management plans and 
accounting at that time proposed to ‘first, abolish the public 
corporation, Japanese National Railways, and form a new 
organisation. Dismiss all the staff, carry out a large cutback 
In the number of personnel, and reduce the number of s ta ff 
needed. Employ only the people who are cooperative to the 
company,’ At that time, there was no explanation about what 
to do with the national railway’s finance.
Certain management members present at the meeting 
insisted that the proposal was abrupt and bore no relation to 
the Internal discussions beforehand, that the plan was an 
effective bankruptcy of the JNR and that it would involve 
unfair labour practices. Nevertheless, the group which 
proposed that idea did not listen to these opinions, and le ft  
their seats after a short time. They had made a declaration 
rather than a proposal.
After this, there were no organised, calm discussions within  
the JNR concerning what the future national railway should 
be like. During the remainder of the debate on the 
reorganisation of the JNR, dialogue between the pro and anti 
reform factions in the national railway management was 
conspicuous by its absence. Instead, both sides enlisted the 
support of other forces - including politicians, members of 
the Second Rinchô, and Ministry of Transport officials - to 
further their positionssi.
A balanced analysis of the principles of the JNR pro-reform group 
is complicated by the subjective nature of the views of the 
protagonists52 m the debate about the reconstruction of the 
national railway. There was a genuine perception amongst the JNR 
reformers of the likely failure of the internal Management Plan to
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ensure the JNR’s rehabilltationsa, and a belief that division and 
privatisation of the national railway was the only route to its  
salvation. There was also, nevertheless, a self-interested element 
in the pro-reform view, one which saw privatisation as the way to 
secure career advancements^ for those who advocated and 
supported such a policy initiative. In this sense, self-interest was 
a factor influencing both the JNR pro-reformers and the status-quo 
group in the national railway management, the latter believing that 
the preservation of the national railway as a nationwide public 
sector organisation was a necessary pre-requisite for the 
protection of their career position and status in the railway 
management hierarchyss
The LDP Mitsuzuka Sub-C om m ittee
There were two additional factors during 1981 - 82 which helped 
promote the reform proposals, and which further undermined the 
resistance to change in the method of running public sector bodies 
in Japan. The first, involving an important group which, in the past 
had resisted any moves to change the status quo, was the LDP party 
machinery. Nominally participants in the government which was 
proposing the administrative reforms, the LDP Diet
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representatives, as individuals, instead benefitted greatly from 
the maintenance of the existing political system. Within this 
framework the operation of the JNR, with its benign relationships 
amongst the railway management. Diet politicians, and railway 
construction and supply companiesse was the epitome of the 
Japanese public sector system of ‘vested interests’. The prospect 
of any disturbance to such a modus operandi was viewed, not 
surprisingly, with hostility by those to whom the benefits accrued, 
and not least so by the LDP members57. it was therefore an 
unexpected development in the administrative reform debate that 
the LDP’s JNR Restructuring Sub-Committee (Kokutetsu Saiken ni 
Kan Sum Shô linkai) , formed in February 1982 to examine the 
issue from the Party’s viewpoint, came to conclusions at variance 
with the prevailing mainstream LDP opposition to radical change in 
the method of operation of the national railway.
The LDP Sub-Committee was also known as the Mitsuzuka Sub­
committee, a reflection of the status of its Chairman, Mitsuzuka 
Hiroshiss, Mitsuzuka was the Transport Affairs Section Chief of 
the Policy Affairs Research Council (Seichôkai) within the LDP 
hierarchy, and was later (in December 1985)- in reward for his
369
efforts to promote the reform of the JNR - to be appointed Minister 
of Transport by PM Nakasoness. His ‘Mitsuzuka sub-Committee’ 
was initially set up by the LDP to represent the party’s own 
position on the administrative reform debate , and as a 
countervailing force against the Second Rinchô. The Mitsuzuka Sub­
committee, however, surprised both its own political party and the 
opponents of the public sector restructuring who thought of it as a 
potential ally, by taking a line independent of the LDP, and one 
which served to reinforce the Rinchô opinions on JNR reform.
The report of its findings, containing proposed measures for the 
restructuring of the JNR , was issued in June 1982. In reality not 
particularly radical per se, the Sub-Committee’s Exit Theory 
(Deguchi Ron) as it became known, recommended systematic 
changes in the JNR structure only if it were to be the case that the 
Management Improvement Plan was proved to have failed60. Even 
though it thus stopped short of open advocacy of the JNR’s division 
and privatisation, however, the Deguchi Ron 6i stance was s till 
sufficient, in that it represented what purported to be a ‘new’ and 
independent view from within the hitherto anti-reform LDP, to 
help further fragment opposition to the reconstruction plans.
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A significant factor in the deliberations of the Mitsuzuka Sub­
committee was its unofficial links with the JNR San Nin Gumi who 
were able to provide it with direct evidence of what were deemed 
to be shortcomings in the public corporation management system.
The San Nin Gumi were, at that time, members of a faction within 
the management of the JNR which was led by Nawata Kunitake and 
Ota Tomoyuki, then respectively a JNR Board member (Jomu Ri j i )  
and Staff Relations Department Manager (Shokuin Kyokuchd) . The 
Nawata/Ota group shared the antipathy of the San Nin Gumi 
towards the JNR labour unions, and they saw the Mitsuzuka Sub­
committee as a vehicle for the dissemination of pro-reform and 
anti-labour union views. The San Nin Gumi and Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, 
the LDP Sub-Committee Chairman, had common links with the 
Sendal62 region of Japan, the former all having worked there for 
the JNR Sendai Division, and Mitsuzuka being a Giin (Member of the 
Diet) representing that area.
The contact between the pro-reform group in the national railway 
executive and Mitsuzuka thus added a new dimension to the LDP Sub­
committee’s investigations into the JNR. Through their position
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within the JNR the San Nin Gumi had the means to give Mitsuzuka 
an ‘inside story’ as to how they saw the quality of the JNR’s senior 
management, the state of labour relations in the national railway, 
and the prospect of the existing Board of Directors being able to 
reorganise the JNR through Its Management Improvement Plan.
The Mitsuzuka/San Nin Gumi links were so strong in fact that, 
according to the aforementioned writer llo Jun, the JNR Keiei 
Keikaku Shitsu (the Management Planning Office within the 
national railway) became an unofficial office for the LDP party 
deliberations on the JNR reform issue. Since It had to be kept 
secret, much of the LDP pro-reform JNR discussion took place at 
the Teikoku Hoteru (Imperial Hotel) in Tokyo, from which 
documents were drafted to be used by the Mitsuzuka Sub- 
Committee63.
Through the mechanism of direct contact with acting JNR 
executives with a pro-reform standpoint, the Mitsuzuka Sub­
committee was offered invaluable insights into the running of the 
national railway. There is no doubt that the input of the San Nin 
Gumi was a major influence on the thinking of this LDP Sub-
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Committee, and The Group of Three played a significant part i n 
Mitsuzuka reaching the final conclusion that there were very real 
doubts as to whether the JNR executive could carry out the 
rehabilitation of the national railway operation within the existing 
public corporation structures-^.
The JNR In the Media S p o tlig h t
Despite the intervention of the pro-reform faction within the JNR 
in the findings of the LDP’s Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee, the latter’s 
non-LDP mainstream line would not necessarily have been a crucial 
opinion-forming factor on its own had it not been for the fact that 
its opinions were published at a time coincident with extensive 
coverage of the JNR reform debate in the Japanese mass media.
Through the Spring of 1982, coincident with the Second RInchô and 
Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee deliberations there appeared a stream of 
newspaper and magazine articles and television programmes on the 
subject of the national railway. The JNR as a reform issue had 
become a matter for public debate, which served to bring into the 
open discussion of the problems of the national railway and of the 
potential means of their resolution.
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That there was a growing public mood antagonistic to the existing 
JNR management system which might be galvanised by influential 
newspapers was highlighted by Ishikawa Tatsujiro in February 
1 982. At that time he wrote:
... at the background of such heated discussions concerning 
the proposed forms of management lies the fact that the 
public, impatient with the current impasse in which the JNR 
continually ‘reconstructs its plans’, has taken up the 
alternative method of changing the present system and i s 
inclining towards privatisation and division. Both the labour 
union leaders and the management of the JNR should take 
serious note of this factss.
The role of the mass media - “Creating A Mood for Reform” - in the 
JNR reform process is also discussed extensively in Eunbong Choi’s 
PhD Dissertation, The Break-up and Privatization Policy of the 
Japan National Railways. 1980- 87 . This present study notes her 
comment that “In the JNR reform process, the mass media exerted 
influence over key decision makers and, more broadly, over society 
as a whole. Obviously, the reform headquarters relied on the mass 
media to publicize its cause and arouse the sympathies of the 
public for the JNR’s structural reconstructionee. choi concludes, in 
her section on the importance of the media in furthering the JNR 
reconstruction proposals, that "... the media played a significant 
role in creating a reform mood among the public. It shared with
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the PCAR’s (the Second Rinchô) reform idea and cooperated with 
the reform promoters. As long as the issue was under 
consideration, the mass media had not only benign and indirect 
influence but also strong and surprising power over society and 
politics”67.
In weighing up the influence of views expressed by ‘left wing’ and 
‘right wing’ newspapers in Japan on the deliberations on JNR 
reform, Choi further confirms that while in general most 
Japanese newspapers are sympathetic to labour unions ... In the 
1980s, however, the papers devoted much space to the collapse of 
JNR work discipline and its staggering deficit. In turn, these 
reports increased public concern, and a majority of the population 
then favored reforming the JNR.”68
A review of the significance of the media in the administrative 
reform debate, particularly in the early period of 1982, thus 
confirms that the ‘informing’ of public opinion was a critical 
supplementary factor to reinforce the official Rinchô reports on 
administrative reform. On this matter, moreover, there i s 
evidence from another author, Paul Noguchi who, writing on the
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“One Railroad Family” (Kokutetsu Ikka) , also supports the 
contention that "... the press and other media tend to be highly 
critical of the JNR. In fact, according to some employees at 
“Shiranai Station”, several newspapers have established a 
reputation for being biased against the JNR. One worker i n 
particular remarked that a certain Tokyo daily with a very large 
circulation was unduly critical of Kokutetsu and that I should 
consult this paper if I ‘wanted to find out everything that’s bad 
about the railroad.’”69
Any such assessment of the role of the media in the JNR reform 
process must, of course, include an account of the number of 
articles which appeared in newspapers of differing political 
opinion during the debate on ‘What to do with the National 
Railway’. In this context Choi’s critique (cited above) incorporates 
an analysis of the volume of material published by the major 
Japanese newspapers on the JNR during the reform dispute. While 
it was found that so-called ‘left wing’ papers, such as the Asahi 
Shinbun 70, were also prominent in the production of editorial 
articles on the JNR, the sheer volume of material In Journals 
critical of the JNR was substantially greater^!.
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The leading lights of the JNR administrative reform movement, 
Dokô Toshio, and Katô Hiroshi, were in the vanguard of the use of 
the media to promote the reformist point of view. Thus, as Choi 
states:
...an active reformist, Kato Hiroshi, whose nickname was 
“masukomi kyoju” (Professor Mass Communication), tried to 
provide the public with an easy way to understand the JNR 
issue. He took the initiative to change public opinion to favor 
administrative reform as well as privatization of the 3 
public corporations, including the JNR. He frequently 
appeared on television and wrote summarizing articles of the 
reform headquarter’s reports to explain the rationale behind 
its recommendations. The total number of his interviews and 
articles in newspapers as well as magazines was 60, 42 of 
which were related to the JNR problem, during the period 
between 1981 and 1982.
Of course, Kato Hiroshi was not the only person who went 
public. Many persons concerned with the reform movement, 
both supporters and opponents, also often appeared in the 
media. For instance, Doko Toshio, who was often called “Mr. 
Gyokaku” (Mr. Administrative Reform), showed up in the 
media advocating the administrative reform in general about 
50 times. 72
Prominent in the JNR reform debate in 1981/2 were the Yomiuri 
and the Sankei Shinbun , both of which were in favour of the reform 
of the JNR. Katô Hiroshi is quoted in Choi as stating that "... as 
Sankei Shinbun stood in the vanguard of the public campaign for 
reform by reporting a series of articles criticizing the JNR, other 
newspapers competed against each other for the best report.”73
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This ‘competition’ took the form of finding the most interesting 
way to portray the JNR issue, a task which was more difficult i f 
the ‘no change’ line was taken. The general public in Japan was by 
1982, as already seen, considerably more aware of the issue of JNR 
reform, thanks not only to the express efforts of the Rinchö 
membership but also to the burgeoning volume of material already 
available in the mass media. Views expressed of the need to 
maintain the status-quo in the national railway could easily be 
countered with the reality of the JNR’s financial position, and of 
its ‘problematic’ labour relations. Newspaper stories supporting 
the by then largely discredited JNR Board position (and that of the 
labour unions) were therefore of little journalistic value74. The 
pro-reform stance of the Yomiuri , which had close contacts w ith  
the JNR San Nin Gumi and was supportive of PM Nakasone, and of 
the Sankei 75 thus had considerably greater appeal to the Japanese 
newspaper readership with a normal appetite for ‘interesting 
stories’.
A significant factor in the JNR reform debate was, therefore, that 
the Sankei Shinbun took up the theme of labour relations in the 
JNR in a series of special features from February to November
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1 98276. Omitting to recognise that labour disputes had, in fact, 
declined dramatically from the position in the late 1970s, the 
Sankei argued in these articles that the dissolution of the national 
railway was the only way to curb the power of the so-called 
militant labour unions.
The Sankei also helped promote the slogan “Yami Kara Poka” 
which became a widely used catch phrase to describe what was 
thought to be symbolic of the JNR’s failings. The three elements of 
this phrase were the following:
Yami - getting overtime pay without working overtime 
Kara - being paid for non-existent operation of services 
Poka - taking holidays without due notice.
All of these practices undoubtedly took place in the operation of 
the JNR77 but were by no means exclusive to the activities of the 
national railway. Other public bodies which practised these 
methods of benefitting their workforce beyond the limits of 
government restrictions - notably the Postal services in the case 
of “Yamichokin” (known as Yami) - escaped the censure which 
was concentrated by the media on the JNR.
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Coverage by the Sankei Shinbun of the supposedly critical state of 
labour relations in the national railway reflected the views of 
JNR’s most right wing labour union, Tetsurô . The internal 
divisions amongst the JNR unions were highlighted in the Sankei 
as part of a Tetsurô move to turn public opinion strongly against 
the formerly radical Kokurô rather than as a reflection of a 
reasoned argument on the then state of labour relations in the 
national railway's.
On this emotive issue of management:labour relations in the JNR, 
the pro-reform lobby in Japan, in fact, astutely took a line from 
Thatcherite Britain where the government’s anti-union policies had 
struck a chord with the general public. Never mind that in Japan 
the facts did not fit the rhetoric, that - as highlighted in previous 
sections on JNR management:labour relations - the incidence of 
labour disputes in the national railway had fallen dramatically 
since the midi 970s. Never mind that the era of militant labour 
unions in the JNR had long since passed; there was capital to be 
made by the promotion of policies which would have the effect of 
destroying the ‘militant’ labour unions.
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The media coverage of the JNR reform issue undoubtedly gave 
impetus to this policy initiative, providing as it did a vehicle for 
the broadcast of the merits of the reconstruction proposals being 
developed by the Second Rinchô. Moreover, by concentrating on an 
aspect of the JNR’s operation which had been criticised in the past, 
its managementdabour relations, the media focus had a significant 
impact on the formation of a ‘consensus’ of the need to carry out a 
radical reform of the national railway. The extent to which i t 
constituted a ‘media campaign’, orchestrated by the Dokô Rinchô 
and its allies, may be a matter for debate but its effect on 
consolidating the pro-reform position is surely In no doubt.
The Initial MoT P osition
The consolidation of the pro-division policy view offered by the 
Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee and the 1982 media exposure of the 
JNR’s problems also helped to isolate the Ministry of Transport, 
whose separately conceived plans (in April 1982) were met with  
hostility by both the LDP and the Rinchô Council79. The MoT had not 
proposed privatisation but, instead, a substantial reduction in the 
JNR workforce - though much less severe than the cuts which 
comprised part of the privatisation policy which was actually
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implemented five years later - and a separation of the 
corporation’s railway operations and the track infrastructure into 
two distinct entities. The MoT plan was that developed by the then 
Minister of Transport, Kosaka Tokusaburd, acting on the basis that 
the MoT should, like the Second Rinchd and the LDP, have its own 
independent policy on JNR reform.
Before it could be articulated properly this MoT standpoint was 
‘scooped’ by the Asahi Shinbun , which published an article critical 
of Kosaka’s contribution to the JNR reform debate on 23 April 
1982. The Kosaka initiative was thereafter abandoned and with it  
any independent line from the MoT. Ironically, however, the 
criticism of his proposal (the Kosaka Shian ) was apparently at 
least as much due to the fact that the Ministry was judged to have 
failed to go through the correct procedures - such as consulting 
the Second Rinchdso - as to the view that its plan was not 
sufficiently radical to deal with the JNR’s problems.
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The National Diet Contribution to the Initial JNR Reform  
Debate
As indicated in the foregoing section on the ‘media debate’, by the 
time that DokôToshio delivered his Reform Commission’s Basic 
Proposals on Administrative Reform to PM Suzuki in July 1982 
there had already been a significant swing in sentiment towards 
the pro-JNR reform side. The combination of a Cabinet-appointed 
Shingikai (the Second Rinchô) with increasing public support 
having been garnered by the mass media’s coverage of the JNR’s 
‘problems’, the apparent ‘official’ conversion of the LDP machinery 
to the cause of division and privatisation of the JNR, (through the 
activities of its Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee), the groundswell of 
rebellion within the ranks of the JNR management (led by the San 
Nin Gumi) and the discrediting of the MoT’s supposed independent 
line (as adopted in the Kosaka Shian ), was such that the opposition 
from the JNR Board, from its labour unions, and from the  
opposition parties in the Diet had minimal impact on the reform 
debate.
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In this process the position of the National Diet had effectively 
been marginalised, its role as the medium for public discussion of 
the issues having instead been taken up by the mass media. The 
Diet, as the people’s elected representatives, had voted the Second 
Rinchô into existence on 28 November 1980 but Its position in the 
administrative reform debate was thereafter reduced to the status 
of observation. The conclusions of the various Rinchô Reports 
between July 1981 and March 1983 (as set out in the Chronology in 
Figure I) were merely reported to the Diet by PMs Suzuki and 
Nakasone and, from the commencement of the deliberations of the 
Dokô Rinchô in March 1981 until the enactment of the Special Law 
(Kokutetsu Saiken Suishin Rinji Sochi Hô) through which the JNR 
Reform Commission was set up in May 1983 the JNR reform debate 
took place effectively away from any full discussion in the 
national parliament.
The key period in this respect was that between the release of the 
Third (Basic) Report of the Da/n/ Rinchô (30 July 1982)- which 
confirmed the aim of the JNR privatisation - and the passing of the 
law forming the JNR Reform Commission ten months later. In that 
crucial phase, the reform proposals developed from the broad
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outline of the Rinchô recommendations to official statements of 
government policy with an established machinery for carrying 
them out.
During the foundation of the reform policy which became law in 
May 1983, the degree of influence of the Diet may be assessed by 
reference to the procedures by which the preceding 10 month 
period saw such a transformation of the JNR reconstruction issue 
from vague intentions to the Statute Booksi. That process began 
with an almost immediate confirmation (on 5 August 1982) o f 
support for the Rinchô Third Report by the AMA Head Nakasone 
Yasuhiro, and this official sanctioning of the Rinchô principles of 
JNR reform was then reinforced by PM Suzuki’s declaration five  
days later, on 10 August 1982, that his administration would 
respect the Rinchô views and would endeavour to turn them into 
firm legislative measuressz. The 10 August meeting of the LDP 
Administrative Reform Committee (Gyôsei Kaikaku Suishin Honbu) 
which received Suzuki’s commitment to the privatisation 
proposals, further received instructions from the Cabinet th a t 
measures to deal with the financial problems of the JNR pension 
fund would have to be considered. The presentation of the pensions
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problem was in direct response to the Daini Rinchd Third Report, 
which had recommended that the JNR Pension Fund - which was i n 
severe financial difficulty - should be integrated with those of the 
other two main public corporations (NTT and the Salt and Tobacco 
Monopoly) and that, thereafter, the San Kosha should operate a 
joint pension scheme83. The matter was subsequently referred to 
the Diet for discussion, being delegated in the Lower House to the 
Finance Standing Committee (Okura linkai) and in the Upper House 
to the Cabinet Standing Committee (Naikaku linkai) .
The Diet was therefore involved soon after the publication of the 
Rinchd Third Report on a real issue concerning JNR Reform. The 
legislation which followed these deliberations, however, took a 
year to materialise, almost six months after the unelected JNR 
Reform Commission had taken charge of the JNR reform process. I n 
the face of opposition, moreover, from the Denden Kdsha (NTT) the 
Bill (Gyosei Nenkin T6g6 H6an) which was enacted in November 
1983 did not merge the pension funds of the San Kdsha but instead 
instituted a system of borrowing and lending amongst the pension 
funds in the public sector84.
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In the meantime, a preparatory Cabinet office section (Kokutetsu 
Saiken linkai Shitsu) had been quickly set up (on 2.1 August 1982) 
to prepare the bill for the establishment of the JNR Reform 
Commission, The Reform Office consisted of representatives from 
the MoT, MoF, MoL, the Ministry of Welfare, and the Administrative 
Management Agency (AMA) and it was through this procedure - 
acting on behalf of the Cabinet of government and not of the Diet - 
that the draft of what became the JNR Reform Law of May 1983 
was prepared and submitted to parliament for enactmentss.
The delay which took place between the Cabinet’s formal approval 
of the draft bill - on 19 November 1982 - and its passing by the 
Diet In May of the next year was not, furthermore, a result of 
lengthy debate of the matter in parliament. The length of time 
taken for the bill to become law was instead, as outlined In the 
early chronology of events, the result of the change of LDP 
government in November 1982 - which brought Nakasone to power - 
and the subsequent Diet proceedings concerning the ‘Lockheed 
scandal’. The procedure adopted by the Cabinet to turn the Rinchô 
recommendations into legislation which would take the 
privatisation proposals forward was, moreover, conscious policyse
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to avoid the sidetracking of the ‘administrative reform’ policies by 
opposing factions. In serving this aim, it undoubtedly succeeded in 
minimising the involvement of parliament in the formulation of the 
reform proposals and, in so doing, cut out any meaningful role by 
the political parties, both government and opposition.
A further significant factor in muting the influence of the Diet on 
the course of the JNR reform process was the built-in  
parliamentary majority of the Liberal Democratic Party.
Therefore, while PM Suzuki’s resignation had taken place as a 
reflection of declining popular support for his leadership, Nakasone 
Yasuhiro still inherited a national Diet dominated by the LDP. I f 
any opposition to the administrative reform policies from his own 
political party, the LDP, could be neutralised - as this Chapter w ill 
further attest that it was from the time of the aforementioned LDP 
Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee which, combined with the growing 
influence of the San Nin Gumi group within the JNR, broke down 
the natural resistance to change of individual LDP Diet members - 
then the minority opposition parties were In no position to achieve 
anything more than token resistance to the JNR privatisation 
process.
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The left wing of the political spectrum was, of course, 
fundamentally opposed to the JNR’s dissolution, partly from an 
ideological standpoint, but partly also because of a fear of reduced 
revenues in the future. The philosophical arguments against the 
privatisation of the JNR were based on the belief that public 
services should remain in public ownership and on the expectation - 
an expectation that was to be met in full - that the 
implementation of the policy would mean a substantial reduction 
in employment. The latter point was also related to the revenues 
of the labour unions which, like their power base, would be greatly 
diminished in the event of the dissolution and privatisation of the 
national railways?. At the early stage of the Second Rinchô’s 
deliberations on administrative reform and on the reorganisation 
of the JNR, the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party, 
Sôhyô (the national federation of public sector labour unions), and 
the JNR left wing unions Kokurô and Dorò were therefore united in 
their opposition to the idea of the national railway being broken up 
and transformed into a private enterprise.
The scope for effective opposition to the JNR restructuring 
proposals was, however - and as hitherto stated - severely
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1constrained by the effective political control of the reform 
process by the Suzuki and , particularly , the Nakasone 
administrations. Thus, although, as outlined above, there were two 
labour union federation representatives (one from Dômei, and one 
from Sôhyô ) on the Second Rinchô it was difficult for the main 
Socialist (Shakaitô) opposition - particularly as public opinion 
began to gather in favour of reform - to argue convincingly that 
their views were either unrepresented or that they were seriously 
opposed to the general principles of administrative reform. Thus 
the absence of any means of debate in the Diet on the issue further 
robbed the opposition parties of a forum in which their views could 
be made heard. Thus their loss in the ‘media battle’ meant that the 
alliance of the Socialist party and the JNR labour union Kokurô 
was bereft of any significant voice in the other medium of public 
debate, the country’s major newspapers.
It could therefore be said that by the time that the JNR Reform 
Commission began to discuss the means by which the national 
railway would be reorganised - its deliberations being based on the 
firm premises of the JNR’s division and privatisation - the reform 
‘war’ had already been won. Since there was no effective political
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opposition from the other parties in the Diet, moreover, the really 
significant victory for PM Nakasone was really that over the prior 
entrenched opposition from within the party of government, the 
LDP.
At the time of the initial proposals from the Second Rinchd to 
restructure the national railway the LDP rank and file were, as 
previously here confirmed, united in opposing a policy initiative  
which they realised would endanger the system of mutual interests 
for whose benefit the JNR had long been runes. The issue of the 
manipulation of the JNR to serve political interests has previously 
been discussed at various points in this thesis, the point having 
been made that it was a feature of the operation of the national 
railway well before the establishment of the public corporation in 
1949.
The circle of common interests, which a policy of breaking-up and 
privatising the JNR might well upset, was widely known to Involve 
the placing of national railway contracts with favoured industrial 
companies. Political pressure on the JNR, through the t/nyu Zo/ru i n 
the Diet, to make decisions on expenditure on new local line
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construction and on investment on capital equipment ensured that 
national railway business went to suppliers and contractors who 
would, in their turn, reward their benefactors with financial 
contributions to party funds89.
Business donations were a particularly important source of finance 
for the ruling LDP party, and the award of lucrative JNR contracts 
an accustomed source of revenue to a wide range of companies i n 
the civil and electrical engineering, construction, and car 
manufacturing industries. It Is therefore not surprising that the 
prospect of an end to this convenient system by which, in reality, 
the Japanese taxpayer was subsidising the Industrial sector and 
its political parties, was met with antagonism by those who had 
for so long benefitted from it.
It was, in fact. In this climate of continuing self-interested  
opposition to the restructuring of the JNR - but with a growing 
body of opinion In its favour - that Nakasone had stepped out of 
former PM Suzuki Zenko’s shadow and Into the administrative 
reform spotlight. There was the prospect of a major political coup 
In achieving what many regarded as unachievable, and of widening
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the LDP’s appeal by convincing the public that here was a political 
leader capable of tilting at the established party windmills and 
winning. There was also that other glittering political prize on 
offer, of being seen as the Prime Minister who succeeded in 
defeating the left wing trade unions and destroying their influence 
on Japanese political and economic life.
Nakasone had, of course, been influenced, in the formation of his 
beliefs on the merits of the reconstruction policies, by the 
examples of their implementation in the USA and, particularly, in 
the UK. The wide-ranging privatisations in Britain pioneered by PM 
Thatcher, and President Reagan’s policies of dismantling the public 
sector in the US, had convinced Nakasone both of what was 
achievable in Japan, and of what the potential political rewards 
could be90. in winning domestic support for his growing 
enthusiasm for the implementation of the privatisation plans, he 
was also able to use to good effect the argument that if Japan 
ignored these major changes in policy in other major countries, she 
would be increasingly isolated from a position of power and 
influence on the international stage.
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At a more parochial level, It must be said that the attitude of 
Nakasone Yasuhiro towards the break-up and privatisation of the 
JNR in particular was shaped also by his time as Minister of 
Transport, although this had been for a relatively short period on 
one year (1967 - 8) It gave Nakasone practical experience in 
dealing with the administration of the national railway. His 
recollections of the implementation of transport policy in the 
public corporation domain were to be held in good stead in the 
shaping of the policies to reorganise the national railway some 
fifteen years later.
The verdict of the LDP’s own Kokutetsu Saiken ni Kan Sum Shô 
linkai (the Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee) that there was a limit on 
the time which the JNR management should be allowed to effect an 
internal solution to the public corporation’s financing problems 
was of inestimable value to Nakasone’s causesi. It effectively  
broke down the traditional resolve of the mainstream LDP position 
to preserve the JNR as a ‘vehicle’ for political gain, and from that 
point what had been solid opposition from the Unyu Zoku to moves 
to demolish the status quo position of the national railway run as a 
source of funds for the LDP diminished to the level where all the
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Nakasone administration had to do was to ensure the ‘facesaving’ 
of individual Giin (Diet members) who had been the prior 
beneficiaries of the system of mutual benefits from the operation 
of the ‘JNR Family’. This the government was ultimately able to do 
by convincing the LDP rank and file that the achievement of a 
divided and privatised JNR could result in the Party appealing to a 
broader electoral base, and also that the success would reflect 
well on the Unyu Zoku prepared to support the policy92.
Nakasone’s persuasion of the LDP Unyu Zoku to drop their hitherto 
overt opposition to the JNR reform plans was, in addition, given 
further weight by his argument that credit would be attained by 
politicians who were seen to have carried through policies which 
resulted in the conclusive defeat of the so-called militant labour 
unions in the national railway. The Nakasone line succeeded in 
convincing the LDP membership, and the overt hostility from 
within his own party to the measures to break-up the JNR thereby 
ceased93. As a consequence the role of the LDP party members in 
the Diet was, from the time of the establishment of the JNR 
Reform Commission, as marginal in the development and 
formulation of the specific break-up and privatisation policies as
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those of the opposition political parties. Their function was
effectively reduced to that of a voting machine, the LDP’s majority
in the Diet allowing for the simple enactment of the JNR Reform
Laws three years later in November 1986. The Mainichi Shinbun
Ichibu (Political Section of the Mainichi Newspaper) described the
phenomenon of a compliant LDP in the JNR Reform debate thus:
In such an important matter (JNR reform) It would have been 
natural to have active debate within the LDP as well, but 
most members did not say a word. In 1985, the only occasion 
when the LDP called on the JNR authorities and discussed 
this issue officially, was on January 23, when a jo in t 
meeting of the Transport Committee (Kôtsu Bukai), the JNR 
Basic Issues Research Committee (Kokutetsu Kihon Mondai 
Chôsakai), and the JNR Restructuring Sub-Committee 
(Kokutetsu Saiken ni Kansuru Sho linkai) was held at the LDP 
headquarters. It was held to hear about the specific points 
of the JNR’s own proposals, from the JNR executive itself.
The JNR plan was entitled Basic Policies for Management 
Reform (Keiei Kaikaku no Tame no Kihon Hôsaku), and was 
submitted on January 10. After the January 23 meeting, 
there were no fruitful discussions, and also there were no 
further requests from the LDP to hold such meetings.
JNR Restructuring - The Second Phase
Any prospect of the JNR being able to see off the Rinchd’s radical 
restructuring proposals effectively died with the accomplishment 
of the privatisation policies of the two other of the San Kdsha in 
1984. The essential difference in the implementation of the 
privatisations of the Tobacco and Salt Monopoly, and of the Nihon
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Denden Kôsha (which, in its privatised form, became known as 
NTT) was that only the JNR of the San Kôsha was singled out for 
both division and conversion to a private company structure.
In the administrative reform debate, the Tobacco and Salt 
monopoly, and how it was to be restructured, was not a politically 
contentious subject, and there was a lack of animated reaction to 
the Rinchô proposals for its eventual privatisation. NTT, as i t 
was to become on privatisation was, by contrast, seen to be an 
integral part of the radical Rinchô plans to reorganise the 
‘inefficient’ public corporations. Initially at least made 
comparable by the Second Rinchô with the JNR, the treatment of 
the telecommunications public corporation in the administrative 
reform policies - and Its place in the public debate - however soon 
varied from that of the national railway. In terms of public feeling 
NTT aroused much less emotion - either favourable or unfavourable 
- than did the JNR. It was not a source of substantial losses or of 
massive debts, its position in an expanding market place having 
been protected by Its monopoly statusss. The successful 
conclusion of Its reorganisation, therefore, offered a less 
spectacular political gain than that of the JNR, with Its financial
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problems and its ‘militant’ labour unions. NTT also proved to be 
much more astute than the JNR in dealing with the reality of an 
inexorable political will to carry out the privatisation policies. 
This relative success can be judged in the reflection that, despite 
the /?/nc/7ô proposal that it too should be broken up, NTT was 
privatised as one entity with its monopoly power largely 
unchallenged96. Support from the Ministry of Finance helped in this  
process, the judgement that the Government would raise more 
revenue from flotation of the telecommunications corporation as a 
single national enterprise transcending the ideological desire to 
deregulate its market and to allow competitive forces to improve 
its efficiency.
The JNR was, therefore, partly as a result of its own misjudgment 
of the powerful forces which were driving the privatisation 
movement, left exposed as the focus of the government’s 
administrative reform policy. This was a policy which, moreover, 
was by then bereft of a clear philosophical base and instead was 
articulated more simply by the desire to cut back government 
spending in order to lessen the burden of national debt. Given 
Nakasone’s increasing realisation that greater domestic political
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power and a higher international standing was there for the taking 
if the privatisation policy could be implemented, it rapidly became 
the case that the plan to break-up and privatise the JNR was taken 
to be synonymous with what had originally been the much wider 
concept of administrative reforms^, jh e  reality was that by 1983, 
if indeed not before, the Three K’s which had been at the forefront 
of the administrative reform movement at its formative stage, had 
been reduced to one, the Kokutetsu (the JNR).
The JNR Reform Commission Period
Restructuring to the chronology of the national railway reform  
process, the JNR Restructuring Supervisory Commission or JNR 
Reform Commission (Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri linkai) began its task 
of formulating the definite JNR reconstruction plan on 10 June 
1983. Its brief was to articulate practical means by which the 
Second Rincho’s broad framework of division and privatisation of 
the national railway corporation could be implemented, and 
therefore to draw up proposals which could be converted into 
legislation.
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The composition of the Commission emphasised the continuity of 
the administrative reform policies, three of its five members 
having served on the preceding Second Rinchô. Its Chairman was 
Kamei Masao (President of Sumitomo Electric Industries), one of 
the former Ad Hoc Committee members, as were two of his 
appointees, Katô Hiroshi and Sumita Shôjiss. Katô’s role in 
publicising the campaign to privatise the JNR has already been 
detailed in this Chapter; to the position of Deputy Chairman of the 
Reform Commission he brought a strong commitment to the break­
up and privatisation of the national railway. Sumita Shôji was at 
this time Director of the Japan Transport Economics Research 
Center (Nihon Unyu Keizai Kenkyû Sentà) , having formerly been a 
Vice Minister of Transport. The two ‘new’ members of the JNR 
Reform Commission were Sumiya Mikio (President of Tokyo 
Women’s Christian University), a labour relations specialist, and 
Yoshise Shigeya (Governor of the Japan Development Bank) with  
experience of the bureaucracy - through the Ministry of Finance.
The deliberations of the JNR Reform Commission lasted from its  
formation in June 1983 until the publication of its final report in 
July 1985. The issue of the Commission’s ultimate findings, its
400
Opinions on the Restructuring of the JNR of July 1985 (Kokutetsu 
Kaikaku ni Kan Suru Iken) , outlined the proposals by which the 
division and privatisation of the JNR was to be effected, and the 
methods to be adopted for the disposition and repayment of the 
national railway’s long term liabilities. In the Intervening period, 
the Commission had delivered interim reports to PM Nakasone, the 
second of which (Dai Ni Ji Kinkyû Teigen) was compiled on 10 
August 1984. The latter document contained the first categoric 
reference to the division as well as to the privatisation proposals 
for the JNR. It also, however, acknowledged, for the first time, 
that the JNR’s privatisation would not encompass a complete 
solution to the problem of the national railway’s indebtedness. In 
the Second Emergency Report, it was admitted that it would not be 
a practical proposition for the privatised companies which were to 
be created out of the JNR to be obliged to take over all of the 
national railway’s long term debt. Instead, the Commission 
pledged Itself to produce the means by which it would “handle a 
certain amount of [the] JNR’s liabilities by depending on taxation 
of the people.”99
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The role of the main players in the second phase of the JNR 
reconstruction process can be judged by their reaction to the 
deliberations of the JNR Reform Commission. To begin, as before, 
with the JNR itself the JNR Board continued to resist In the face of 
its, by then, inevitability, the proposal to break-up the national 
railway. The JNR’s privatisation was no longer even a topic for 
debate; after the successful implementation of the privatisation of 
the Tobacco and Salt Corporation and NTT (enacted on 3 August and 
20 December 1984 respectively) it was a certainty. Yet the 
Directors of the national railway apparently still believed that 
they could forestall the JNR Reform Commission’s definitive plan 
that the JNR should be divided into a number of separate operating 
companies run as private corporations!oo.
By the time of the publication of the JNR Reform Commission’s 
Reports confirming the break-up and privatisation policy the two 
senior JNR executives, Ota TomoyukI and Nawata Kunitake, who had 
supported the San Nin Gumi in their submissions to the LDP’s 
Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee had reached positions of very high rank 
In the national railway hierarchy. Ota was a member of the Board 
of Directors (Jômu Riji) , and Nawata the JNR’s Vice President
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(Fuku Sdsai) . The attainment of these positions of power had not, 
however, reinforced the reformist zeal they had shown two years 
earlier. Rather the opposite was the case, for Nawata and Ota - 
having an ‘empire’ to preserve - were now firmly in the status-quo 
camp which wished to see the JNR maintained as a single, 
nationwide operation in the public sector!oi.
In contrast the San Nin Gumi , the earlier allies of Nawata and Ota, 
remained committed to the cause of radical reform of the JNR. 
After the publication of the Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee’s Report In 
1982 which supported their pro-reform position, however, their 
jobs in the management of the national railway had been In posts 
which, for a period, reduced the impact of their involvement In the 
JNR reorganisation process!02. it was during that time that the 
JNR Board, still hopeful of turning back the tide of reform - with 
the support it believed of former PM Tanaka Kakuei who still had a 
strong power base in the LDP - formulated its own plans for the 
national railway’s salvation.
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The JNR’s Reform Plan (Keiei Kaikaku no Kihon Hôsaku) i03 was 
announced early in 1985, its Board accepting the privatisation of 
the national railway but collectively setting its face against 
division of the JNR operation. The Plan had been In the making 
from the summer of 1984, so its drafting took place In the 
knowledge of the confirmation of the pro-reform position of the 
national railway’s least radical labour union, Tetsurô (published in 
June 1984) and the conversion to a pro-division and privatisation 
stance of the MoT (announced in October 1 984). The JNR Board 
must also have been aware that the Socialist Party was also 
moving away from its dogmatic opposition to the privatisation 
proposals, a draft of its own reform plan being released in August 
1984. Of these other participants more later, but even a brief 
reference to the growing volume of pro-reform opinion must make 
it clear that the JNR Board’s status quo position was increasingly 
losing touch with the reality of the situation.
The ‘JNR Reform Plan’, when released in January 1985, confirmed 
the Board’s view that the national railway should remain one 
corporation, but that its executive would improve its finances by 
dramatic cuts in the workforce (the target was to reduce the
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labour force from an average level of some 300,000 in 1984/5 to 
180,000 by fiscal 1990). The Board further requested that a 
substantial proportion (16 trillion Yen) of its long term debt be 
taken over by the Government!
The Plan was produced against the advice of the JNR Reform 
Commission to whose Chairman, Kamei Masao the then JNR 
President Nisugi Iwao had presented it in December 1984. Failing 
to get approval from Kamei, Nisugi related the JNR Board’s views 
to Tanaka Kakuei and other senior figures in the LDP hierarchy and, 
believing that the traditional support of the LDP machine for the 
JNR would continue, published the Keiei Kaikau no Kihon Hosaku on 
10 January 1985105.
It received a bad press, even from the politically unaligned Kotsu 
Shinbun , the Yomiuri and Sänke/loe discussing the JNR Plan as 
“too little, and too late" to save the national railway from 
dissolution and break-up. Opposition to the JNR Board position was 
also forthcoming from the JNR Reform Commission - predictable 
after the earlier reaction of its Chairman Kamei Masao - the 
Ministry of Transport, and the main JNR labour unions. The
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radical unions Kokurô and Dôrô opposed the Plan because i t 
admitted privatisation was necessary; while the ‘moderate’ unions 
Tetsurô and Zenshirô criticised it because the Plan held out 
against the JNR’s divisionioz.
The isolation of the JNR Board view after the negative reaction to 
its Reform Plan was augmented by the subsequent illness of 
Tanaka Kakuei (he suffered a stroke in late February 1985) and the 
waning of his influence in the LDP machinery. The JNR Reform 
Commission had further advised PM Nakasone that, if there was 
continued opposition from the JNR “...its final report, which was 
expected to be written by July (1985), would be meaningless and 
impractical.”108 Matters finally came to a head in late May 1985 
when Nakasone got wind of an attempt by Ota Tomoyuki, the now 
anti-reform JNR Director, to persuade the Asahi Shinbun to 
publish material supportive of the national railway Board 
positloni09. To Nakasone, Ota’s action was ‘the last straw’, and he 
decided to dismiss the JNR President and Vice President. This was 
done in late June 1985, Nisugi Iwao and Nawata Kunitake (and a 
member of other status-quo JNR executives) losing their positions, 
and the pro-reform Sugiura Takaya (formerly Vice Minister of the
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MoF) taking over as the Nakasone appointee on 24 June 1985 in the 
post of JNR President. The Board’s opposition to the division of 
the JNR empire was finally over, and national railway policy was 
thereafter shaped by the MoT acting on behalf of the Nakasone 
administration and orchestrating its dictates through a JNR 
Directorate now dominated by pro-reform opinion.
The position within the JNR had already further moved away from 
the status quo position with the production of a report in favour of 
the break-up of the national railway by a group of JNR executives 
headed by the San Nin Gum/ no. |n total, 20 JNR managers put therr 
name to a statement entitled Kokutetsu Kaikaku no Tame ni Ware 
Ware wa Tsugi no Y6 ni Kangaeru (We Feel This Way Towards JNR 
Reform). It criticised the JNR Board’s Reform Plan published some 
five months earlier, supported not only the privatisation of the 
national railway but also Its division, and insisted on changing the 
top JNR management. It is sa id n i that the report was sent to 
MItsuzuka Hiroshi, the former Chairman of the LDP’s Reform Sub­
committee (and soon to be appointed by Nakasone as Minister of 
Transport) on 14 June, and to Kamei Masao (the JNR Reform 
Commission Chairman) on 16 June 1985.
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Grateful for their invaluable support, the new JNR regime repaid 
the San Nin Gumi by promoting them to higher positionsH2 in the 
national railway hierarchy, Ide and Kasai taking up new senior 
posts as soon as 4 July 1985, only two weeks after Sugiura had 
replaced Nisugi as JNR President,
The Opposition Parties and the JNR Labour Unions
The foregoing references to the position of the Ministry of 
Transport, to that of the Socialist Party, and to the views of 
Tetsurd (the union connected with the Democratic Socialist Party, 
the Minshato ) on the JNR reform issue may now be amplified, to 
provide confirmation that even a full year before the privatisation 
was implemented the only remaining fundamental opposition to 
the break-up of the national railway from amongst the main 
‘players’ In the branch was that from Kokuro, historically the 
most ‘left wing’ of the JNR’s labour unionsH3.
As hitherto expounded, the Shakaitd (the Japanese Socialist Party) 
remained ideologically opposed to the break-up of the national 
railway. The scope, for political manoeuvering by the Socialists 
had, however, been severely constrained by PM Nakasone’s tight
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control over the method of discussion of the JNR reform issue. The 
strategic use of the Shingikai as forum for the debate, through 
both the Second Rinchô, and its successor, the JNR Reform 
Commission allowed for little input from those groups opposed to 
reform. Moreover, as previously stated, the Socialist Party had 
been in support of the main original principle of the administrative 
reform policy, that of reducing the level of ‘unaccountable’ power 
in the public sector. Since the JNR reform plan was being carried 
out in the name of that policy, it was not easy for the Socialists to 
put up a cogent opposition.
A related difficulty for the Socialist Party was that the labour 
union in its camp from the telecommunications public corporation 
(Zen Dentsu) had already moved away from its initial opposition, 
to a position supporting the NTT privatisationii4. On the JNR 
privatisation issue the Socialist position was thus complicated by 
the fact that the Party had, implicitly at least, favoured the 
privatisation of another of the San Kôsha .
409
The Socialist Party did, nevertheless, try to come to terms with  
the growing weight of opinion in favour of drastic reform of the 
JNR by formulating its own recommendations of measures designed 
to rehabilitate the national railway. A plan was drawn up in 1 984 - 
a draft of which was publicised on 9 August of that year - and 
eventually announced as official Party policy in March 19 8 6 H 5.
The Socialist proposals for the rehabilitation of the national 
railway were the Party’s attempts to articulate their opposition to 
the break-up of the national railway within an overall policy 
stance of support for the broader principle of administrative 
reform, namely the reduction of bureaucratic power and influence. 
The Plan which was announced in March 1986, the Kokutetsu 
Kaikaku An (National Railway Reconstruction Plan), was an 
extended version of the 1984 draft but retained its central tenet 
that there should be no lay-offs in any JNR reform. It had six main 
points! 16, as follows:
(0 The JNR would not be broken up but would become a private 
company - so it would be privatised
410
( i i )  30%of its capital would be from the private sector
( in )  It would be divided into 7 branches - so its management 
would be decentralised
(iv ) Its accumulated debt would be taken over by the State
(v) Its unprofitable areas of operation would be subsidised by 
the government
(v i) All of Its employees would be re-employed after the 
reconstruction and only thereafter would there be consideration of 
a decrease in their number.
The key reason for the two year gap between the draft of the 
Socialist Plan and Its release in complete form was that the Party 
was prevented from producing a coherent counter to the Rincho 
proposals by the prevarication of Kokuro , Its ally In the JNR labour 
unionsii7. The favoured Socialist strategy had been to secure the 
support of Kokurd for a proposed deal with the LDP in which the 
left wing opposition party would not hinder the Rinchd
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recommended plan for the JNR’s reconstruction if the government 
would guarantee that no national railway workers would be made 
redundant. In the face of Kokurô’s maintenance of a hard-line 
opposition to the privatisation and break-up policies, however, 
such a ‘dear was not possible and eventually the Socialist plan 
was announced without labour union supportas.
Kokurô was, by the time of the release of the Socialist Party’s 
counter-proposals (March 1986) completely isolated on the labour 
union side as to its policy on JNR reform. Tetsurô, historically 
the most ‘moderate’ of the national railway labour unions had been, 
from an early stage of the JNR reform debate, consistent in Its  
criticism of the Intransigent position of Kokurô . As discussed 
earlier in the context of the role of the mass media in the JNR 
reform process, Tetsurô had also used its connections with the 
Sankei Shinbun to spread antl-/Cokurô views. The Tetsurô pro­
reform stance was further confirmed in its own ideas for the 
restructuring of the national railway (Kokutetsu Kaiei Saiken ni 
Kan Suru iken to Teigen) which were released in June 1984. The 
Tetsurô proposals supported the Rinchô JNR reform plan for the 
division and privatisation of the national railway with only minor
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variations from the official government line. Tetsurô proposed 
that, although the JNR should be broken up, the companies thereby 
created should still be connected and that the new operations 
should be funded by both the State and the private sectorii9.
These small differences notwithstanding, Tetsurô’s colours had 
thus, by mid-84 been fixed clearly to the JNR reform mast. 
Tetsurô’s affiliation with the Minshatô , the Democratic Socialist 
Party (DSP) ensured that its views were represented in the Diet 
although, in reality, the weak electoral position of the DSP meant 
that, like the rest of the political opposition, it had little direct 
influence on the JNR reform process. Nevertheless, Tetsurô’s 
unequivocal support for the division and privatisation policies 
represented a distinct ‘success’ for the union in that its members 
were fully protected from the substantial job cuts in the new J R 
companies, and the union’s own existence thereby preserved into 
the post-privatisation erai2o.
Although it was later than Tetsurô in showing its hand, the other 
previously militant JNR labour union, Dôrô, took a similarly 
pragmatic line on the reform plans, putting protection of the
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union’s position, and the job security of its members before 
ideological considerations. In the early stages of the reform  
debate, Dôrô’s public stance had been one of being absolutely 
against the Rinchô recommendations of division and privatisation. 
However, sources close to the heart of the JNR management:labour 
relations issue have indicatedi2i that from as early as 1981 the 
national railway executive were aware of a subtle shift in the real 
Dôrô strategy. The key figure in this process was the charismatic 
Dorò leader, Matsuzaki Akira, and the catalyst in his move away 
from hostile opposition of the JNR privatisation the indication 
from the LDP leadership (notably from Kanemaru Shini22)that 
maintenance of the union’s hard-line position would result In the 
destruction of the union and substantial job losses for its  
members.
Thus, although the official Dôrô position was to oppose the 
proposed reform, Matsuzaki had by 1981 indicated to the JNR 
management that his union would co-operate with the reform  
proposals so long as the rights of the Dôrô members were not 
taken away. The JNR Staff Relations executive were given notice 
of this new Dôrô stance when the union agreed to the scrapping of
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previously jealously-guarded agreements on the contentious 
system of Genba Kyôgi Sei (JNR workplace practices), followed 
then by the evaporation of Doro-inspired labour disputes in the 
operation of the national railwayi23.
The culmination of the revised Dorò line on JNR reform came with 
its public declaration of support for the division and privatisation 
policies through the signing of a labour:management Joint 
Declaration (Rôshi Kyodo Sengen) on 13 January 1986. In this 
agreement Dorò allied with Tetsurô and Zenshirô (a smaller JNR 
labour union affiliated with the Komeitô political party) in 
officially co-operating with the JNR management to effect the 
voluntary retirements and Job transfers necessary before the 
national railway was changed into a group of private companies, 
and the unions formally abandoned any further strike action. The 
quid pro quo was, of course, the agreement by the JNR that the 
members of the ‘co-operative’ unions would not suffer Job losses 
in the privatisation process, a promise which, as will be seen in 
later discussion, was kept fullyi24. This new relationship between 
the unions and the JNR executive was then further cemented by the 
undertaking (in August 1986) that the former would drop all legal
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claims against the national railway for supposed ‘unfair labour 
practices’; the JNR management responded by agreeing to abandon 
its claim against Dorò for 20.2 billion Yen as estimated damages 
for the effects of the illegal Sutokensuto 12S dispute in 1975.
The signing of joint labour:management by the other JNR unions 
left Kokuró in complete isolation on the reform issue, a point 
which by early 1986 was abundantly clear to the Kokuró 
leadership. The publication of the Socialist Party’s JNR Reform 
Plan in March 1986, and the sweeping victory of the LDP in the July 
General Election further weakened the left wing opposition 
position in the JNR reform debate, and convinced the Kokuró 
leader, Yamazaki Shunichi, of the need - for the union’s own se lf-  
protection - to review its strategy. The Kokuró Union executive 
attempted to carry this out by persuading the union members (at a 
meeting of the Kokuró Chuó Tósó linkai on 24 September 1986) to  
co-operate with the reform process. The issue was put to the fu ll 
membership at a meeting of the Kokuró Rinji Zenkoku Taikai 
(Nationwide Kokuró Meeting) on 9 /1 0  October 1986, and there was 
an overwhelming vote against i t i 26.
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Yamazaki’s moderate Mindô leadership faction was then forced to 
resign and Kokurô’s new hard-line executive prepared to lead the 
union into oblivion as the JNR reform process moved inexorably to 
a successful conclusion.
The Turning of the Ministry of Transport
The final key to the transformation of the Rinchô’s initial broad, 
indistinctly defined proposals to their final form as a series of 
Acts which broke-up and reorganised the national railway into 
privatised enterprises may be found in the dramatic change in the 
position of the Ministry of Transport towards JNR reform.
The real turning point in the MoT stance may, in retrospect, have 
been the ridicule which met the attempt by Transport Minister 
Kosaka to articulate a distinct Ministry of Transport Mine’ in April 
1982. The MoT’s public conversion took a further two years to 
come to fruition, its culmination being the declaration by the then 
Minister of Transport, Hosoda Kichizo, at a Press Conference on 19 
October 1984, of his Ministry’s support not only for the JNR’s 
privatisation but also for Its division. Hosoda’s statement in 
favour of the government’s plan to break-up the state railway was
417
widely reported in the national pressi27. it signalled a volte face 
by the MoT in its stance towards JNR reform, the new position 
representing a final recognition that the policies of division and 
privatisation were going to be carried to fruition by the Nakasone 
government whether or not the Ministry of Transport was opposed 
to it. The MoT’s new-found enthusiasm for the reform proposals 
was also a reflection of the realisation that the Ministry’s 
regulatory function would not necessarily cease after the JNR’s 
privatisation; in this regard, the MoT’s position was safeguarded 
by the incorporation in the legislation of a continuing regulatory 
system in which the Transport Ministry was paramount (see 
discussion in Chapter 7).
The final factor in the MoT’s shift of position was a desire within 
the Ministry to ‘get its own back’i 28 on the JNR management which 
had - as set out in Chapters 2 and 3 - defied the Transport 
Ministry’s attempts to subjugate it for long periods of the JNR’s 
operation as a public corporation. A pivotal figure in the MoT’s 
conversion was Sumita Shôji who, although by the time of Minister 
Hosoda’s declaration of support for the JNR’s break-up, was no 
longer in the Transport Ministry, remained a key participant in the
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JNR reform process. Sumita had been Transport Vice Minister 
(Jimu Jikan) in 1978 - 79, the top bureaucrat in the MoT who, 
responsible only to  the political incumbent (the Minister of 
Transport) was the civil servant in charge of the running of the 
MoT. Acting thereafter as Chairman of the Nihon Unyu Keizai Senta 
(the Transport Economics Research Centre) Sumita held the Deputy 
Chair of the influential Fourth Sub-Committee of the Daini Rinchd, 
which recommended the privatisation of the San Kosha (including 
the national railway), and was subsequently a member of the five- 
man JNR Reform Commission which took the general Rinchd 
outline and turned it into specific proposals to divide and privatise 
the JNR. His contribution, within the Reform Commission’s 
deliberations, to the promotion of the JNR reconstruction 
proposals has already been documented in this Chapter; he had 
openly criticised the 1980 JNR Management Plan as Ineffectual, 
had called for the resignation of the intransigent JNR Board, and 
had helped convince the Ministry of Transport that their interests 
would be best served by ending what was futile opposition to the 
reform proposalsi29.
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As a result, both the MoT and Sumita came out well from the JNR 
privatisation. The Ministry’s role as regulator of the national 
railway, in respect of safety, tariffs, company investment policy, 
and Board appointments was - as outlined above - enshrined in the 
new Laws and Sumita personally gained the top post in the new JR 
group, the Presidency of the largest company, JR Easti30.
The Diet Revisited - the Legislative Process of the JNR 
P riv a tis a tio n
Following the delivery of the JNR Reform Commission’s Kokutetsu 
Kaikaka ni Kan Suru Iken (Opinions on the Restructuring of the 
JNR) in July 1985, the Nakasone government formalised a set of 
procedures to turn the proposals into legislation. First, the 
Cabinet gave its approval to the Basic Policy for JNR Reform 
(Kihonteki Hôshin) on 11 October 1985, and mapped out a 
timetable for the division and privatisation of the JNR by 1 April 
1987. Secondly, the Cabinet approved Measures Concerning the 
Management of the JNR’s Long Term Liabilities (Kokutetsu Chôki 
Saimu tonoShôri Hôsaku ni Tsuite) on 28 January 1986. Thirdly, 
the Cabinet gave its approval to eight Bills drawn up to effect the 
dissolution of the JNR, done in two stagesi3i, the first five on 28 
February 1986, and the remaining three on 14 March 1986.
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The JNR Reform Bills were submitted to the Diet in March 1986 
(see the Chronology in Figure I) but that Diet Session (the 104th) 
came to an end before consideration could be given to the JNR 
reform issue. The JNR Bills then became ‘null and void'with the 
dissolution of the Diet prior to the July 1986 General Election, to 
be re-introduced on 11 September 1986 to the next full (107th) 
parliamentary sittingi32.
The JNR Reform Bills having once again been submitted to the Diet, 
their consideration was devolved to newly appointed Special 
Committees on JNR Reform (Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni Kan Sum 
Tokubetsu linkai) set up on 25 September 1986. Loaded with a 
built-in LDP m ajority!33, the Special Committees took over the 
task of overseeing the reform process, at the request of the 
Cabinet, from what would have been the normal procedure of Diet 
Transport Standing Committees (Kokkai Unyu linkai) in both the 
Lower and Upper House. The role of the Diet in providing a forum 
for public debate of the JNR reform issue was therefore further 
constrained by the Nakasone administration which was concerned 
more with the successful implementation of the privatisation 
policy than with any niceties of parliamentary procedures.
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The eight JNR Reform Bills were finally passed, after their 
approval by the Special Committees in the Lower and Upper 
Housesi34 on 28 November 1986. The enactment of the eight JNR 
Reform Laws marked the formal ending of the national railway run 
as a single, nationwide operation and its restructuring, which took 
effect on 1 April 1987, into separate ‘private’ operating 
companies.
A Summation of the Development of the A d m in is tra tiv e  
Reform Policy; JNR Division and Privatisation as the  
Eventual Symbol
When the administrative reform movement was revived by the then 
PM Suzuki Zenko, and relaunched as a coherent policy initiative in 
1981, the JNR was not specifically singled out from the list of 
strategic targets. There were, at that time. Three K’s to be dealt 
with, of which the JNR was but one. Indeed it was, as already 
seen, one of the four conditions laid down by Dokô Toshio for his 
taking the Chair of the Second Administrative Reform Council (the 
Daini Rinchô ) that the reform policies should incorporate a 
solution to the problems of the Three K (Kokutetsu, Kome, Kenkô) 
deficits.
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The intended reforms, at the stage of formulating policy aims, 
were also originally painted with a much wider brush than merely 
that which covered the privatisation of public corporations.
Another of Dôkô’s pre-conditions was that a thoroughgoing reform 
of the administration of local and central government institutions 
should be implemented. In practical terms, however, greater 
attention was paid in the Rinchô findings to the much narrower 
concept of reforming the existing public corporations. Particularly 
as developed thereafter under the Nakasone administration, the 
focus of the administrative reform policies changed away from 
broad thoughts of breaking down the power of bureaucracy and 
promoting an open style of government, to the pursuance of 
policies which, if achieved, would enhance the status of the 
politicians who promoted them.
Loss of an ideological core^ss did not weaken the reform campaign, 
rather the concentration on the art of the achievable gave i t 
particular strength, and gained it the essential unwavering support 
of PM Nakasone. In its revised mode, the policy initiative to 
restructure the public enterprises found relatively  
straightforward targets in the Tobacco and Salt monopoly, andin
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the Telecommunications Corporation. It is not the brief of this 
thesis to discuss in detail the process of privatising NTT but the 
comment can be made that the success of transferring its  
ownership to the private sector (as yet Incomplete)!36 was 
certainly not matched by any really comprehensive accompanying 
deregulation of its market. The distinct lack of moves to open up 
the mainstream telecommunications sector to real competition - 
ostensibly to maintain stable market conditions - contrasted 
vividly with both Dokô Toshlo’s pre-conditions for his appointment 
to the Second Rinchô and to PM Suzuki’s Instructions to that body 
which looked to a reduction in the government’s control and powers 
of intervention in the national economy by deregulation of key 
markets previously the subject of public sector monopolies.
In the years since its privatisation in 1985, certain niche markets 
In the telecommunications field - notably cellular phones, pagers 
and satellite communications - have been liberalised, NTT now 
facing competition from new entrants. However, in an apposite 
observation, Ian Gow has noted that "... (NTT’s) monopoly of 
talented technical manpower, together with its formidable and 
vast R&D power, enable it to retain a significant influence if not
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de facto technological regulatory status over the 
telecommunications sector.”! 37 The privatisation of NTT as a 
single entity essentially substituted a private near-monopoly for 
its public sector predecessor. As such, its privatisation therefore 
does not seem worthy of being regarded as an achievement which 
can be attributed directly to the original aims of the process of 
administrative reform.
The JNR offered a more tantalising proposition for the reformers.
In strict financial terms it had been insolvent for years, and the 
proposals for its division and privatisation made by the Second 
Rinchô could thus have been put forward as official policy 
initiatives much earlier. The Rinchô recommendations for the 
JNR’s reconstruction, in fact, were not completely new, reiterating 
as they did elements of reform plans previously put forward by 
expert observers such as Kakumoto Ryôhei and Ishikawa Tatsujiro. 
What was different this time round was that the proposals had the 
backing of a powerful force identifying the reconstruction of the 
national railway as an achievement, the reward for which would be 
the enhancement of political power. Nakasone’s public declaration 
of the privatisation of the JNR as being central to his
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administration’s policy Intentions added greatly to the standing of 
those, like DokôToshIo, Katô Hiroshi and the other administrative 
reform committee members, who were also prepared to come out 
strongly in favour of the break-up of the national railway.
The JNR privatisation thus became the symbol of the 
administrative reform movement, its original aim of lessening 
overall bureaucratic power in Japan - as had SCAP’s thirty years 
before it - soon superceded. The media coverage which served to 
galvanise public opinion in favour of the break-up of the JNR and of 
the associated target of destroying left wing labour union power in 
the public sector, was a decisive factor in the process by which 
this ‘symbol’ became an accomplishment.
The status-quo faction within administration of the national 
railway was, In this process, completely out-manoeuvered by the 
reform movement, as was the ‘radical’ trade union, Kokurô.
Counter proposals from the JNR executive and, early In the debate, 
from the Ministry of Transport were not given any credence, being 
judged as vain attempts to prop up outmoded, inefficient and se lf- 
interested practices. What opposition that lingered from inside
426
the ruling LDP was also neutralised by the convincing argument 
that the break-up of the JNR need not mean the end of its operation 
as a vehicle for political favour, and that ultimately Its flotation 
would be a major source of revenue for the Government.
Particularly after the conversion, in late 1984, of the MoT to a pro- 
division and privatisation stance, the reconstruction of the 
national railway operation became the centrepiece of the process 
of administrative reform and, in the end, its most obvious 
achievement. On the debatable issue of whether the privatisation 
of the JNR was in fact, the only success of the administrative 
reform movement one observer, Karel van Wolferen, has no doubts.
In The Enigma of Japanese Power he wrote of Nakasone Yasuhiro 
“In the end ... he failed to bring about the policy adjustments he 
championed - except for the break-up of the company running the 
largest losses in the world, the Japan National Railways.”i38
Van Wolferen’s opinion does not, of course, negate the JNR 
reconstruction as a real accomplishment to be savoured by Its  
proponents. Indeed, the very act of implementing the break-up and 
privatisation policies which no one before had dared to carry
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through was, in itself, a major achievement. Eunbong Choi sums up 
the scale of the success thus: "Certainly, a rehabilitated and 
denationalized railroad system was the centerpiece of the 
Nakasone Cabinet’s administrative reforms. It would also be a 
crowning accomplishment for his political career.”!39
The JNR reform was thus a great accomplishment for the Nakasone 
government which implemented it. Whether the process produced a 
‘better’ structure for the operation of the national railway is, 
however, another matter, the political and financial implications 
of which are addressed in the next two Chapters.
428
CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES
1. As the biggest single employer in the public sector the JNR was 
considered a high priority in the new policy of ‘reforming’ public 
sector organisations. The three main public corporations (including 
the JNR) were, in fact, named as requiring such reform in the First 
Report of the Daini Rinchô . See Rinchô Gyôkakushin O B Kai (Former 
Staff of the Second Ad Hoc Committee on Administrative reform 
and of the Council on Administrative Reform) (1 991 ), Nihon o Kaeta 
JÛ Nen - Rinchô to Gyôkakushin (The Decade Which Changed Japan - 
The Second Ad Hoc Committee on Administrative Reform and the 
Council on Administrative Reform), pp.198-199.
2. See Chapter 1 of this thesis, p. 76,
3. An account of the activities of the First Rinchô is contained in 
Gow, Ian (1989), “Government - Industry Relations: Japanese- 
Style Public Corporations and Privatisation”, Japan Forum. Vol. 1, 
No. 2, October, pp.181 - 182.
4. Ibid, p. 182.
5. Choi, Eunbong (1 991 ). The Break-Up and Privatisation Policy of 
the Japan National Railway. 1980-1987. PhD Dissertation, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, pp. 107-108.
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7. Ibid, p.107.
8. Ibid, pp. 65 - 66.
9. Gow (1989), p. 183.
10. Elliott, James (1983), “The 1981 Administrative Reform in 
Japan”, Asian Survey. June, p.766.
11. See Figure 1, adjoining p. 360, for the chronology of the 
Administrative Reform Programme.
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1 2. The need to rehabilitate the government’s finances was the 
real catalyst for the establishment of the Second Rinchô. Although 
the broader aim of a general rationalisation of administrative 
functions was part of the manifesto of the Suzuki administration 
after its General Election victory in June 1980, the urgent 
requirement was to ‘balance the books’. As James Elliott further 
described the motivation for the ‘new’ administrative reform 
policies: in the 1980 financial year the government was
scheduled to issue bonds equivalent to US$63 billion, which are 
exceeded the total of $47 billion for Britain, France, Italy, the 
United States, and West Germany together. In the 1980 budget, one 
third of the general account expenditure was covered by bond 
issues and 12% of the budget was for debt service.” Elliott (1983), 
p.765.
1 3. For further discussion of the San Kôsha , the three public 
corporations designated to be the target of privatisation 
proposals, see Gow (1989), pp.176 - 185.
14. Within the overall public sector deficit, the Three K’s were 
regarded as the central core of the government’s financial 
problems. Writing in 1983, James Elliott expressed the feelings 
prevalent in the administrative reform movement at the time thus: 
“Now the era of high (economic) growth is past, yet demands for 
subsidies, social welfare, and defense expenditures are s till 
strong. For example, the “three K’s - the rice subsidy scheme 
{home ), Japan National Railways (JNR) (kokutetsu), and the 
national health service {kokumin kenkohoken) - are seen as areas in 
particular need of reform”. Elliott (1983), p.765.
15. A discussion of the influence of ‘big business’ on politics in 
Japan is contained in Choi (1991 ), pp.21 6 - 221. Specifically on 
the method by which the government’s financing deficit problem 
would be solved, Choi states that “Undoubtedly, the reform  
catchphrase ‘financial reconstruction not by tax increases but by 
expenditure cuts’ reflected the business sector’s reasoning.” Choi 
(1991), pp. 219 - 220.
16. Choi further reports on this issue, that “The PCAR’s in itia l 
report, issued in July, 1981, reflected an entirely negative 
attitude toward social security. Its tone was amplified by such
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terms as “the respect for the habit of individual responsibility" 
and “the encouragement of self-reliance and self-help.” Welfare 
provision was to be restricted to those genuinely in need of relief. 
...the welfare lobby and the political Left condemned the report as 
a return to nineteenth century views of social security. The 
Ministry of Health and Welfare was really panicked since it had 
apparently not anticipated quite such a vehement denunciation of 
the reform.” Ibid, pp.78 - 79.
1 7. “The heavy electoral dependence on farm sector has been one 
of fundamental assets of the LDP dominance, and the party is under 
constant pressure from farm groups. By giving liberal grants and 
subsidies, the LDP could maintain a solid foundation in rural areas. 
Indeed, the LDP is supported by 55% to 60% of rural voters, as 
compared with 20% to 30% of all urban voters.” Ibid, p.72.
The ‘liberal grants and subsidies’ have led to a situation in which 
“Japanese agriculture is so heavily protected that rice Is at least 
five times as expensive as in other rice-producing areas of the 
world. Indeed, the Japanese consumer pays exorbitant prices for 
most agricultural produce.” van Wolferen, Karel (1990), The 
Enigma of Japanese Power. London, p.60.
18. The concept of a general consumption tax was raised In itia lly  
during the LDP administration of PM Ohira Masayoshi (1978 - 
1980). The first proposal to introduce a Sales Tax, in 1980, failed  
primarily because of strong LDP grassroots opposition.
19. Horsley, William and Buckley, Roger (1990). Nippon. New 
Superpower - Japan Since 1945. London, p.198 for the original 
proposal to introduce a 5% Sales Tax; and p.249 for the actual 
introduction of a 3% Consumption tax.
20. The original objectives of the Daini Rinchd - the removal of 
undemocratic excesses of unaccountable power, and of 
bureaucratic influence - are contained in Rinchd Gyokakushin O B 
Kai (1991), p. 14. The conclusion that the character o f the Daini 
Rinchd changed from the original principles was drawn from the 
analysis of the establishment of the Daini Rinchd in this Chapter 
on pp. 341 - 347, and of its organisation on pp. 348 -354 .
431
21 • The selection of Dokô Toshio to be the Chairman of the Second 
Rinchô provides a further insight on the primary motivation for the 
revival of the administrative reform programme. According to lio 
Jun, Nakasone’s first choice for the Rinchô Chair, Nagano Shigio 
(then Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce - Nihon 
Shoko Kaigi Sho ) was not supported by the staff of the 
Administrative Management Agency. The AMA staff instead 
recommended that, because the real objective of the Second Rinchô 
was to ‘save money', Dokô’s personality would be better suited to 
the task. Nakasone took up this suggestion and secured PM Suzuki’s 
agreement at a meeting on 1 January 1981. lio Jun (1993),
Mineika no Seiji Katei - Rinchô Gata Kaikaku no Seika to Genkai
(The Political Process of Privatization 
Japan in the 1980s), Tokyo, p.33.
Institutional Reform in
22. Dokô Toshio made four conditions as the ‘price’ for his support 
for the establishment of the Second Rinchô, and these were set out 
to PM Suzuki Zenko on 11 March 1981. They were as follows:
a) The Prime Minister should make It clear that, under his 
government political leadership, administrative reform was the 
most Important policy in itiative
b) The reconstruction of the nation’s finances should be 
accomplished without increases in taxation
c) Both central and local government should be subject to the 
administrative reform process
d) Specific targets for the administrative reform policies should 
be the solving of the 3Ks’ problems, and should include the 
privatisation and deregulation of the major public corporations.
On his part PM Suzuki also, shortly after the Diet had passed the 
Bill to establish the ad hoc Administrative Reform Commission 
(which Dokô was to Chair) stated publicly that his administration 
was committed to the aims of reform as embodied in the brief to 
be given to the Second Rinchô viz "... to access the best methods of 
achieving appropriate and rational administration of government ... 
as well as to examine the basic administrative system and its  
management, including the split between public and private
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enterprises ... The government Is resolved to respect the 
conclusions of the Commission and to fully Implement them.” PM 
Suzuki Zenko(1981), Administrative Policy Statement. Thp 
National Diet, Tokyo, 26 January. As reported In the Nikkei 
Shjnbun, 26 January 1981. See also Elliott (1983), pp. 766 - 767.
23. Under DokoToshio, the membership of the Second Rinch6 was 
as follows:
Sejima Ryuzo (Vice President of the East Japan Business Chamber); 
Miyazaki Taro (President of Asahi Chemical); Tashimura Hiroshi 
(Vice President of the Tokyo Stock Trading Company); Hayashi 
Keijd (President of the Japanese Red Cross); Tsuji Kiyoaki 
(Emeritus Professor of Tokyo University); Kanesuki Hidenobu (Vice 
Chairman of Domei); Maruyama Yasuo (Vice President of S6hy6 ).
Despite this wide- ranging membership, the public image of the 
Second Richd was most clearly identified in the person of its  
Chairman, DokoToshio. An NHK television programme, broadcast on 
23 July 1 982, epitomised the view of Dok6 as a man of strong 
principles who disdained any form of ostentation. Entitled 
Hachiiuao Sai no ShOnen:Gvokaku no Kao - Doko Toshio (The 85 Year 
Old DokoToshio as the ‘Symbol’ of Administrative Reform) I t  
portrayed Doko’s taste for the simple life, which was contrasted in 
the public mind with the less dignified behaviour normally 
associated with politicians in Japan.
24. Elliott (1983), p.765.
25. Ibid, pp.768 - 769. See also Gow (1989), pp. 183 - 184.
26. Gow (1989), p.184. This view was also expressed, in 
Interview, by Imashiro Mitsuhide, Tokyo, September 1994.
27. Gow (1989), p. 184.
28. Ibid. Imashiro Mitsuhide, In Interview, also confirmed this  
view that an important contributory factor in the motivation 
behind the proposed reconstruction of the JNR was the desire of 
the LDP Administration to ‘break’ the power of the labour unions 
within the national railway, Tokyo, September 1994. The
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‘unawareness’ of the labour unions of the implications - for their 
own future - of the JNR privatisation proposals is also commented 
on in Mitsuzuka Hiroshi (1984). Kokutetsu o Saiken Suru Hôhô wa 
Kore Shika Nai (This is the Only Way to Reconstruct the National 
Railway), Tokyo, pp.51-52.
29. This conclusion was drawn from the material on pp. 352 - 354,
30. As is later discussed in this Chapter in the section on the role 
of the mass media in the administrative reform debate, Katô 
Hiroshi’s nickname was “Masukomi Kyôju” (Professor Mass 
Communication),
31. Choi (1991), pp.401 - 408 and pp.412 - 431. See also the 
discussion in this Chapter, pp. 341 - 354.
32. Choi (1991), pp. 315 - 320.
33. Choi further commented, in her analysis of the Committee 
structure of the Second Rinchô, that “In selecting the Fourth 
Subcommittee members, the PCAR (Rinchô) retained the former 
Second Special Subcommittee members to smoothly lead the 
debate of the three public corporations’ privatization.” Choi 
(1991), p .413.
34. Dr Kakumoto’s views on the imperfect Implementation of a 
public corporation structure for the national railway in 1949 were 
outlined in Chapter 1 ; his opinions on the need to restructure the 
JNR in Chapters 2 and 3; and his proposals to rationalise the JNR 
Freight Division in Chapter 4.
In the administrative reform debate, the persuasive views of Dr 
Kakumoto on the need to restructure the JNR may well have been 
crucial to the Rinchô’s final adoption of the proposals to break-up 
and privatise the national railway in its Third Report in July 1982. 
This is certainly the view taken by Kusano Atsushi (1989), 
Kokutetsu Kaikaku - Seisaku Kettei Gemu no Shuvakutachi (The 
Reorganisation of the National Railway - The Main Players in the 
Game of Policy Decisions), Tokyo, p.85.
35. Choi also provides an account of the ‘discussion’ which took
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place amongst the Rinchô Fourth Sub Committee, the transport 
bureaucracy, the Unyu Zoku in the Diet, and the JNR executive as to 
the most appropriate legal status of the new JNR Reform 
Commission. Choi (1991 ), pp.430 - 436.
The debate was essentially that of whether the Commission 
(Shingikai) to devise the exact proposals for the JNR’s division and 
privatisation should be set up under Article 3 or Article 8 of the 
National Government Organisation Law of 1 948. An Article 3 
advisory body would be under the broad authority of the Cabinet, 
while one established as an Article 8 organisation would be 
responsible to a specific Ministry.
Both the JNR executive and the majority opinion of the Rinchô 
Fourth Sub-Committee favoured an Article 3 body, arguing - for 
diametrically opposed reasons - that the Article 8 route would 
give the Ministry of Transport an undesirable degree of influence 
over the shaping of the JNR reform plans. As Choi finally states 
“In the end, it was settled following the MOT’s contention, an 
Article 8 status council”. Ibid, p. 436. The decision, approved by 
the Cabinet on the basis that an Article 8 Shingikai would be more 
able to promote the JNR restructuring proposals without 
interference from ‘disinterested’ Ministries later allowed for the 
greater participation of the Ministry of Transport in the formation 
of the plans to break-up and privatise the JNR.
36. See Figure I, adjoining p.360.
37. See again Figure I, adjoining p.360. Professor Imashiro 
Mitsuhide commented to the author that, while the real meaning of 
the Rinchô recommendations was clearly understood by Nakasone 
and the Cabinet, the wording on the proposed division and 
privatisation of the JNR was made deliberately vague in order that 
opposition to the proposals was not alerted by categoric 
references to the planned break-up of the national railway 
operation. Material obtained in Interview, Tokyo, September 1994.
38. See Figure I, adjoining p.360.
39. Ibid.
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40. The JNR Reform Bill (Saiken Hôan) was re-presented to the 
Lower House Transport Committee (Shûgiin Unyu linkai) on 22 
March 1983. This Committee held 6 meetings between 22 March 
and 1 3 April and, once approved by the Lower House (on 1 5 April 
1983), the Bill was referred to the Upper House Transport 
Committee (Sangiin Unyu linkai) . Having been discussed in a 
further 6 meetings (between 21 April and 12 May) of the Upper 
House Transport Committee, it was passed into law in full session 
of the Upper House on 13 May.
The timetable for the preparation of the JNR Reform Bill, and its  
enactment, is discussed in lio (1993), pp. 142 - 144. lio further 
comments (p.143) that great care was taken in the drafting of the 
JNR Reform Bill to avoid any conflict with the provisions of the 
1980 Law which had sanctioned the JNR Management Improvement 
Plan (Keiei Kaizen Keikaku). The Improvement Plan which. If it  
had been successful, would have kept the JNR as a public 
corporation, was still in existence in the period in which the 
Reform Bill was being prepared for submission to the Diet. The 
Bill was therefore drafted without any explicit references to 
division or privatisation although its proponents in the government 
knew that the real purpose of the proposed JNR Reform Commission 
was to draw up definitive measures to effect the dissolution of 
the national railway public corporation and its restructuring as a 
group of privatised enterprises.
41. See p. 348 and Endnotes 21 and 22,
42. See pp. 357-359 for discussion on the establishment of the 
JNR Reform Commission, The conclusion that the setting up of this 
new body to carry out the proposed reform of the national railway 
marked a pivotal point in the administrative reform process was 
drawn from the foregoing analysis on pp. 357-361, and from the 
material In Figure I, adjoining p. 360.
43. A number of the author’s key Interviewees, notably Ishii Naoki, 
Maeda Kiyoji, and Imashiro Mitsuhide, stressed that the JNR 
Management retained a most unworldly attitude towards the 
proposed reorganisation, believing - apparently - that their 
connections with LDP Politicians would protect them from the 
privatisation proposals. Interviews, Tokyo, July 1991 to May 1992.
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44. See Figure I, adjoining p. 360.
45. The First Report (July 1981) of the Daini Rincho had, in fact, 
referred to the public corporations - the San K6sha - only In 
general terms, decisions on the reform of the operations of the 
JNR, NTT and the Tobacco and Salt Monopoly being ‘postponed for 
further consideration’. Rincho Gyokakushin OB Kai (1991), pp.1 81- 
205. For the Section confirming that consideration of the final fate 
of the San Kosha should be postponed, see p.205.
46. The Rinchd Basic Report of July 1982 is contained in Rinchd 
Gyokakushin O B Kai (The Administrative Reform Committees) 
(1991), Njhon o Kaetta Ju Nen - Rinchd to Gvdkakushin f A Ten Y^ar 
Record of the Administrative Reform Committees), p.217-301. See 
also Figure I in this Chapter, adjoining p.360.
47. See again Figure I, adjoining p. 360. This point is also covered 
in Mitsuzuka (1984), pp. 236 - 237.
48. An interviewee who had been in a senior national railway
management position during the JNR reform debate expressed the 
following view. In confidence, to the author on the in itia l 
motivation of the pro-reform group in the JNR executive. “At that 
time, when the future policies of JNR were still not clarified, the 
reformists agreed with the opinion that all the problems of JNR 
centred around labour issues. Therefore, they took action as a 
group before the issue of privatisation and division officially  
emerged, to take measures against the labour unions. The group 
which later became called the reformists, informally insisted on 
one thing even as early as 1981: “JNR will be abolished and another 
organisation will be created. Since JNR will be dissolved, all the 
employees will be dismissed, and the new organisation will hire 
only the people they need.” Material obtained in Interview, Tokyo 
September 1994. ’
49. lio Jun puts the date of the foundation of the San Nin Gumi at 
“... around July 1981.” lio (1993), p.49.
50. The background of the Group of Three (San Nin Gumi) of Ide 
Masataka, Matsuda Masutake, and Kasai Takayuki was as follows:
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Ide’s father was a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education, and 
later an LDP member of the national Diet. A JNR management 
colleague of Ide Masataka told the author in confidence that the 
older Ide was prominent for his right wing views “He had declared 
at an early stage In the post War period that ‘we must amend the 
MacArthur Constitution which we were forced to accept from the 
Occupational Forces’ and that the Ide father and son had extremely 
similar views.”
Matsuda had been, as a student, a leader of the Zengakuren (the A11 
Campus Joint Struggle Committee) of Hokkaido University.
However, in the view of the JNR confidant quoted above on Ide, 
Matsuda “changed from extreme left wing to extreme right wing 
after joining the national railw ay.”
The third member of the San Nin Gumi , Kasai Takayuki, had been an 
enthusiastic supporter of the ‘increasing productivity campaign’ 
(Marusei Undo) of the early 1970s. The Marusei policies were 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. Conspicuously unsuccessful, 
they caused relations between the JNR management and the labour 
unions to deteriorate, and Kasai’s anti-union position was 
established from that time.
Kasai’s role in the San Nin Gumi, particularly that he was the firs t 
to put on paper his views on the JNR reform issues, is further 
discussed by Kusano Atsushi. Kusano states that Kasai wrote a 
memorandum in November 1981 outlining his own vision of the JNR 
reconstruction, in which he concluded that the national railway  
should be broken up. The memo, was sent to an unnamed "... 
prominent figure in the business world... ”, a person who was “... 
close to Nakasone Yasuhiro.” Kusano (1989), pp.78 - 79.
51. Ishii Naokid 991). The Drift of the Unions of JNR - JR Before 
and A fter JNR Reform. Tokyo, p.4; supplemented by Ishii’s 
comments in Interview, Tokyo, September 1994.
52. The ‘battle for power’ within the JNR management Is also 
reported in Kusano. He quotes a member of the Rinchd research 
staff, Tanaka KazuakI, as saying that the presence of such a 
struggle was very positive for the Second Rinchd, as a divided JNR
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improved the prospect of the reform proposals being carried out. 
The exact ‘players’ in the battle for power was not so important as 
the fact that there was a struggle going on which would show 
outside observers that the JNR was not united in its opposition to 
the plans to privatise and break it up. Kusano (1989), p.95.
53. Choi states that “The reformers began to ensure that the JNR 
would be never be rehabilitated if it only relied on the current 
Management Improvement Plan, because however well the plan 
worked, long-term debts could not be cleared up. They believed 
that a sectionalizing privatization plan was the only way for the 
JNR to recover. In particular, Ide, who was one of figures 
responsible for setting up the Plan, no longer expected its  
success.” Choi (1991), p.300.
54. If career advancement was an implicit aim of the pro-reform 
group within the JNR management, it was an objective which was 
successfully accomplished. The San Nin Gumi (Group of Three) JNR 
reformers obtained the following positions in the three major 
Honshu JR companies after the privatisation of the national 
railway;
Ide Masataka was appointed Vice President of JR West; Matsuda 
Masatake became Vice President of JR East; and Kasai Takayuki 
acceded to the post of Vice President of JR Central. In addition, 
Sumita Shôji, who was a member of the JNR Reform Commission, 
was appointed the first President of the largest JR Company, JR 
East. Choi (1991), Note 30, p.308.
55. The ultimate defeat of the status quo faction in the JNR was 
reflected in their post-privatisation appointments. Many of the 
anti-reform school left the national railway for other employment; 
those who remained secured much less prestigious positions than 
their pro-reform counterparts. Choi further confirms this point, 
noting specifically that two of the prominent status quo JNR 
executives (Nawata Kunitake, the former JNR Vice President, and 
Ota Tomoyuki, a JNR Advisory Director who had openly criticised 
the JNR Reconstruction Commission) were, after the break-up of 
the JNR, appointed respectively to the posts of Chairman of the 
Japanese Railways Welfare Business Association, and Vice 
President of Chiba Station Building Company. Choi (1991 ), p.308.
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56. For a thorough analysis of the meaning of The JR Family’ see 
Choi (1991), pp. 267 - 271.
57. Ishii Naoki, then a manager in the JNR’s staff relations 
department, told the author in interview “In that period, the 
majority of the members of the LDP viewed that ‘The labour unions 
are causing all the problems. Attack Kokuró and Doro. If you do 
Just that, the LDP will take care of the JNR’s problems” Material 
obtained in Interview, Tokyo, September 1994.
58. The ‘Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee’ was formally called the Seimu 
Chósakai Kótsu Bukai Kokutetsu Kihon Mondai Chósakai Kokutetsu 
Saiken ni Kan Suru Shó linkai (which might be paraphrased in 
English as the LDP Sub-Committee on the JNR Reconstruction). 
Mitsuzuka was appointed its Chairman as a prominent Unyu Zoku 
member of the Fukuda Habatsu (Fukuda Faction) which was the 
main LDP body of influence on transport matters. Choi (1991) o 
332.
59. Choi (1991), pp. 328 - 329.
60. In June 1982 the LDP’s Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee made its 
proposals on JNR reform (the Mitsuzuka Shian ) in which i t 
recommended that the government should wait until the objectives 
of the JNR Management Improvement Plan were realised before 
deciding on specific JNR reform measures. Specifically it  
proposed that:
(i) additional targets should be incorporated in the JNR’s internal 
management plans, namely resolving the funding of the JNR pension 
scheme; promoting a plan to solve the long term debt problem; and 
to provide convincing evidence to back the JNR proposal to have the 
JNR Kansen (trunk lines) in the black by fiscal 1985.
The Mitsuzuka Sub-Committee concluded that, if by 1985, the 
JNR’s financial results proved that the public corporation system 
was maintainable, then its continued existence could be supported 
by government. However, should the JNR’s own efforts have not 
produced a solution to the financial difficulties by 1985, the 
Committee concluded that it was reasonable that the LDP could
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then put forward a policy of division and privatisation. Moreover, 
should division and privatisation be mooted, such policies should' 
be accomplished by fiscal 1987. Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudb ( 1 9 8 1 ), 
Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudd Kansa H6kokush6 , (Annual JNR Audit 
Report), Tokyo, p.26.
61. Ibid.
62. Ide and Kasai had both, at separate times, held the second
f^ost senior position (Sendai Somu Bucho) in the JNR Sendai 
Division; Ota had also formerly been the Head of the Sendai 
Division (Sendai Kanri Kyokuchd) . Their shared Sendai experience 
thus formed a common bond amongst the San Nin Gumi, and gave 
The Group of Three’ a direct link with the LDP Member for Sendai 
(and Unyu Zoku ) Mitsuzuka Hiroshi. Ishii Naoki in Interview, Tokyo 
September 1994. ’
63. lio (1993), pp.80 - 81.
64. Ibid.
65. Ishikawa Tatsujirb (1982), “ Ke/e/ Keitai Ron no Teihen ”
(The Basis of the Discussions on the Form of (JNR) Management), 
Kdtsu Shinbun , 28 February.
66. Choi (1991), pp. 348 - 349.
67. Ibid, pp.359- 360.
68. Ibid, p.349.
69. Noguchi, Paul (1990), Delayed Departures. Overdue Arrivals - 
Industrial Familialism and the Japanese National Railways.
Honolulu, p.55.
70. The Asahi covered the JNR reform issue from an early stage i n 
the discussions on the national railway’s future. Kakumoto Ryôhei 
(1 992). Kokutetsu Kaikaku o Meauru - Masu Media no Doko (A round­
up on the Reconstruction of the National Railway - Trends in the 
Mass media), Tokyo, pp. 114 - 119, provides an analysis of the 
content of the articles emanating from the leading Japanese papers
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(the Asahi included) on the JNR reform debate.
His evaluation of the slant of the major articles which appeared in 
the Asahi concludes that this relatively ‘left wing’ paper was not 
unduly supportive of the JNR status quo position. Analysing 
editorial articles published In the Asahi between May 1981 and 
May 1982, Kakumoto observes that the newspaper was, in fact, 
highly critical of the JNR and of its financial results, and that Its  
‘opposition’ to the Second Rincho’s reform proposals took the form 
of no more than comments that it would be a difficult task to 
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CHAPTER 6
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JNR DIVISION AND 
PRIVATISATION POLICIES AND THEIR IMMEDIATE 
CONSEQUENCES1
The Opinions of the JNR Reform Commission 
The major principles behind the recommendations of the JNR 
Reform Commission were set out in full in the Final Report of its  
Opinions in July 1985. Its strategy for the rehabilitation of the 
Japanese National Railway under privatisation, as it was 
implemented in April 1987 in the form shown in Table 28 
(adjoining p. 457), was based on these following premises2:
- The passenger operations of the JNR should be divided into 
six regional companies. The former JNR Freight Division 
should, however, be established as a nationwide company, JR 
Freight
- The JR operating entities to be created should be 
incorporated as joint stock companies and their stock sold to 
private investors as soon as possible after the establishment 
of a sound financial basis for their management. The 
business scope of the new companies should be as large as
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possible and, in order that they operate in the manner of 
privately owned companies from the outset, the level of 
government supervision and control over their management 
should be reduced to the minimum ‘that the situation 
permits’
- A stable foundation for management should be ensured by 
putting into place special measures for profit adjustment 
between the new regional parts of the JR group. Involving 
the correcting of the imbalances in the profitability of the 
four existing Sh/n/ransen, the subsidisation of the JR 
companies in underpopulated areas, and the alleviation of the 
debt burden on the JR operating businesses by its disposal to 
newly established public corporations with responsibility for 
its future repayment, the profit adjustment provisions were 
aimed at the achievement of declared profits - and the 
avoidance of losses - by the seven JR passenger and freight 
companies
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- The number of personnel to be employed by the J R 
companies should be not more than that appropriate to  the 
efficient conduct of their business
- The placement of former JNR personnel excess to the 
requirements of the JR operating companies, and the 
dispersal of the JNR indebtedness not transferred to the JR 
businesses should be undertaken by the establishment of the 
JNR Settlement Corporation (Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudd Seisan 
Jigyo Dan)
- The disposal of the JNR debt should be accomplished by the 
marketing of the former national railway corporation’s non- 
operational land assets and by the sale, on the stock market, 
of the stock of the JR operating companies.
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The division of the former national passenger railway network into 
separate regional operations was decided on the judgement that 
the level of cross-border traffic amongst the six proposed 
geographical areas was minimal. The basis of the split of the 
JNR’s passenger division on the main island of Honshu into three 
operating companies was that 98% of rail journeys undertaken 
were completed in each of the three proposed areas without 
passengers entering any of the other new companies’ operating 
boundaries3.
The recommendation of a separate operating company for the 
passenger services of each of the three islands of Hokkaido,
Shikoku and Kyushu was similarly considered appropriate as their 
‘self completion’ rates were contained in the 9 5 -  99%range. The 
bus services of the former JNR were also to be divided on this 
geographical basis and, while It was intended that they should 
eventually be separated from and made independent of the railway  
businesses, their operation was initially to be taken over by each 
of the six regional JR companies^.
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The recommendation of the Reform Commission for the reform of 
the JNR's freight operations differed from the proposed split of 
the passenger services into regional operating companies. While i t 
was considered necessary to separate the freight business from 
the passenger operations, the long distance nature of the freight 
services premised the maintenance of a single nationwide freight 
company. The Japan Freight Railway Company was therefore to be 
established to take over the former JNR’s freight operations, 
albeit with a minimal amount of rail track directly owned.
Instead, the JR freight operation was to rent the track from the 
new owners of the national rail network, the passenger operating 
companies. As with the passenger operations, JR Freight was to be 
established as a joint stock company, and its shares floated on the 
Stock Market as and when its profitability permitteds.
The proposal for the JNR’s research and development activities  
was that the two existing bodies, the Railway Technical Research 
Institute and the Railway Labour Science Research Institute, be 
integrated into a single, independent organisation. A new 
institution, the Railway Technical Research Institute Foundation 
was to be established with funds provided by the JNR. Thereafter
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the Institute was to be financed by annual contributions from the 
JR operating companies, both passenger and freight, to whose 
activities its R & D was to be directed. The rate of contributions 
decided upon was 0.35% of the annual income of the JR passenger 
companies, and 0.035% of that of JR Freight, and it was expected 
that the required R & D related to railway development be financed 
from this revenue^.
The remaining operations of the JNR, outside the mainstream of 
the railway services, were to be integrated with two separate 
businesses, whose capital would be inherited by the JR passenger 
and freight companies. In the telecommunications sector, the JNR 
activities were taken over by the Railway Telecommunications 
Company, its services in communications networks and telephone 
exchanges for the railway networks to be utilised by the JR 
operating companies. In 1989 the Railway Telecommunications 
Company was merged with the former JNR affiliate, Nippon 
Telecom, integrating the former’s railway related telephone 
business with the latter’s long distance telecommunications 
services. In data communications, the JNR operations were to be 
transferred to a new business, the Railway Information Systems
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Inc., which inherited the information processing systems such as 
the seat reservation service accessed by the JR operating 
companies^.
The New Operating S tru c tu re
The proposals in the “Opinions” for the post JNR era, concerned 
with the continuation of the activities of the national railway, 
produced the operational structure summarised in Table 29. The 
companies in the lower part of this Table, while comprising part of 
the new JR group, were not established to operate railway services 
but to provide the means of dealing with the major problems 
entailed in the restructuring of the Japanese National Railway. It  
might also be said that the policy of separating the former JNR 
freight division into a new national business which would rent the 
track facilities from the JR passenger companies was also devised 
in order to produce a structure to balance one of the inherited 
problems of the national railway, its Inherent unprofitability.
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As part of the measures for ‘profit adjustments’ in the new JR 
group of companies, therefore, the elimination of the burden of 
owning its own track network, also obviating the need for 
maintenance personnel, resulted in intrinsically lower operating 
costs for the JR Freight operation. Moreover, the adoption of an 
Avoidable Costs System, under which JR Freight would bear only 
the additional and variable costs incurred as a result of the use of 
the track facilities for freight transportation (ie the costs which 
would be ‘avoided’ if freight trains did not use the lines), was 
designed to balance the differing levels of profitability of the 
freight and passenger operationsS.
The legal process of dividing the JNR Group into separate operating 
companies (shown in Table 30) thus acknowledged the fact that a 
substantial part of the services provided by the national railway 
was not financially viable. This requirement to adjust profits and 
losses in the new JR Group was the prime factor behind the 
establishment of the Shinkansen Holding Corporation, and the JNR 
Settlement Corporation, the further public corporation entities 
created (as shown in Table 29) as part of the division of the JNR. 
The understanding that the continued provision of a national ra il
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service would not be self financing was also the reason for the 
provision of a method of subsidisation - the Management 
Stabilisation Fund (Keiei Antei Kikin) - for the JR passenger 
companies in Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido^.
The setting up of the Shinkansen Holding Corporation was based on 
the principle of establishing a viable financial base for the 
operating companies. Thus, the Shinkansen Holding Corporation 
Law provided for a government agency to acquire the existing 
Shinkansen facilities, and to lease them to the three Honshu JRs 
which would be the operators of the services. The Shinkansen 
Holding Corporation inherited the facilities of the Tôkaidô, Sanyô, 
Tôhoku and Jôetsu Shinkansen in exchange for liabilities  
equivalent to the book value of the Shinkansen assets required. 
This debt of 5.7 trillion Yen was to be repaid through revenues 
generated by lease payments from the Honshu JR Companies, the 
individual charges to be determined according to the passenger 
traffic volume and the value of the facilities related to each
Shinkansenio.
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The Shinkansen Holding Corporation further inherited a debt of 2.9 
trillion Yen payable to the JNR Settlement Corporation, 
representing the difference between the book value of the 
Shinkansen assets and their replacement costs. The annual lease 
payments by JR East, JR Central and JR West were thus calculated 
as to provide sufficient funds to the Holding Corporation to repay, 
over a period of 30 years, the total replacement costs of the 
Shinkansen facilities. The division of this aggregate sum of 8.6 
trillion Yen amongst the three Honshu JRs is later shown in 
Table 44.
JR Central was asked to bear by far the largest single 
responsibility for the repayments of the Shinkansen indebtedness, 
in recognition of its acquisition of the highly profitable Tôkaidô 
Shinkansen! 1. The system was designed not only to facilitate the 
financing of the eventual replacement of the Shinkansen 
facilities, but to balance the profitability of the long established 
Tôkaidô and Sanyô Shinkansen against the losses inherent in the 
operation of the Tôhoku and Jôetsu lines. Thus, the disparity 
between the Shinkansen route length inherited by the Honshu JRs 
and the share which each of the Companies would bear of the
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annual leasing charge reflected a belated recognition that the 
decision to build the later Shinkansen had been taken on ‘national’ 
grounds, and not on the basis that they would be financially
viablei2.
The realisation that a basis for ensuring the continuation of 
nationwide rail services would have to allow for the wide 
variations in profitability throughout the former JNR network was 
also the background to the establishment of the Management 
Stabilisation Fund. The Three Island JRs on Kyushu, Shikoku and 
Hokkaido, in addition to being exempted from the inheritance of any 
of the JNR’s long term indebtedness, were provided with this Fund 
so as to produce profits that would cover their expected operating 
deficits. The Management Stabilisation Fund (Keiei Antei Kikin) 
was to total 1.3 trillion Yen and was to be provided by the JNR 
Settlement Corporation according to the relative requirements of 
each of the three Island companies to balance their intrinsic 
losses from continuing to provide rail servicesis. The Fund (see 
Table 31, adjoining p. 465) was to be invested such as to create an 
annual stream of income broadly equivalent to the deficits 
incurred by the railway operations of the Three Island JRs.
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T a b l e  31 THE THREE ISLANDS MANAGEMENT
S T A B I L I S A T I O N  FUND CKE I E I ANTE I KI KI N)
J R  C o m p a n y A  m o u n t o f  F u n d
J R  K y u s h u ¥ 388 b. 30
J R  S h i k o k u ¥ 208 b. 16
J R  H o k k a i d o ¥ 682 b. 54
T o t a l  F u n d ¥ 1278 b. 100
Source : Adapted from data in UnyushoIMlnistry of Transport). ShTSwa 63 Nenban Tetsudd 
Ro££ o (Compendium of Railway Law for 1988). 1988. p. 2432.
The Key Targets of the JNR P riv a tis a tio n
The setting up of the Management Stabilisation Fund was an 
integral part of the process by which the imbalances In profits and 
losses likely to be generated from various parts of the former JNR 
operations would be offset in order to provide a balanced return 
from the new JR Group taken as a complete entity. It thus dealt 
with the first key issue of the JNR Restructuring, namely the 
correcting of major profit differentials amongst the new JR 
companies, and thus the establishment of financial viability for 
the continuing railway operations. A further critical consideration 
in this process was the creation of a structure which would allow 
for the eventual selling off to private investors of the 
government's shares (initially 100%of the companies’ capital) in 
the three Honshu operating companies. This latter target was to be 
facilitated by the method of disposition of the JNR’s debts in such 
a way as to leave the Honshu JRs with a level of indebtedness 
which they could service and yet remain profltablei^.
The division of the national railway’s long term liabilities was 
therefore the second key consideration In the JNR Restructuring.
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It was also connected to the third major factor, that of reducing 
the labour force to be taken over by the new JR operating 
companies, these two issues coming together in the establishment 
of the JNR Settlement Corporation. Formed under the JNR 
Settlement Corporation Law this new public corporation was set 
up with the following functions in mind:
- the servicing of the JNR’s long term indebtedness
- the redemption of these debts through the disposal of 
assets which had belonged to the JNR
- the provision of measures to deal with the re-employment 
of former JNR personnel deemed not to be required by the 
new JR companies! 5.
The system devised for the disposition of the JNR’s debts, in which 
the JNR Settlement Corporation was to play a pivotal role, i s 
described in detail in Table 32. The total level of indebtedness at 
the time of the dissolution of the JNR of 37.2 trillion Yen was 
made up of the JNR’s long term liabilities to government and banks 
of some 25 trillion Yen, and various ‘exceptional’ debts of 12.2 
trillion Yen. The separation of the debt into mainstream JNR
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liabilities and into the five remaining groupings (as in Table 32) 
was a further retrospective acknowledgement of the financial 
burdens which had been imposed on the national railway beyond its  
management responsibility and beyond its financial capabilities. 
Hence, the specific amounts of debt to be apportioned relating to 
the outgoing pensions obligations, the placement of ‘surplus’ 
personnel, the need to subsidise the operations of the Three Island 
JRs, and the liabilities incurred through previous JNR capital 
expenditure on projects of national interesti6.
Table 32 shows these categories of indebtedness and, in addition, 
the means of their distribution to the new companies created in 
the JNR Reconstruction. The share of the liabilities relating to the 
four existing Shinkansen were, as already stated, allocated to the 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation on the basis of their full 
replacement cost. In total this accounted for 8.6 trillion Yen of 
which 2.9 trillion Yen was repayable to the JNR Settlement 
Corporation. A further 5.9 trillion Yen, of which 1.1 trillion Yen 
were deferred rentals due to the Japan Railway Construction 
Public Corporation, was taken over by the three Honshu based 
operating companies and by JR Freight. Even inclusive of the
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future rentals to the JRCPC, therefore, the Honshu JRs acquired 
only 16% of the grand total of the JNR’s long term indebtedness, 
although, initially, they were also committed to the 30 year lease 
agreements covering the Shinkansen facilities owned by the 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation.
The balance of the long term debt was taken over by the JNR 
Settlement Corporation {Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Seisan Jigyô Dan or 
JNRSC) which, incorporating the 2.9 trillion Yen due from the 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation, amounted to 25.5 trillion Yen. The 
JNRSC liabilities included 5 trillion Yen of obligations to 
supplement the former JNR Pension Fund in order to meet future 
unfunded pension payments^^.
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It was proposed that the JNR Settlement Corporation would repay 
its liabilities (net of the 2.9 trillion Yen owed to it by the 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation) through revenues from the sale of 
real estate acquired from the JNR, and from the eventual flotation 
of the shares of the three Honshu JR operating companies!8. As 
shown in Table 32, these two categories of cash generation were 
estimated to account for only 8.9 trillion Yen, leaving around 14 
trillion Yen of the JNR’s original indebtedness as a long term 
obligation on the public sector. As will be discussed later in this 
and in the next Chapter on the flotation plans for the shares of JR 
East, JR Central and JR West, the amounts to be recouped from 
‘asset sales’ are likely in practice to vary from those shown in the 
official estimates. Thus, the return from the share flotations may 
well be much higher than the 1.2 trillion Yen assessed for the 
JNRSC’s holdings in the three Honshu JRs and in the Teito Rapid 
Transit Authority.
By contrast, however, the problems incurred by the JNR Settlement 
Corporation in disposing of surplus land, also later discussed i n 
detail, could equally well indicate that the 1987 evaluation of the 
proceeds from real estate sales will prove to be higher than can be
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achieved in reality. As will be quantified in Chapter 7, the 
experience of the five year period since the JNR Restructuring 
would certainly suggest that the timescale for the achievement of 
the asset and share sale targets will be considerably longer that 
originally envisagedis.
In any case, the original projections given in Table 32 did not 
disguise the fact that no feasible plan could be devised for the 
repayment of a substantial proportion of the long term  
indebtedness inherited from the JNR. The figure of 13.8 trillion  
Y e n 2 0  was the expected long term level of government debt which 
would remain after all conceivable forms of repayments. It was 
thus the estimate of the real cost to the Japanese public of the 
abuses of the public corporation system of operation knowingly 
condoned by successive governments.
implementation of the Reductions in the JR Labour Force
In addition to its role in redeeming at least a portion of the 
national railway’s debts, the JNR Settlement Corporation was 
charged with being responsible for those former JNR employees not 
employed by the new JR companies. This function, involving the
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promotion of re-employment of the excess workers (originally 
estimated at 41,000), was a critical part of the overall strategy, 
as the creation of a large body of unemployed ex JNR staff would 
have been an adverse factor in the public’s reaction to the JNR 
privatisation process. Under the JNR Restructuring plan, those 
former JNR employees not selected for re-employment became a 
burden on the JNR Settlement Corporation which was obliged to 
seek other jobs for the body of workers deemed undesirable in the 
new JR Group2i.
In practice, the impact of this policy on the JNRSC, which bylaw  
had to guarantee employment for the surplus labour force for three 
years after the JNR dissolution, was substantially mitigated by the 
significant reduction in the national railway’s workforce in the 
last two years of its existence. The significant achievement later 
claimed of finding re-employment for all but a small number of the 
displaced JNR personnel was largely a reflection of the pre­
privatisation policy of encouraging early retirement. This policy 
had been introduced after the 1985 findings of the JNR Reform 
Commission which estimated the real staffing requirements of the
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new JR Group to be 183,000 employees, 93,000 less than the 
number forecast to be employed by the JNR at the end of fiscal
198622.
The planned number of employees was determined by the 
Commission on the basis of setting productivity per employee at 
around the same level as pertained in the private railway 
companies. Allowance was also made for the particular aspects of 
the JNR’s operations such as the need for additional staff for 
counter sales of long distance tickets and for fare adjustment, and 
a further margin built in for the expectation of an initial number of 
surplus employees.
It must have occurred to the Reform Commission that if 1 83,000 
employees (168,000 for the passenger companies and 15,000 for 
JR Freight) was the optimum number for the proposed JR Group of 
companies, it would also have been for the JNR public corporation. 
Had measures been put into practice several years earlier to bring 
the JNR’s labour force down to this appropriate level, the problems 
entailed of a sudden reduction in the number of employees would 
not have been incurred. The Commission’s recommendation for
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dealing with this problem, which remained as a result of the lack 
of any such action in the past, was for the JNR to establish a 
special voluntary retirement scheme. It was anticipated that the 
provision of special allowances for those choosing to accelerate 
their retirement from the JNR would reduce the number of 
employees by some 20,000. In the Reform Commission’s view this 
would be only a partial solution to the problem, as the balance of 
the forecast ‘surplus’ of 93,000 people would have to be dealt with 
by the passenger railway companies taking on excess employees 
(32,000) and the JNR Settlement Corporation inheriting the 41,000 
remaining unemployed ex-JNR workers.
The special early retirement scheme was funded by Ministry of 
Finance Guaranteed Bonds23 issued to the JNR despite the 
knowledge that the corporation had no means to repay them. This 
hidden subsidy was, of course, designed to minimise the problem of 
over-employment for the post-privatisation JR Companies, but its 
cost contributed to the additional burden of pensions expenses 
later assumed by the JNR Settlement Corporation.
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As previously seen in Chart 1 2 in Chapter 3, the number of 
employees retiring from the JNR had already accelerated in fiscal 
1 985. A revision of the Pension Fund system in that year had made 
retirement in fiscal 1985 financially advantageous, and 48,000 
JNR employees took advantage of the improved pensions conditions 
offered. The number retiring in fiscal 1986 rose to an 
unprecedented 53,000 as a result of a special allowance which 
provided, in addition to the normal pensions rights, an additional 
payment of ten months of basic salary24.
As a result the JNR labour force, by the end of fiscal 1986, had 
fallen to 223,947. This left, instead of the envisaged 93,000, a 
surplus of unwanted employees of only some 40,000. In addition to 
the impact of the incentives offered to encourage early 
resignations from the JNR, the greater than expected reduction in 
the national railway’s workforce was attributable to a specific 
government campaign to promote its re-employment. This policy, 
undertaken through the Re-employment Promotion Law, involved 
requests to public sector agencies and to business organisations to 
give preferential treatment to applicants who had been voluntary 
JNR retirees. The strength of the economy in 1986/7 contributed
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towards the success of this administrative guidance, not least 
because it provided the justification for the employment of a 
substantial number of the ex-JNR workers by companies in 
transport related industries such as construction, trucks, hotels 
and travel agencies, and by the private railway companies.
The JNR Settlement Corporation thus inherited, as a consequence 
of the strategy of creating other employment opportunities for JNR 
staff prior to the beginning of operations of the JR companies, 
23,660 new ‘employees’. Of this number, already almost half of 
the 41,000 forecast by the JNR Restructuring Commission, 2,510 
were to be permanent employees of the JNRSC. Taking further 
account of the surplus workers who had been provisionally granted 
new employment by other organisations, and those additionally 
desiring retirement, the net figure of those people transferred to 
the JNRSC who had not yet secured alternative employment was 
only 7,62 825.
The new JR companies also gained significantly from the reduction 
in excess staffing levels. Inclusive of the forecast surplus of 
replaced JNR personnel, it was estimated that the total number of
4 7 6
employees which the JR group of companies would have to take on 
might be in the region of 215,000. As of 1 April 1987, however, 
the number of JR operating company employees was 199,596, over 
77,000 (28%) less than the staffing level of the JNR at the 
beginning of its final year of operation.
In addition to the substantial savings in their operating costs 
which this smaller labour force entailed, the new companies also 
benefitted from the system of re-employment chosen to implement 
the transfer from JNR to JR. The method of dismissal of all 
remaining JNR employees and their application to the new JR 
operating companies was not one which had been adopted in the 
privatisation of either NTT or the Japan Tobacco and Salt 
Corporation in which ail public corporation personnel were 
transferred directly to the respective new organisations. The 
policy requiring re-application by all JNR employees in the railway  
privatisation, by contrast, enabled the JR companies to be 
extremely selective in their choice of s ta ff26.
The ability of the JR Group to choose only those who were 
considered to be appropriate new employees was facilitated by the
477
method of allowing each of the new companies to establish its own 
working conditions and criteria for selecting employees based on 
its own new management philosophy. As previously outlined27 in 
Chapter 5 this policy was implemented in the JR Group from the 
top down, principal positions in the JR operating companies being 
awarded to individuals who had actively promoted the 
privatisation measures. A prime example was that of Sumita Shôji 
who, having formerly been a Vice Minister of the Ministry of 
Transport, and a serving member of the Supervisory Commission 
for JNR Reconstruction, was appointed the first President of the 
largest JR operating company, JR East.
On employment policy, Sumita’s Company JR East included the
following clause in its Criteria for Employment. This contained a
‘requirement’ which could be judiciously applied to exclude all of
those former JNR management or staff members thought not to be
wholly In favour of the new privatised structure.
Those whose service record during the days of JNR I s 
satisfactory to meet the requirements of this Company. The 
evaluation of the record during the days of JNR shall be made 
in a comprehensive and fair way based on available data from  
JNR in terms of special knowledge and skills on the services, 
aptitude, and routine performance.28
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The selective use of the JR Companies’ Criteria for Employment 
was, in practice, not restricted to lower status staff. Dismissal 
of JNR management personnel was also undertaken, in order to 
remove those groups which had not shown a positive attitude to 
the division and privatisation of the national railway operation. At 
the general manager level, within the 65 people who had joined the 
JNR in the five years between 1959 and 1963 and were s till 
national railway employees in its last year, only 17 were re ­
employed by the JR passenger and freight companies29.
A substantial element of the former JNR employees forced to seek 
employment elsewhere therefore comprised those who opposed the 
privatisation of the national railway. Of the 7,628 people rejected 
by the new JR companies and transferred to the JNR Settlement 
Corporation as those workers who were unable to find alternative 
employment, indeed, the great majority were members of the 
National Railway Workers Union (Kokurô) , the elimination of 
whose influence on the operation of the national railway had been 
integral to the motivation behind the privatisation policy. None of 
the members of the National Railways Motive Power Workers Union
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(Dôrô) or the Railway Workers Union (Tetsurô) , both of which 
come out in favour of the JNR division and privatisation, were
dismissed30.
The JNR Settlement Corporation was left with the less significant 
than expected problem of finding new employment for the 7,630 
workers transferred from the JNR in April 1987. By the end of the 
three year period of the JNRSC’s statutory employment period, a ll 
but some 1,050 of this number had found alternative jobs. On 1 
April 1990, the remaining 1,047 workers were finally dismissed 
from the JNR Settlement Corporation. Out of the total, 950 had 
been members of Kokurô , the National Railway Workers Union.
The impact of the policy of dismissal and re-employment, together 
with that of the requirement to employ a substantially smaller 
number of staff than in the case of the JNR, was to produce a lower 
operating cost base for the JR Companies. It also resulted in a 
workforce which was more likely to co-operate with the new 
management objectives, so that the JR companies were later able 
to point to ‘improved working attitudes’3i as a consequence of the 
privatisation process.
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Management:Labour Relations in the Immediate Post 
Privatisation Period
The attainment of ‘better’ labour relations in the national railway 
was a stated aim of the privatisation process32. The selective 
employment policy practised by the newly formed JR companies 
was aimed at the achievement of such an improvement in the 
relations between management and labour by the straightforward 
device of strengthening the former and weakening the latter. A key 
feature of this process was the accomplishment of a major shift in 
the balance of power amongst the JR railway labour unions as 
compared with that which had existed in the JNR era.
As discussed in consideration of the administrative reform 
process in Chapter 5, Kokurô’s continuing opposition to the 
proposals to divide and privatise the national railway, in the face 
of the inevitability of the policy being implemented, had 
contributed substantially to its own downfall. Even before bearing 
the brunt of the dismissals from the JNR on its dissolution, the 
National Railway Workers Union (Kokurô) had lost members rapidly 
to those unions (notably Tetsurô ) in favour of the JNR reform
plan33.
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To this element of self-destruction, however, must be added the 
JNR management policy towards relations with the labour unions in 
the period of preparation for the privatisation of the national 
railway. As outlined in Chapter 5, there had, in fact, been signs of 
an attempt on the part of the Kokurô leadership to take a more 
conciliatory line towards the JNR privatisation policy when, in the 
Autumn of 1986, the then union president Yamazaki Shunichi 
proposed that it adopt - as the Tetsurô and Dorò factions were to 
do that year - a joint labour:management declaration in favour of 
the reform proposals in exchange for an agreement on the 
protection of the employment rights of its members. This proposal 
was rejected in October 1986 by the Kokurô union executive - and 
its rank and file - on the basis that its terms - including the 
requirement that the union retract its pending claims against 
unfair labour practices before the Labour Relations Committees - 
were tantamount to a capitulation to the pro-privatisation lobby34.
The response of the pro-reform management of the JNR handling 
the transitional phase between the end of public corporation 
operations of the national railway, and its division and 
privatisation was that a policy of active discrimination against
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Kokurd members In the employment policies of the new JR 
companies could thereafter be justified in the face of the 
uncooperative stance of that particular union. Kokurd’s isolation 
was compounded by the combination of the former Ddro and 
Tetsurd unions into a new body3S, the Japan Confederation of 
Railway Workers’ Union (Tetsuddrdren or JR Soren) with some 
1 33,000 members. This and the secession of the Yamazaki faction 
of Kokurd in February 1987 to form a new union, Tetsussnro (the 
Japan Railway Industry Workers Union), left the pro-management 
side of the labour movement firmly In control as the JNR was re ­
organised into the JR Group of Companies.
The composition of the union membership in the national railway in 
April 1987 therefore differed substantially even from that in the 
latter JNR years. Kokurd , its 34,000 membership comparing with  
a figure of around 250,000 in the mid-1950s, was in no position to 
Influence the decision led by Tetsuddrdren to conclude a Joint 
managementJabour agreement at the outset of the JR operations.
In this joint declarationse the newly formed labour unions - and JR 
management - agreed not to bring about disputes until a stable 
basis had been established for the new operating companies.
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It was this declaration of intent which produced the apparent new
stability in labour:management relations in the JR Group’s firs t
year, and enabled the companies to attribute the absence of strikes
to the implementation of the privatisation policy. That it was so,
certainly reflected the initial elimination of the influence of
Kokuro. If this was then one of the aims of the policy of dividing
the JNR into separate operating units, the ‘better’ labour relations
claimed could indeed be deemed one of the early successes of the
privatised JR Group. In view of the significant cuts in the
inaugural workforce of the new JR Companies, however, these
improved labour:management relations may also have reflected an
enforced element of docility amongst the JR company employees.
As Sumita Shoji, President of JR East later put it:
Dividing the Japanese National Railways and making a private 
management system was a huge trial for us. There is an 
opinion that because of a good business market in Japan, we 
could do it well, but I think this success owed much to the 
employees’ attitudes. Certainly, the Heisei prosperity 
contributed to our satisfactory management, but the 
employees’ attitudes made them accept the facts. The 
sinking of the Japanese National Railway, which was a 
symbol of a ‘ship which could never be sunk’ and the 
employment anxiety that between 70,000 and 80,000  
employees out of 280,000 had to be fired, helped their 
attitudes further.37
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T a b l e  33 F IN A N C IA L  ESTIM ATES FOR JR COMPANY 
OPERATIONS IN F IS C A L  1 9 8 7 :  
COMPARISON WITH  ACTUAL RESULTS
V Billion
JR
East
JR
Central
JR
West
JR
Kyushu
JR
Sh i koku
JR
Hokka i do
JR
Freight
Op era t ing 
Revenues:
Forecast 1472.7 825. 7 773. 8 120. 0 31. 3 88. 0 172. 0
Actual 1535.1 868. 3 747. 0 126. 6 30. 6 72. 6 172. 7
Pre-Tax Profits: 
Forecast 16. 6 9. 8 7. 8 1. 2 0. 5 1. 0 1. 9
Actual 72. 2 60. 8 9. 2 3. 6 1. 1 3. 2 5. 9
Ope ra 11ng Margin : 
(Pre-Tax Prof i ts 
to Operating 
Revenues)
Forecast 1. IX 1. 2X 1. OX 1. OX 1. 6X 1. IX 1. IX
Actual 4. 7X 7. OX 1. 2X 2. 8X 3. 5X 4. 4X " 3. 4X
Return on Net 
Assets: Forecast 4. 3X 5. 7X 4. 4X 0. 2X 0. IX 0. IX 5. 5X
Actual 18. 7X 35. 3X 5. 2X 0. 5X 0. 3X 0. 3X 17. OX
Note: The Pre-Tax Profits Shown for the Three Island JRs include the contributions 
from the Management Stabilisation Fund.
Source : Adapted from data in KOtsu Kyoryoku Kal(Traffic Cooperation Association). Kdtsu 
Nenkan(Transport Yearbook). 1988-1989 Editions.
UnyushO(Ministry of Transport). Showa 63 Nenban Unyu HakushofAnnual Ministry of 
Transport White Papers for 1988). 1989. p. 211.
The Profit Forecasts and the First Year Results o f the J R 
Group
The process of dividing and privatising the Japan National Railway 
produced a new operating structure as was summarised in Table 
29. The privatisation proposals contained profits forecast for the 
JR operating companies on the basis of their separation from the 
organisations, the Shinkansen Holding Corporation and the JNR 
Settlement Corporation, which would incur the bulk of the former 
national railway’s indebtedness. The forecasts were modest, in 
the expectation - which was fully realised - that their 
surpassment would create a favourable public reaction38 to the 
implementation of the privatisation policy.
The Government’s profit forecasts for the first year of the JR 
Group of operating companies are shown in Table 33 together w ith  
the actual figures achieved In fiscal 1987. The overall assumption 
in the official estimates was that the JR Companies should 
generate a 1% profit on revenues, an undemanding target given the 
pre-conditions which had been established for their operation.
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The estimates of operating revenues for the JRs of 3,483 billion 
Yen for fiscal 1987 on which the profit targets were based was 
even a figure 3% less than that achieved by the JNR in the previous 
year. Not only was such a target unrealistically low on any 
comparative basis with the JNR, but it was also completely out of 
line with the official macroeconomic forecasts for that year, 
which predicted substantial growth in the national GNP.
The projected return on net assets was similarly less than 
rigorous, averaging only 5% for the non-subsidised Honshu JRs and 
JR Freight, Inclusive of the Three Islands JR Companies, the 
overall return on group net assets was projected at no more than 
2.9%39.
That the actual results achieved by the operating companies were 
greater than ‘expected’ was unremarkable, except in that they 
confirmed the disparate levels of profitability amongst the former 
JNR’s operations. In particular, the results for fiscal 1987 
demonstrated the inherent profitability of the earliest Shinkansen 
the Tdkaidd , operated by JR Central, and of the Tokyo urban lines 
run by JR East. They further appeared to vindicate the decision to
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place the heaviest burden of the Shinkansen leasing charges on JR 
Central which, despite paying 59% of the total lease costs, 
produced profits six times higher than forecast on revenues only 
some 5% ahead of the estimated figure.
The explanation for the apparent out-performance of the new JR 
Group in its initial year lies in the meticulously planned conditions 
set out in the privatisation process. Thus, the measures 
implemented to deal with the reduction in the workforce, with the 
disposition of the JNR’s long term liabilities, and with the 
financial support required by the Three Island JRs, represented a 
form of stage-management to ensure that the results of the new 
JR companies would appear favourable by comparison with those of 
the JNR. The key factors in producing the turnaround from the 
losses of the JNR to the profits of the JR Group in fiscal 1 987 can 
be summarised as follows:
- The measures taken to avoid placing excess JNR 
personnel in the new companies resulted in a JR 
workforce almost 30% lower than in the JNR in fiscal
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Without this form of subsidy, the JR Freight Company would 
undoubtedly also have been lossmaking in fiscal 1987.
- The formation of the Shinkansen Holding Company, and 
the long lease system adopted of transferring the 
Shinkansen facilities according to the ability to pay, 
resulted in the averaging out of profits from the three 
Honshu JRs. As part of the lease revenues were 
channelled, via the JNR Settlement Corporation, to the 
Three Islands Management Stabilisation Fund, this 
measure also resulted in the profits from the Honshu 
Shinkansen being used to subsidise the lossmaking 
operations in Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido.
- The favourable legacy to the JR operating companies 
of a lengthy period of preparation for privatisation. In 
addition to the significant cost savings from the 
reductions in employment levels which had taken effect 
in the latter JNR years, the new JRs gained on the 
revenue side from the JNR’s policy of increasing fares 
regularly up to 1986. The measures taken to maintain
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T a b l e  34 JR COMPANY RESULTS IN F IS C A L  1 9 8 7 :  
COMPARISON WITH JNR IN  F IS C A L  1 9 8 6
(Interest Payments) Pre-Tax Prof 1ts/(Losses)
7 JR Operating Passenger 
& Freight Companies (339. 3) 156. 0
Railway Telecom and 
Railway In forma t i on (2. 4) 0. 8
Shinkansen Holding 
Corpora t i on (604.8) 1. 8
JNR Set 11ement
-
Corpora t i on (912.6) (2315. 2)
Totai JR Group Results 
in Fiscai 1987 (1859.1) (2156. 5)
JNR Croup Res u1ts in 
Fiscal 1986 (1514.2) (1381.3)
Note: 1) JNR Interest Payments in Fiscal 1986 Include Lease Charges.
2) 7 JR Operating Companies Pre-Tax Profi ts  in Fiscal 1987 include income 
of ¥93.3 Billion from the Management Stabilisation Fund.
Source : Adapted from data in JR Kakusha(Japan Railway Companies). JR Kessan HOkokusho 
(JR Companies Financial Results). 1986-1987 Editions.
The Consolidated Financial Results of the JR Group fo r  
Fiscal 1 9 8 7
A more valid comparison of the first year of the new JR Companies 
with their public corporation predecessor would be that which 
incorporated analysis of the fiscal 1987 results of the government 
agencies which formed part of the new JR Group. The results of 
such an evaluation are shown in Table 34 in which the results of 
the Shinkansen Holding Corporation and the JNR Settlement 
Corporation are consolidated with those of the JR Operating 
Companies. This form of analysis of the real results of the entire 
JR Group for its first year of operation is contained in Abe S e iji’s 
Privatisation of JNR and its Conseauences o^. and the financial 
critique in this Chapter is based on the principles established in 
Abe’s work.
The findings, summarised in Table 34, clearly indicate the overall 
impact of the division of the JNR operations and of the division of 
the national railway’s Indebtedness. Inclusive of the two public 
corporations established to deal with the JNR’s liabilities, the 
first year results of the new JR Group appear in a very different 
light to those of only the seven main operating companies. Thus,
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the profits generated by the 7 operating JRs of 1 56 billion Yen 
were wiped out by the massive deficit of the JNR Settlement 
Corporation. The JNRSC’s loss was the direct result of the burden 
of servicing the bulk of the national railway’s debts which were 
transferred on the JNR’s dissolution. Even consolidating the small 
profit made by the Shinkansen Holding Corporation, the JR Group i n 
total recorded a loss in fiscal 1987 substantially higher than did 
the JNR in the previous financial year. The resultant ‘real’ deficit 
of 21 57 billion Yen (2.1 trillion Yen) was actually considerably 
higher than that recorded in any single year by the national railway 
and over 300 billion Yen (17%) greater than the record JNR loss of 
fiscal 1985*^1.
The key factor in this process was the interest burden which, 
having been taken away from the JR operating companies, was 
transferred to the JNR Settlement Corporation and the Shinkansen 
Holding Corporation. The interest charges borne by these two 
public organisation in fiscal 1987, at 151 7 billion Yen, was higher 
than that incurred by the entire JNR Group in the previous year. 
Inclusive of the interest and lease charges paid by the JR operating
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companies, the JR Group’s outgoings of 1859 billion Yen in 1987 
surpassed the record high figure of 1514 billion Yen in the JNR’s 
fiscal 1986 by no less than 345 billion Yen or 23%.
The JR Group One Year A fter P r iv a tis a tio n
The availability of the figures required to make a more objective 
analysis of the effect of the reorganisation of the national railway 
into the group of JR Companies did not prevent the JRs’ first year 
results being generally greeted favourably‘^ 2 . The positive 
reaction was reinforced by the recording of a significant increase 
in rail passenger transport volume in 1987/88 which, whether or 
not achieved through the direct efforts of the JR management, 
offered a favourable comparison with the stagnancy of traffic in 
the latter JNR years. Reference to the earlier Chart 3 (in Chapter 
2) indicated the growth in railway passenger volume achieved in 
the late 1980s, coinciding with the inauguration of the divided and 
privatised JR Group. In fiscal 1987 specifically, passenger- 
kilometre volume rose by 3.2%, thus supporting the conclusion i n 
the 1988 Annual Report on the Transport Economy that “the JR 
business went generally smoothly for an Initial year”.43
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While writing that “A closer look at the details of this (first year)
settlement of accounts ...will reveal that a situation exists that
leaves no room for undue celebration”44 ishikawa Tatsujirô also
made the following comments after the JR company results for
fiscal 1 987 were announced.
Privatisation has brought about a change in awareness 
reflected in media comments and in the attitude of the 
general public. Coupled with the strong impression made by 
the many actual improvements in service and the active 
expansion of business, there is a generally positive view that 
JR has lived up to public expectations. Strong efforts made 
by the JR Group since its inception have received full public
recognition.45
The “public recognition” to which Ishikawa had referred 
undoubtedly reflected the efforts made by the JR Companies, at the 
outset of their operation as privatised enterprises, to emphasise 
an approach of ‘improved service’ to customers. In this context, 
such initial measures taken by the new JR companies to foster an 
image of being consumer-driven are summarised in Table 35.
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T a b l e  3 5 POST P R IV A T IS A T IO N  SERVICE ENHANCEMENT BY JR COMPANIES
Es tab 1i sh- 
ment of
Increas­
ing
t rans- 
por t 
demand
Passenger railway Companies:
•Establishment of ’Green Boxe s’ for listening to the opinions of Passeng­
ers (Hokka i do)
•Appointment of consumer advisory groups(East Japan)
•Running of special’Torokko trains’ (Central Japan and Shikoku)
•Sale of special tickets in tie-up with aquariurns, go 1f courses, etc. (a 11 
companies)
Freight railway company:
•Expansion of intermodal transport service.such as piggyback service 
•Transport service of motorcycles for touring 
•Passenger car freight
Manageraen t 
Founda t ion
Sa I es 
act ivi t- 
i es
Passenger railway companies:
•Introduction of open counters to ’Green Window’ ticket reservation coun- 
tersCEast Japan)
•Extension of hours for selling reserved tickets(East Japan)
•Introduction of ’Orange C a r d s ’ cards for buying tickets,with a variety 
of i11 ustrations(a 11 companies)
Freight railway company:
•Reinforcement of sales activities by visits to customers 
•Joint sales activities with transport companies
Cos t 
sav i ng
•Reduction in the number of cars per trainfall companies)
•Saving of outside order costs by reviewing outside ordersCall companies)
Related
projects
•Full-fledged operation of tourist business(all companies)
•Operation of new business, such as insurance agents and warehousing(a11 
companies)
•Expansion of railway-related business,such as direct-run concessions(aI 1 
companies)
Enhance­
ment of 
Passenger 
Conven- 
i ence
Bet ter 
serv i ce
Passenger railway companies:
•Increase in trains(all companies)
•Increase o f ’E trains’ at night on Fridays(East Japan)
•Increase of special Shinkansen trains at night on Fridays(CentraI Japan) 
•Running of special trains for the audience of night baseball games at 
the Nagoya StadiumCCentral Japan)
Freight railway company:
•Organization of freight train schedules corresponding to seasonal trans­
port needs
Improve­
ment in 
t rans- 
por t
facilit­
ies
Passenger railway companies:
•Improvement and cleaning-up of station facilities, including repair of 
toilets(aIl companies)
•Increase in trains equipped with cooling faci1ities(a 11 companies) 
•Improvement of seats of trains(all companies)
Freight railway company:
•Trial manufacture of new container cars
Source : Adapted from data in Fukushima Toru. Privatisation of Japanese National Railways and Its Operation 
Afterwards. Japan International Cooperation Agency. 1989.
This list was assembled by Fukushima Toru who, while writing as 
a representative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, i s 
also an Executive of JR Centrale. The lengthy compilation of 
‘service enhancements’ shown in Table 35 may therefore be 
regarded as being from the internal perspective of the JR 
companies themselves, concerned with justifying their new 
‘favourable’ image in the minds of the travelling public.
A non-JR view might instead contrast the impact made by this 
large number of minor improvements on the overall national 
railway service with that of alternative strategies, such as the 
completion of major capital investment projects which would 
have, for example, effected the speed-up of commuter services and 
alleviated their congestion levels. The contrast between the 
cosmetic nature of the self-proclaimed service enhancements by 
the JR companies, and their 61% reduction in capital spending on 
railway investment projects in fiscal 1987 (compared with the 
final year of the JNR) put the JR management policies more clearly 
in the category of being publicity-driven rather than the consumer 
orientation that it suited their image to emphasise.
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Despite these reservations, there is no doubt that the 
identification of the effects of the division and privatisation of 
the JNR with 'tangible evidence’ such as the ‘new’ services 
introduced by the JRs (as listed in Table 35) helped to deflect 
attention from the less positive consequences which the end of the 
first year of the JR Group’s operation had brought about.
Thus, the provision of the various individual enhancements in sales 
and service facilities was held up to be a greater contribution to 
national transport than would have been the capital investment 
required for instance to deal with the important problem of 
overcrowding in urban transport.
In summary of the position of the privatised JR Group a year after 
its establishment, the positive image of service betterment and of 
more stable labour relations prevailed over the reality of the 
financial results of the privatisation process. Thus, the overall 
outcome - real, and substantial losses - of not just the JR 
operating companies but of the consolidated JR Group was 
generally overlooked.
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The normal basis for financial comparisons being that of the 
profits of the seven JR operating companies for fiscal 1987 with  
that of the huge losses of the JNR in the previous year, the results 
of the two public bodies which had inherited the problem of 
resolving the debt position - as the exponents of the privatisation 
process wished - received little attention. With the consolidation 
of the new public corporations, however, not only were the JR 
group’s overall losses considerably higher than in the JNR era but, 
although the JR operating companies had achieved a small 
reduction in their debt levels in their first year, the total amount 
of JR indebtedness at the end of fiscal 1987 was higher than at the 
time of the JNR's dissolution.
The overall conclusion is that, to take the initial year of operation 
of the new JR Group as a benchmark of the positive nature of the 
JNR reconstruction policy, would be a premature basis for 
judgement. A much longer period of operation by the JR companies 
was surely required as the basis for a reasoned evaluation of the 
JNR privatisation process, a point addressed in the next Chapter 
which reviews the national railway as administered by the JR 
Group five years into its privatised state.
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CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES
1. Examination of the financial structure of the national railway 
after its division and privatisation and of the first year’s results 
of the JR operating companies is undertaken in this Chapter with 
basic statistics obtained, in the main, from the library of Kôtsu 
Tôkei Kenkyùjo (Institute of Transport Statistics), Tokyo. Specific 
acknowledgement is given in each statistical Table for the 
principal sources of information, as is it to Abe Seiji of Osaka City 
University for the author’s adaptation of his technique of 
assessing the financial results of the JR group consolidating the 
two public corporations set up in the privatisation process to deal 
with the disposal of the Shinkansen assets and the JNR liabilities. 
With these exceptions, however, the detailed financial analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 6 Is the work of the author and therefore no 
additional credit to other writers is considered to be due. The 
substantial reference In the analysis to specific Tables, moreover, 
acts as a supplement to the Endnotes in this Chapter.
2. JNR Restructuring Commission (1985). Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni Kan 
Suru Iken (Opinions on the Restructuring of the JNR), Tokyo, July.
3. Nihon KokuyCi Tetsudo Saiken Kanri linkai (1985) (JNR Reform 
Commission), Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni Kan Suru Iken (Opinions on the 
Restructuring of the JNR), p.51.
4. Ibid, p. 51.
5. Ibid, pp.82-88 covers the proposals for the Freight operation. 
The specific issues of setting up a single nationwide company for 
freight, and eventually ‘floating’ its shares on the stock market, 
are dealt with on p.83 and p.87.
6. Ibid, pp. 89 - 90.
7. As shown in Table 29, adjoining p. 461.
8. Ishii Naoki, in Interview, indicated to the author that the 
Avoidable Costs System had first been considered by the JNR in the 
late 1960’s. At that time the JNR Freight Division was beginning to
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lose business to Road freight transport and it was argued - by the 
JNR Freight management - that since, even if there was no 
railfreight operation, the JNR would still have to run the same 
amount of track and it would therefore have been "fairer” to 
reduce the cost, to the Freight Division, of accessing the track 
infrastructure. The introduction of such an Avoidable Costs 
System would thus have enabled JNR Freight to cut its charges to 
freight users and to compete better against the truck sector. The 
JNR Board decided against any such policy change - because i t 
would have meant the passenger operations bearing a higher 
proportion of the total costs - and the adoption of Avoidable Costs 
was delayed by some 20 years. Interview, Tokyo, September 1994. 
Discussion of the initial proposal to introduce an Avoidable Costs 
system for the JNR Freight operation is also contained in Ishikawa 
(1975), p. 311.
9. Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Saiken Kanri 
117.
inkai (1985), p. 71 and p.
10. Ibid, p. 71, p. 1 25 and p. 132.
11. The differing profitability of the Shinkansen lines inherited 
by the JR companies was the subject of analysis in Chapter 4. 
Charts 13 and 14 (adjoining p. 252 and p. 291 respectively) show 
the financial results of the Tôkaido, Sanyo, Tôhoku and Jôetsu 
Shinkansen.
12. As postulated in Chapter 4, pp. 295 - 299.
13. See Table 31, adjoining p. 465.
14. As set out on p.456 and as reflected in the provisions of the 
Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni Kan Sum Iken which is discussed on pp.455- 
461.
1 5. Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Seisan Jigyô Dan Hô (1986) (JNR 
Settlement Corporation Law), in Chùkai Tetsudô Roppô (1993). 
(Compendium of Railway Laws), pp. 2433-2461. As also confirmed 
in Suga (1992), Privatisation in Japan. London, p.44.
1 6. This was the conclusion of the analysis of the proposals for
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the disposition of the JNR debt, on pp. 461 - 468, and in Table 32, 
adjoining p. 469.
17. The JNR Settlement Corporation inherited, as part of its  
responsibility to repay the national railway’s accumulated debt, a 
commitment to pay pension entitlement to the remaining former 
JNR employees. The new JR operating companies were excluded 
from any pension liabilities incurred during the JNR era. Ishii 
Naoki in Interview, Tokyo, September 1994.
18. See Table 32, adjoining p. 469.
19. This matter is discussed in Chapter 7, pp. 528 - 535.
20. Principally as a result of the rounding of smaller amounts, the 
estimated amount of residual debt quoted in the Kokutetsu Kaikaku 
ni Kan Sum Iken (1985) of 14.2 trillion Yen (p. 131) is at variance 
with this figure. The calculation of a forecast 13.8 trillion Yen of 
remaining Long Term Public Sector Obligation is, however, the 
conclusion of the financial analysis in Table 32 (adjoining p. 469) 
of the disposal of the JNR’s liabilities, and is therefore taken to be 
substantially accurate in this study.
21. Suga (1992), p.44. The Law under which the JNR Settlement 
Corporation assumed the responsibility for the re-employment of 
‘surplus’ railway workers Is the Nihon Kokûvu Tetsudô Seisan Jiavô 
Dan HÔ . in Chûkai Tetsudô Roooô (1993), pp.2433-2461,with this 
specific provision (Article 26, 3rd. Part), on p.2435.
22. Nihon KokuyCi Tetsudô Saiken Kanri linkai (1985), p.97.
23. The issue to the JNR of Bonds guaranteed by the Ministry of 
Finance in order to meet the cost of reducing the national railway 
workforce as a prelude to its privatisation had the result of 
increasing public sector borrowing. This policy was sanctioned 
consecutively with the administrative reform strategy of reducing 
government indebtedness. Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô (1986), Kokuvû 
Tetsudô (National Railway Monthly), Tokyo, Vol. 44, No. 3, March, 
pp. 6 - 7.
24. As shown in Chart 12, adjoining p. 237.
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25. Abe Seiji(1 991 ), “Privatisation of Japanese national Railways 
and its Consequences”, The Society of Business Research of Osaka 
University (ed.). Keiei Kenkvû (Business Review), Vol.41, No.5/6, 
p.125.
26. This point is explained in the succeeding text, on pp. 477- 480.
27. See Endnote 54 of Chapter 5 for further examples of 
favourable treatment of former JNR executives who had supported 
the privatisation process.
28. JR East (1987), Criteria for Employment. Tokyo, No. 3.
29. This information is contained in Ishii Naoki (1991 ). The Drift 
of the Unions of JNR - JR Before and After JNR Reform. Manuscript, 
Tokyo, p.9.
30. Ibid, pp. 9 - 10.
31. Better employee attitudes were cited by JR East President 
Sumita Shôji as a prime reason for the company’s ‘success’. “Part 
1 of Interview with Sumita Shôji, President of JR East” (1992), 
Mainichi Shinbun , 23 March. For a further, similar, description of 
changed ‘worker attitudes’ see also Endnote 38.
32. The existence of ‘abnormal’ labour relations in the national 
railway was advanced in the Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni Kan Suru I ken. 
(1985), pp.28 -29, as a contributory factor to the problems of the 
JNR.
33. See Table 47, adjoining p. 566.
34. lio Jun (1993). Mineika noSeiii Katei - Rinchô Gata Kaikaku no 
Seika to Genkai (The Political Process of Privatisation - 
Institutional Reform In Japan In the 1980s), Tokyo, pp. 169 - 170.
35. Prior to the conclusion of the JNR privatisation process Dôrô 
had made - in conjunction with Tetsurô and the smaller labour 
union Zenshirô - two labour:management joint declarations i n 
favour of the reform of the organisation of the national railway. I n
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the agreements, concluded before the end of 1986, Dôrô had 
undertaken to avoid strike action, and to ensure ‘workplace 
discipline’ in the post-privatisation JR enterprises. These 
agreements paved the way for the establishment of Tessanrô as a 
moderate labour union combining the former Tetsurô and Dôrô 
membership. Mochizuki, Mike (1993), “Public Sector Labor and the 
Privatisation Challenge: The Railways and Telecommunications 
Unions” in Allinson, Gary D. and Sone Yasunori (eds.) Political 
Dynamics in Contemporary Japan. Ithaca and London, pp. 1 8 7 - 188; 
and Mutò HisashI In Interview, Tokyo, March 1992.
36. The Dôrô agreement (hitherto outlined in Chapter 5) not to 
indulge In strikes or other disputes - in exchange for job 
protection for union members - together with the exclusion of 
Kokurô activists from employment in the new JR companies was a 
crucial factor in contributing to the outward appearance of 
improved labour relations in the post privatisation era. Ishii 
Naoki, Managing Director of Kôtsu Tôkei Kenkyûjo indicated to the 
author in interview that the new attitude of JR management 
towards the newly conciliatory labour unions was epitomised by 
comments made. In the first stages of operation after the 
implementation of the privatisation process, by senior 
management of JR West, that their employees who had been Dôrô 
members in the JNR era, were now “fellows in the JNR reform”. 
Material obtained in Interview, Tokyo, September 1994.
37. Mainichi Shinbun (1992), 23 March.
38. Even prior to the publication of the results for the first year 
of the JR companies, an article in the form of a discussion between 
the Journalist Yayama Tarò and the Managing Director of JR East, 
Matsuda Masatake was published in Shokun (1988), **Minei 
Kokutetsu wa Montò ni Mokatte Iru ” (Privatization Pays Off for 
the Railways), Tokyo, January. An English version also appeared In 
Japan Echo (1988). Tokyo. Voi. 15, No. 1,pp. 6 5 - 69. In the latter 
version, when asked by Yayama Tarò to explain the secret of the 
turnaround (from losses to profits) Matsuda Masatake offered the 
following opinions. “The biggest change is In our employees’ 
attitudes. Their mood has brightened considerably. We’ve rid 
ourselves of the gloomy atmosphere that plagued us in the days 
when you were going around telling the public that the national
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railways were a band of ‘national traitors’.” p. 65.
39. As shown in Table 33, adjoining p. 484.
40. Abe (1991), p p .m -130.
41. Taken from the JR and JNR Kessan Hókoku Sho (Annual 
Financial Results).
42. In Matsuda Masatake and Yayama Taro (1988), p.68 (see 
Endnote 38) the former stated that “We tell everyone who asks 
that denationalization can invigorate a railroad and make it a going 
concern. We hope to set an example of what privatization can 
accomplish”. There is little doubt that the first year’s results of 
the JR group of operating companies were viewed in this light. 
Independent observers, Ishii Naoki and Maeda Kiyoji both indicated 
in interview that the consensus public reaction to the JR profits  
for fiscal 1987 was favourable, on the basis of a simple 
comparison being made with the losses of the JNR for the previous 
year. See also the comments on the fiscal 1987 JR financial 
results by Ishikawa Tatsujirò cited in Endnotes 44 and 45.
43. Ministry of Transport (Fiscal 1988) (Unvushò) . Annual Report 
on the Transport Economy. Tokyo, p.l 1.
44. Ishikawa Tatsujirò “Henka e no Taiò” (Coping w ith
the Changes) Unvu to Keizai (Transportation and Economy), Tokyo, 
Voi. 48, No.10, October, p.2.
45. Ibid, p. 2.
46. Fukushima Toru is Manager, International Section, Corporate 
Planning Division, JR Central.
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CHAPTER 7
THE JAPANESE NATIONAL RAILWAY FIVE YEARS AFTER IT S  
DIVISION AND PRIVATISATION
Assessment of the Privatisation Process
It being reasonable to conclude, as was done In the previous
Chapter, that no balanced judgement could be made of the JNR
privatisation only one year after the inauguration of the new JR
structure. It is the intention of this study to take the end of five
years of operation of the national railway in the form of a group of
privatised enterprises as a representative time at which to
undertake an assessment of the ‘success’ of the privatisation
process.
It has already been the contention of this thesis, as expressed in 
Chapter 5 on the administrative reform programme, that the 
privatisation of the JNR was Its most tangible achievement. This 
view implies that the implementation of the JNR dissolution and 
its reorganisation into privatised corporations was, per se, a 
measure of its ’success’. The very fact of achieving the 
unachievable, the transformation from the original feeling of 
inertia towards the proposals In the public domain - and from open
504
opposition even in the ranks of the party of Government, the LDP - 
to the realisation of the privatisation policies was therefore, in 
itself, an admirable political success.
It is now argued, however, as it was expounded in the Introduction 
to this study, that it is not acceptable to regard the political 
achievement of the actual implementation - against all odds - of 
the JNR privatisation as a sufficient means of judging its  
‘success’. The contention that the sole measure required to prove 
that the privatisation of the JNR has been successful on a political 
basis would be of questionable validity If, the new policy having 
been put into effect, the financial results of the privatised 
national railway turned out to be worse than its predecessor, the 
JNR public corporation. This Is a fundamental point because the 
stated motivation of the policy to break-up and privatise the 
national railway was to reform its finances. Any 
acknowledgement that the privatisation was effective as a 
political exercise - the ‘glittering prize’ of the administrative 
reform programme - must therefore be balanced by an assiduous 
analysis of the financial results of the JNR privatisation processL
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The Favourable Aspects of the JNR P riv a tis a tio n
A non-contentious starting point for a financial analysis of the JR 
group five years into its post-privatisation state is to examine the 
published results for the JR companies for the period 1987 - 1992 
(Fiscal Years 1987 - 1991). The results for the JR Group of 
operating companies for these five financial years are shown in 
Table 36 and the individual figures for revenues and costs 
highlighted in Chart 20. Having comprehensively exceeded the 
conservative forecast for the first year, revenues and profits from  
the group of seven JR passenger and freight companies continued to 
rise in each of the succeeding four years. As can be seen in Table 
36, the momentum of revenue and particularly of profit growth 
slowed considerably towards the end of this five year period under 
review, but profits for the JR operating companies in fiscal 1991 
were still 1% higher than in the preceding year.
At face value, the financial results support the view that the 
privatisation has effected a transformation in the national railway  
form a lossmaking public corporation to an increasingly profitable 
group of quasi-private enterprises. The favourable conclusion to  
be drawn from a reading of the JR Company results is, moreover.
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compounded by two further factors, the positive posture of the 
new operating companies themselves as to the effects of their 
privatisation, and the gains in market share achieved by the JR 
group in the five year period since the implementation of the 
privatisation policy.
1. The Benefits of Privatisation From the Perspective o f  
the JR Companies
The companies’ own positive reaction to the conclusion of five 
years of privatised operation were contained in a review of the 
“Five Years’ Progress of JR and Its Future Tasks” in the December 
1992 issue of Unyu to Keizai (Transportation and Economy)2. The 
main achievements, as identified by the JR operating Companies 
themselves, were the following:
JR E ast
The beneficial effects of privatisation (Mineika) are 
described as:
- the removal of the spirit of Oyakata Hi no Maru (translated 
as “the Government is the boss, so it will pick up the tab for 
any excesses or mistakes”).
- the favourable change from the JNR which was essentially 
the same as central government, and its replacement by
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- an organisation which is customer oriented, and therefore 
responsive to the needs of its users in each particular local 
area, and to Its shareholders3
The beneficial effects of the division of the JNR into smaller 
units (Bunkatsu) are described as:
- the introduction of a spirit of competition
- the removal of the “closed society” feeling of the JNR as a 
monolithic organisation and its replacement by
- a smaller organisation in which the company’s employees 
can “see the face” of its senior management.^
JR C en tra l
- The main benefit of the new structure is described as being 
the ability to make decisions independently and to Implement 
them quickly
- This is compared favourably with the prevention of such an 
autonomous system of management being practiced in the 
JNR era.5
JR W est
- The new structure after privatisation and division of the 
JNR is seen as offering a clear identity of the company’s top 
management to all employees
- The clarification of the company’s management 
organisation has been further facilitated by the 
establishment of local management units
- Although additional capital investment is required in the 
company’s area of operation (Kansai) the local governments 
are now prepared to fund a proportion of the cost. The 
identification of the benefits of capital spending on local 
economies was not apparent In the JNR era
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- The measure o f the success of the new structure is the 
achievement of increases in transport volume. Over the five 
years since privatisation, JR West’s passenger volume has 
risen by 20%, which compares favourably with the 7% gain by 
the five major private railway companies operating in the 
Kansai area.6
JR Hokkaido
- The division o f the JNR into separate units has increased 
the awareness of each regional company. This has raised the 
prospect of increased tourism business to Hokkaido from 
areas such as Tokyo
- The decentralised operating structure has permitted faster 
decision making, such as provided for the construction 
(designed by a Danish State Railway architect) of the new 
Sapporo Airport station.7
JR Shikoku
- The opening of the Seto Ohashi (The bridge system linking 
Shikoku with the main island of Honshu) has been very 
beneficial to JR Shikoku in increasing traffic volumess
- The decentralised structure has facilitated higher capital 
investment in the company’s operating areas. Management 
has concentrated its capital spending on the speed-up of its  
rail operations, and on diversification to broaden the 
earnings base of the company.9
JR Kyushu
- The division of the JNR into separate companies has 
facilitated the introduction of a decentralised management 
structure. JR Kyushu has established local management units 
to be more responsive to local customer needs
- The autonomous management organisation has also provided 
for the establishment of separate accounting control 
systems for the company’s rail and diversified operations
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- Both local and central governments are now contributing 
towards the cost of essential capital investment, such as the 
speed-up of the company’s trunk rail serv ices.io
JR Fre ig h t
- The Company inherited the smallest amount of debt 
(amongst the JR Group) from the JNR
- It also has the smallest asset base since it does not own 
the rail track on which it operates. However, this is 
reflected in the system in which JR Freight pays only the 
avoidable costs for accessing the infrastructure
- Capital investment has increased from the low levels 
which pertained in the last years of the JNR era
- The company is benefitting from government 
encouragement to use railfreight for environmental 
reasons.11
Z.The Market Share Performance of the JR Companies
It is an undeniable fact that In the five years 1987 - 1992, 
coinciding with the period since privatisation, the JR Group has 
managed to arrest the decline in the share of the transport market 
held by the national railway. The JNR suffered a long period of 
loss of market share (as discussed In Chapter 3) and, not only has 
this been reversed but the growth in transport volume achieved by 
the JRs since 1987, In direct contrast to the pattern in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, has outpaced that of the private sector which has 
recently suffered a two point drop in its market shareiz.
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The split of Japanese domestic transport by individual mode i s 
shown in Tables 37 and 38, If it is reasonable to equate the 
passenger volume increases of the private railways with the 
contribution made by economic growth!3, then the JR Companies’ 
performance had undoubtedly been positively influenced by pro­
active management policies to attract new business.
In the freight market (as outlined in Chapter 4) it was the growth 
in freight transport by road which, combined with misguided 
management strategies within the national railway, led to the near 
demise of the JNR’s freight operation. Since 1 988, however, 
compared with road truck freight the growth in volume of the JR 
Freight business has been favourable, as shown In Table 38.
The share of railfreight in the goods transport market remains 
small in comparison with the country’s traditional mode of 
transportation, coastal shipping, and with the competitor which 
emerged in the 1950’s, transport by road. The strength of the 
domestic economy and the shortages in capacity In the truck sector 
have also been supporting factors in the performance of JR Freight
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since its establishment in 1987. Nevertheless, management 
efforts to improve services have made a significant contribution 
to the volume increases achieved.
It would be possible then to describe the privatisation of the JNR 
as a political success. It would also be simple to conclude that 11 
was also a financial success; the old JNR debt had disappeared 
from view; the JRs were now eminently profitable, having been 
heavily lossmaking In the JNR era; and the JRs had reversed the 
fall in market share apparently endemic under the JNR 
management. To this aura of success could, moreover, be added the 
fact that, in the five years since privatisation, there have been no 
tariff increases!4, again a vivid contrast with the experience in 
the final ten years of the JNR; and that, to outward appearances at 
least, management:labour relations In the JR group have improved 
compared with their condition in the time of the JNR.
The last mentioned ‘benefit’ of privatisation, the supposed 
attainment of a better climate for labour relations, is not s tric tly  
speaking a financial matter, although a lower incidence of labour 
disputes would have a favourable impact on the profitability of the
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JR companies. The state of labour relations in the JR Group i s 
therefore treated as a separate issue in this study, to be examined 
after the adoption of a wider basis for the assessment of the 
financial condition of the national railway five years after its  
privatisation.
Financial Analysis of the Consolidated JR Group
The consolidation of the JR operating companies for the purposes 
of this analysis is with the two government agencies set up to deal 
with the JNR indebtedness, the JNR Settlement Corporation and the 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation. The latter organisation was 
dissolved in September 1991, and, as will be discussed later, 
reconstituted as the Railway Development Fund (Tetsudô Seibi 
Kikin) »5. The financial results for the Shinkansen Holding 
Corporation can therefore be included for only half of the final 
year of the five year period, fiscal 1991, in the consolidated 
results for the full JR Group. This point of detail notwithstanding, 
the method of evaluation continues that shown earlier in Table 34 
of the JR Group’s overall performance in the initial year, but now 
brings the figures up to and including fiscal 1991.
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The comparison which is effected in this manner of evaluating the 
financial performance of the JR Group is with the JNR as 
constituted up to fiscal 1986. It is, of course, feasible to 
postulate that the ultimate comparison should be with the JNR 
public corporation as brought forward from its dissolution in 1987 
to an imaginary state of continuance in 1992. Such a standpoint, 
nevertheless, presents conceptual as well as practical difficulties. 
It would, in theory, be possible for the analyst to estimate the 
financial results - and the level of debt outstanding - of the JNR 
had it remained in existence in its then organisational state by 
extrapolating the trends in income and costs the final years of the 
actual operation of the public corporation.
The JNR in its final phase was, however, no longer an organisation 
with a future; it had already been reshaped to prepare the way for 
Its dissolution and privatisation. Even the World Bank study on the 
JNR privatisation - previously cited as coming to a favourable 
conclusion on the effects of the privatisation exercise - draws 
attention to the following factors contributing to the improvement 
in profitability of the new JR’s, their internal management efforts  
being but one of four important considerationsi^:
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Any projections of the JNR five years forward from 1987 would 
have to take account of these positive factors as if they had also 
applied to the national railway in its public corporation guise.
There was, however, no question of what the World Bank study 
above refers to as the “change of institutional framework” - the 
hiving off of the JNR debt and excess personnel to the JNR 
Settlement Corporation or “the effects of rationalization 
achieved in the prior restructuring process” - the massive 
reduction of the JNR labour force in its later years - being applied 
to the JNR as an on-going organisation!8. These measures were 
only put into effect because they were pre-conditions to the 
process of breaking up and privatising the JNR; there was never any 
possibility of them being implemented as part of a policy of 
maintaining the JNR as a single, nationwide operator of the 
national rail network.
In this study, extrapolation of previous patterns of revenues and 
expenses has therefore been deemed an inappropriate exercise i n 
the absence of compensatory factors for the hypothetical ‘on-going 
JNR’ such as the effects of a strong economy (Japan’s GNP rose by 
more than 5% per annum in the first three years after the JNR
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privatisation), the benefit of the personnel cuts, and the financial 
gain from the sideways movement of its debts. Instead, the 
comparison considered most appropriate is that of the JR Group 
(consolidating the new public corporations considered necessary to 
shelter the less acceptable side effects of the privatisation 
process) with the JNR Public Corporation. It was, after all, the 
JNR which had retained the obligation of maintaining a nationwide 
passenger and freight service without the benefit of the more 
enlightened policies on public investment in the rail network or of 
a real economic assessment of the scale of the labour force 
required for the implementation of such a function. The benefits 
from the government’s reassessment on both counts - on future 
public investment in the rail infrastructure and on the required 
labour force in the ‘new’ national railway - were only applied to 
the privatised JR operating companies after the decision was made 
to dissolve and privatise the JNR Public Corporation.
The ‘JNR to JR’ comparison Is included in Table 39, in which the JR 
Group results for 1987-92 are compared with the last five years 
of the JNR. The results of the two JR related public corporations 
are thus consolidated with those of the operating companies, and
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the group figures show the effect on interest costs and on 
profitability of the still existent ex-JNR indebtedness. It can be 
seen that in only one of the five years since 1987 did the full ‘JR 
Group’ made an overall profit, and the average annual deficit on a 
consolidated basis for the five year period would have been 780 
billion Yen. While this is lower than the average loss made by the 
JNR in the last five years of its existence, the calculation of the 
adjusted ‘real’ losses made by the JR group provides a more 
balanced view as to the financial success or otherwise of the 
privatisation of the national railwayis.
The true financial position of the JR group is also illustrated in 
the figures for interest charges since 1987. Inclusive of the debt 
burden of the JNR Settlement Corporation and the Shinkansen 
Holding Corporation, interest charges for the five year period 1987- 
91 were substantially higher than in the preceding last five years 
of the JNR. In each of the five JR years, moreover, the amount of 
interest paid exceeded the figure for fiscal 1986, the JNR’s final 
year of operation, by a considerable margin. The lowest JR Group 
Interest cost figure since 1987 was In fiscal 1990 but, at 1,848 
billion Yen, was 334 billion Yen more than for the JNR in 1986.
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The increase in interest charges in the JR era primarily reflects 
the failure of policies designed to repay a considerable portion of 
the indebtedness inherited from the JNR. As will be discussed 
later in this Chapter, the liabilities of the combined JR Group are 
actually no lower now than the amount taken over from the JNR 
public corporation in 1987, and the lack of success in reducing 
debt has had a dramatic effect on the interest costs borne 
particularly by the JNR Settlement Corporation20.
Additional Considerations in the Financial Analysis of the  
JNR P riv a tis a tio n
There are, in addition, two further factors which must be taken 
into account in reviewing the results of the JR group of companies 
over the past five years. Reference to the first of these was made 
in Chapter 6 - the immediate cutback in capital expenditure by 
the JR companies in the first year of the new regime - but, in fact, 
the low level of investment compared with the JNR era continued 
until 1990. As shown in Table 40, capital investment by the JRs 
did not surpass that of fiscal 1986 until the fifth year, fiscal
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1991, and the five year average of 429 billion Yen per annum since 
1987 was substantially below that of the 650 billion Yen per 
annum spent by the JNR in the five years to 1986.
The claims made by the JR operating companies of enhancements i n 
services since 198721 should therefore be viewed in the context of 
the substantial investment in increasing transport capacity, in 
new rolling stock, and in the renewal of capital equipment which 
took place under the JNR’s operation. The maintenance of the JNR 
level of capital investment would have had a major negative 
influence on the interest costs of the JR Group, and on its  
profitability since 1987.
The impact of the reduction in capital spending on short term 
profitability has also been augmented by a second contributory 
factor - the completion of the programme of closure of ru ra l 
lin e s  - a policy sanctioned in 1 9 8 1 2 2 , The transfers and closures, 
while a product of decisions made originally on behalf of the JNR 
public corporation, continued to be implemented in the post­
privatisation era, in fact right up to 1990. This has prompted 
comments that the privatisation of the JNR has led to the closures
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and removal of passenger services.23 Given that the policy began 
in the JNR era, and that the JR Companies were merely carrying 
through the final parts of a programme which had been agreed 
before their incorporation, such views are without foundation. It  
is, however, pertinent that the JR Companies have benefitted from 
what was a JNR initiative, in the form of elimination of losses 
from local lines which in the past the JNR had been obliged to run.
There is no doubt that the JR group has gained both from prior year 
capital spending by the JNR - and from its immediate reduction by 
JR management - and from the programme of local line closures. 
The origins of such factors deemed to be JR inspired improvements 
in the operation of the national railway thus lie in the JNR era, but 
they have helped the JR operating companies to produce the profit 
increases which are taken as a mark of the gains from the 
privatisation policy.
Notwithstanding the cutback in capital outlays by the JR 
companies, the overall debt burden of the consolidated JR Group 
has not fallen since 1987. Table 32 has already shown how the 
JNR’s long term liabilities were split in such a way as to minimise
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the negative impact on the new operating companies. This element 
of the policy of dividing up the future responsibility for the 
repayment of JNR debt has been reasonably successful in that the 
JR operating companies have been able to  reduce their debt burden 
since the commencement of operations in April 1987.
Long Term Indebtedness - JNR to J R
As highlighted in Table 41, the long term indebtedness of the seven 
JRs has fallen from the 5.9 trillion Yen inherited as a reflection of 
the assets acquired from the JNR, to 4.5 trillion Yen at the end of 
fiscal 1991. This figure does not include the sum of 9.1 trillion  
Yen of new debt acquired In October 1991 as a long term payment 
for the purchase of the four existing Shinkansen from the former 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation. The implications of this 
additional debt will be covered in later discussion of the Holding 
Corporation's successor, the Railway Development Fund. At this 
point it should be noted that the transfer of ownership of the 
Shinkansen has enabled the JRs to begin depreciation of the assets 
acquired, and the extra debt of 1.1 trillion Yen so incurred (the 
excess of the market value over the book value of the Shinkansen 
assets acquired) will be repaid over a sixty year period24.
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The bulk of the JNR’s liabilities, taken over by the JNR Settlement 
Corporation, however, remain in place and, indeed, are now greater 
than the 1987 level. As at 31 March 1992, the JNR Settlement 
Corporation’s debts were almost 1 trillion Yen higher than at the 
starting point five years earlier. Despite the fall in the debt 
burden of the operating companies, the overall level of long term 
liabilities in the combined JR Group at the end of fiscal 1991 was 
therefore almost exactly the same as the 37.2 trillion Yen 
inherited In 1987 from the JNR25.
As the Settlement Corporation’s main function was to be the 
redemption of the long term liabilities of the national railway 
through the sale of its assets, it must therefore be said that it has 
not yet been remotely successful. The JNR debt may have been 
separated and divided up to allow the JR companies to be able to 
generate profits on the operations acquired. The liab ilities, 
however, still exist, and remain as a major part of the overall 
Japanese Government sector indebtedness.
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T a b l e  41 D I S P O S I T I O N  OF THE JNR’ S LONG TERM 
L I A B I L I T I E S  S IN C E  1 9 8 7
¥ tri11ion(figures rounded)
Long Term
Liabilities at 1.4. 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
JR Operating 
Cofflpan i es 5. 9 5. 5 5. 0 4. 8 4. 6 4. 5
Shinkansen Hold- 
ing Corporat ion 5. 7 5. 6 5. 5 6. 2 6. 2 6. 1
JNR Settlement 
Corporat ion 25. 5 26. 1 26. 9 27. 1 26. 2 26. 4
Total 37. 2 37. 3 37. 5 38. 0 37. 0 37. 1
Note: 1) As of 1 October 1991 the 3 Honshu JR Passenger Operating Companies
acquired a further liability of ¥ 9 . 1 tr111 ion,representing the purch­
ase cost of the four existing Shinkansen from the former Shinkansen 
Holding Corporat ion.
2) At 1 April 1987, the former Shinkansen Holding Corporation also 
assumed a long term debt to the JNR Settlement Corporation of ¥2.9 
trillion. This figure is here shown as part of the gross liabilities 
of the JNR Settlement Corporation.
Source : Adapted from data in Unyusho(Ministry of Transport). Toranspoto(Transport). 
1992. p. 32.
The Debt Disposal Issue
The position of the JNR debt as a continuing burden on the Japanese 
public has received less attention than the results of the JR 
operating companies, although realisation is growing that there is 
still a problem of major proportions in dealing with the repayment 
of past JNR debts. An illustration of this issue appeared in the 
financial newspaper, the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei) which, on 7 
February 1993 carried a feature entitled Kakure Fusai 1 Chô 1300 
Oku En Zô (An Increase of 1.1 trillion Yen in the Hidden Debts). In 
this article it was stated that, while the official Government 
estimate was that the former JNR indebtedness would be reduced 
from 26.4 trillion Yen to 26 trillion Yen in fiscal year 1992, the 
remaining national railway debt would still comprise some 70% of 
the total national public sector deficit. The Nikkei thus 
highlighted the fact that the JNR’s debt was still, five years after 
its privatisation, the major constituent of overall central 
government borrowings. The reminder of the continuing existence 
of the JNR indebtedness confirms that the privatisation of the JNR 
did not deal successfully with the comprehensive repayment of the 
prior liabilities built up by the national railway in the providing of 
a level of nationwide service far beyond its financing capabilities.
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It was never expected, of course, that the disposal of former JNR 
assets would produce sufficient revenues to repay all of the long 
term liabilities transferred to the JNR Settlement Corporation in 
1987. As Table 32 had indicated, some 13.8 trillion Yen of the 
JNR’s debts were forecast to remain as a burden on the public after 
the sale of all realisable real estate, and after the flotation of the 
shares of the marketable JR operating companies^e. it was not in 
the original plan, however, that five years after the 
implementation of the privatisation policies, the level of debt 
would still beat 1987 levels. That It is so reflects the 
recessionary conditions In the Japanese economy, the effects of 
which have rendered the JNR Settlement Corporation’s task of 
making substantial inroads into the inherited debt position 
impossible.
The Settlement Corporation was charged, in addition to its  
obligation to find employment for the excess JNR personnel, with 
the duties of paying interest on the liabilities transferred from 
the JNR and of reducing their amount through the selling off of 
surplus assets. These assets comprised the non-operational land 
of the former JNR (8,180 hectares or 13% of the total real estate
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owned by the JNR), its holding in theTeito Rapid Transit Authority, 
the stock of railway equipment not required by the new JR Group, 
and the share capital of the JR operating companies.
The initial policy laid down was for the JNRSC to maximise the 
sale of the real estate assets through the then current practice of 
open connpetitive bidding. It Is somewhat ironic in the present 
climate of substantial falls in real estate values that the 
Government sought to change this principle in October 1987 in 
accordance with the Emergency Countermeasures against Rising 
Land Prices27. This Government decision prevented the JNRSC from 
taking full advantage of the buoyant real estate prices which 
existed at that time, and it was thereafter forced to adopt less 
aggressive tactics to dispose of surplus land.
The JNRSC then had to devise methods in which open bidding - and 
therefore the declaration of the sale price of the land - did not 
take place. These involved the sale of real estate already 
developed by the JNRSC, and disposals through Land Trusts28 set up 
In conjunction with Trust Banks. The lack of success of these 
conservative policies led to the resumption In late 1991 of the
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method of land sales by free market contract. The last mentioned 
strategy was targeted mainly at other public sector bodies, such 
as government, public utility, local authorities etc, and its  
adoption formed part of the Emergency Proposals for the Disposal 
of Land by the JNR Settlement Corporation set out in September 
199129.
In spite of these emergency measures, the sale of land by the 
JNRSC has continued to lag behind the original expectations. Up to  
the end of fiscal 1991 revenues from fixed asset disposals 
(including the sale of its share of the Teito Rapid Transit 
Authority) amounted to 2.2 trillion Yen, only 28%of the 7.7 tr illio n  
Yen target set out by the JNR Reform Commission.
In the Intervening period, the JNRSC has had to bear the costs of 
the Seikan Tunnel joining the islands of Honshu with Hokkaido, and 
of the new bridges constructed to link Honshu with Shikoku. 
Inclusive of Its future (JNR) pensions liabilities, and of the Three 
Islands Management Stabilisation Fund , the JNRSC’s long term 
liabilities as at 31 March 1992 amounted to 26.4 trillion Yen 
compared with the 25.5 trillion Yen it took over in April 198730.
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The JR Share Flotations
The economic conditions which have led to the slump In the real 
estate market have also resulted in the postponement of the 
proposed flotation of the shares of JR Freight and of the three 
Honshu JR’s. The JNR Restructuring Commission’s proposals for 
the eventual sale of the equity of the newly created JR Operating 
Companies to private Investors had been reinforced by a cabinet 
decision on 19 December 1989 that “JR stocks shall be disposed of 
as early as possible in the most effective way available under the 
principles of the JNR reform”.3i
In this statement of intent It was envisaged that the sale of the 
equity of the JR companies would begin by fiscal 1991 (at the 
latest) and, to that end, a Study Group was formed under the 
auspices of the JNRSC to devise the most efficient means of 
putting the share disposal policy into operation. This, in turn, 
resulted In the May 1991 production of a report for the Ministry of 
Transport by the Study Meeting on the Basic Problems of JR Shares 
which re-iterated the need that “effective disposal should be made 
as rapidly as possible in order to speed the complete privatisation 
of the JR and the redemption of JR’s long term liab ilities”.32
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The specific recommendation was for the flotation of the shares i n 
the three Honshu passenger companies as soon as the requirements 
for their listing on the Stock Exchange were met, and that separate 
study should be undertaken with regard to the other JR companies. 
The later point was a tacit admission of the unlikelihood of the 
Three Island JR’s reaching a position in the foreseeable future in 
which flotation of their shares could be countenanced. It was, 
moreover, a recognition that despite the progress made by J R 
Freight, it would take considerably longer to fulfil the listing  
requirements than would JR East, JR Central or JR West33,
The Listing Standards of the Stock Exchange which the J R 
operating companies have to meet prior to any flotation are as 
follows:
- the company requiring a listing must have been in business 
for at least five consecutive years
- It must have net assets valued at a level no less than twice 
that of its paid-up capital
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- its operating and pre-tax profits In the financial year 
immediately preceding any listing must be more than 40% of 
its paid-up capital, and its profits must also be more than 
30% of Its paid-up capital in the two previous years
- it must have paid a dividend in the financial year 
immediately before the proposed listing.34
As can be seen in Chart 21, JR East, JR Central, and JR West had 
met all of these listing requirements by fiscal 1991. It was, 
however, the expectation that the remaining JR operators would 
not fulfil the listing standards in time that led to the May 1991 
report to the MoT recommending that the strategy for the JR share 
flotations should be confined in the short term to the three Honshu 
companies.
In spite of this scaling down of the original flotation plans - lip  
service is still being paid to the possibility of JR Freight and the 
Three island Companies being sold off to the public at some stage 
In the future - the share listings of the three Honshu JRs were 
again postponed. Contrary to expectations, there were therefore no
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JR share sales during fiscal 1991 and, while the management of 
the JR Honshu companies pressed for an early resolution of the 
issue, the commencement of the flotations during the next year 
(fiscal 1992) was also finally formally abandoned by the Ministry 
of Finance.35
The first tranche of the share flotation finally took place in 
October 1993 with the sale of equity in JR East. The listing  
involved the sale of 2.5 million out of JR East’s total capital of 4 
million shares. The flotation raised some 1.07 trillion Yen for the 
JNR Settlement Commission, and represented the first really 
significant receipt of funds to offset the debts it acquired on the 
dissolution of the JNR in 1987.
Mindful of the disastrous experience of the latter instalments of 
the NTT flotation, when the share price fell substantially below 
that at which the public had earlier subscribed for NTT shares36, 
the remaining JR share sales will doubtless be subject to very 
careful scrutiny by the Ministry of Finance in terms both of pricing 
and quantity of stock offered in each tranche. Nevertheless, the 
achievement of the first instalment of shares in JR East is an
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important psychological event, one which now provides a more 
tangible basis on which to assess the overall potential value of the 
JR stocks in relation to the targets for the flotation by the JNR 
Restructuring Commission, This is particularly pertinent because, 
if real estate asset sales continue to be sluggish, the raising of 
revenue from the ‘privatisation’ of the JRs will be a critical factor 
in enabling the JNRSC to reduce its debt burden.
The Restructuring Commission, in its proposals for the division of 
the JNR, originally estimated the proceeds from the flotation of 
the JR stocks (as included in Table 32, adjoining p. 447) at 1.2 
trillion Yen. That figure included the prospective revenues from  
the sale of the JNR’s 51% holding in the Teito Rapid Transit 
Authority, the net sum from the JRs being forecast to be in the 
region of 0.7 trillion Yen ( a figure already surpassed with only the 
first JR East share flotation)37.
However, since the initial establishment of the JR group that 
original basis of estimation of the flotation value has been 
reviewed by a special body - the Assets Disposal Council - 
established by the JNR Settlement Corporation. The Assets
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Disposal Council was established to make recommendations on the 
basic principles on which sales of assets by the JNRSC will be 
made. Having considered the flotation matter, the Council decided 
on a basis of estimating the worth of the JR companies geared to a 
comparison with the actual market valuation of comparable 
companies already quoted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In the case 
of the JRs, the relevant comparison Is with the private railway 
companies such as T6kyu Corporation, T6bu Railway, Nagoya 
Railroad (Meitetsu) , KInkI Nippon Railway (Kintetsu) and, in the 
case of JR Freight, Nippon Express.38
It was on this revised basis that the JR East flotation went ahead 
in October 1993, and the initial experience would suggest an 
ultimate market value of the realisable JR’s, ie. the three Honshu 
passenger companies and JR Freight, several times higher than the 
0.7 trillion Yen first estimated by the Reform Committee. A figure 
of revenues of 5 - 6 trillion Yen is now eminently possible, which 
would reduce the balance of debt outstanding after all asset sales 
by the JNRSC from the forecast figure o f 13.8 trillion Yen to 
something in the region of 8 - 9 trillion Yen. It Is also conceivable 
that a recovery in the real estate market would produce a final
533
return from land sales in excess of the 7.7 trillion Yen originally 
forecast, which would further reduce the net debt which would 
remain.
These are positive conclusions to be made from the initial JR share 
flotation, and from the hope that, eventually, a better climate in 
the real estate market will facilitate property sales to bring down 
the final legacy of JNR debt. It could, however, be some 
considerable time before there is a return to buoyant conditions i n 
the property market. The wish of the Ministry of Finance to avoid 
the embarrassment caused by the NTT flotation would also suggest 
that there could be a lengthy period before the completion of the 
JR share sales, perhaps being accomplished in up to four or more 
tranches. The potential gains from higher than estimated receipts 
from real estate and share disposals are therefore likely to be 
offset by the continuation of a substantial interest burden on the 
existing liabilities for which the JNR Settlement Corporation 
remains liable.
On a narrow basis the policy of separating the JNR’s long term 
liabilities, and apportioning them such that the JR operating
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companies would still be able to generate profits, can be judged to 
have been a success. On a more balanced view, nevertheless, the 
first JR share flotation notwithstanding, the policy of repaying the 
liabilities inherited from the JNR can not be regarded as having 
achieved its aims. The remaining debt burden will not, because of 
the careful policy of dispersion of the JNR liabilities, have any 
major negative impact on the JR operating companies. The 
continuing existence of a substantial level of the former JNR’s 
indebtedness, however, should not be overlooked in any evaluation 
of the achievements of the division and ultimate privatisation of 
the national railway.
Public Sector Funding of Railway In vestm ent
It should be remembered that the aim of reducing the public sector 
financial burden related to the national railway was undoubtedly a 
fundamental objective of the privatisation process. The repayment 
of debt was a clear target, but also implicit in this policy was the 
wish to lessen the dependence of the national railway on public 
subsidies. Again, ostensibly, such an objective has been 
successfully accomplished, at least if the measure is limited to 
that of the results of the JR companies. A broader analysis of the
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government’s present role in financing railway investment, 
however, would suggest a somewhat different conclusion.
In order to evaluate the current position of public sector funding of 
the railway network, it is necessary to divide the post JNR 
privatisation era into two periods. The first would comprise the 
fiscal years 1987 to 1990, covering the period during which the 
three Honshu JR companies were leasing the existing Shinkansen 
from the Shinkansen Holding Corporation. The second period would 
commence from 1 October 1991 when the Shinkansen were sold to 
the Honshu JRs, and the Shinkansen Holding Corporation 
reorganised as the Railway Development Fund. The changes 
implemented in October 1991 incorporated a new basic framework 
for financing the construction of the proposed Shinkansen agreed i n 
January 198939. They, in fact, heralded a different approach to 
government funding of railway Investment, and it Is primarily the 
operation of this new policy which calls Into question the notion 
that the privatisation process has led to a fundamental reduction 
in the public sector’s fiscal obllgatlons^o.
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Even looking first at the pre 1991 four year period, the surface 
view that the Government’s financial burden associated with the 
JRs has been drastically reduced compared with that for the JNR, 
can not be fully supported. Table 42 shows the payment of 
subsidies to the JNR in its final fiscal year, 1986, and compares 
this government funding with the post privatisation experience up 
to fiscal 1990.
As has been discussed in the section on subsidy policy in the JNR 
era (in Chapter 3), payments made by government to the national 
railway after 1977 included grants and interest subsidies which 
were not credited to the JNR Profit and Loss Account. These non­
revenue subsidies were paid to the JNR Capital and Special 
Accounts and. In Table 42 they are separated from payments into 
the Profit and Loss Account. Similarly, the JNR Settlement 
Corporation received, in fiscal 1989, in addition to regular 
subsidies to offset Its burden of supporting JNR debt, special 
payments to supplement the former JNR’s pension fund. In Table 
42 these special subsidies are shown distinctly from the other 
Profit and Loss Account subsidies paid to the JNRSC.
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Included as a further separate category of subsidies paid to the 
post- privatisation JR Group are the revenues generated by the 
Three Islands Management Stabilisation Fund. The establishment 
of this fund as part of the process of dividing the JNR into regional 
operating companies has already been covered in Chapter 6. To 
reiterate, it was designed as a means of providing financial 
support for the Intrinsically lossmaking services in the three 
smaller islands of Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido which would 
replace the need for annual payments from the public sector to 
meet the operating deficits in these regions.
In its operations the Fund - a system devised by Okano Yukihide, 
then Professor of Economics at Tokyo University - produces income 
for the Three Island JRs which is not regarded by some observers 
(Okano included)^! as being a subsidy payment. The rationale for 
such a view is that the annual revenue from the Fund is basically 
different from the system of subsidising the former JNR which 
was essentially a post facto compensation for losses previously 
Incurred. The Keiei Antei K ikin , It Is argued. Is simply a fund of 
money, the income on which can rise or fall according to decisions 
made on its Investment. The return on the Fund Is therefore the
538
product of management decisions which will dictate whether or 
not the overall Income is sufficient to cover the Three Island JRs’ 
operating losses. The management of the Kyushu, Shikoku and 
Hokkaido JR operating companies thus have, in theory at least, 
responsibility for the management of the investments, and their 
actions in deciding on policy towards the Fund will therefore be 
akin to decisions made on matters of railway operation^z.
There is no argument with the case that the return on the Fund over 
time will be a variable, dependent on management decisions 
separate from government policy on offsetting losses incurred by 
the Three Island JRs in providing fundamentally unprofitable 
railway services. The difference in view is, rather, concerned 
with the process involved in setting the initial value of the 
Management Stabilisation Fund, and with the source of the funds 
which facilitated its creation.
The Antei Kikin was set up with funds ‘provided’ by the JNR 
Settlement Corporation, the wholly owned government agency 
whose primary function is to generate revenue from asset sales to 
provide for the repayment of the JNR’s long term liabilities.
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The total amount of 1.3 trillion Yen which makes up the Fund was 
divided as to JR Kyushu 388 billion Yen, JR Shikoku 208 billion Yen, 
and JR Hokkaido 682 billion Yen (as detailed in the earlier Table 
31). The size of the fund was calculated on the basis of an amount 
which, if invested to produce an annual return of 7.3%, would 
produce a level of income which would broadly match the 
estimated operating deficit of each of these three JR operating 
companies.
The Settlement Corporation did not actually have the monies to set 
up the Fund, however, and so its establishment created a new debt 
which did not exist in the JNR era. For the first two years of the 
JR, no part of the principal of the debt was transferred to the 
Three Island Companies but, instead, the JNRSC paid over to JR 
Kyushu, JR Shikoku and JR Hokkaido an amount equivalent to a 7.3% 
return on Its share of the still imaginary fund-^3. As the principal 
of the debt remained notional, the payment of this Interest by the 
JNRSC in years one and two could only be made by further 
increasing its own interest payments and, in turn, its own 
indebtedness.
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From the third year (1989) and for a further seven years the 
principal amount of the Fund is being paid in equal annual 
instalments to the Three Island JRs, but only at the end of this 10 
year period will the JNRSC cease to have the obligation to fund the 
interest payments on which the continued operation of their 
unprofitable rail services is dependent.
The Management Stabilisation Fund was established as an integral 
part of the disposition of the JNR’s liabilities, but its origin was, 
however, an additional long term debt created as part of the burden 
inherited by the JNR Settlement Corporation44. its ultimate source 
is therefore government indebtedness and its existence as 
dependent on the provision of public funds as would be the case 
with the payment of ‘normal’ subsidies. The setting of a target for 
the investment return on these public monies, moreover, 
represented a process little  different from the establishment of an 
annual subsidy. The necessity of the fund continuing to have to 
return around 7.3% per annum greatly limits management 
independence on investment policy, and in practice it is lit t le  
different to the government accepting the obligation to finance the 
deficit from the operation of ‘socially essential’ railway services.
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It is accepted that, since the commencement of payment of the 
loan principal In fiscal 1989, the scope for direct management 
responsibility for the Fund had increased. The implications of this 
additional element of risk on the financial management of the 
Three Island Companies are indeed to be discussed later in this 
Chapter. The conclusion of the evaluation of the Keiei Antei Kikin 
is, however that, sourced from the public sector, and with the 
level of funds calculated to finance lossmaking services, the 
income from the Fund should be regarded as a new and ingenious 
device, but still as a public subsidy.
To the subsidies paid to the JRs and to the JNR Settlement 
Corporation In Table 42 has therefore been added the annual 
payments generated by the Three Islands Management Stabilisation 
Fund. Far from showing the elimination of subsidies after 
privatisation, the reading of this Table is that a substantial public 
sector obligation on funding the railways network remained in 
place up to and including fiscal 1990. Allowing for the 
contributions made in corporate tax payments by the JR companies, 
the average level of public sector funding in the period 1987 - 
1990 was certainly less than in the concluding JNR era but.
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whether it was sufficiently lower to validate the more 
extravagant claims for the supposed new policy, is debatable.
Thus, on a comparable basis, the JR Group’s receipt of 265 billion 
Yen per annum in total subsidies between 1987 and 1990 can be set 
against the JNR’s 375 billion Yen in fiscal 1986. Thus, also on 
comparative figures, the JR Group’s four year annual average of 
1 55 billion Yen per annum of subsidies exclusive of extraordinary 
payments, can be viewed in relation to the 1986 JNR Profit and 
Loss Account subsidy of 188 billion Yen.
That direct public subsidies paid to the JR operators of the 
national railway have been reduced compared to those to the JNR, 
has been taken as evidence that the privatisation process was 
successful in creating a greater degree of financial se lf 
sufficiency than In the public corporation era^s. The acceptance of 
the need for a new system of funding railway investment projects, 
embodied in the decision to sell the Shinkansen network to its  
operators and In the establishment of the Railway Development 
Fund In 1991, however, has prompted a new Interpretation of the 
present state of the relationship between the JR Companies and 
the government.
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JR - Government R elations
The interpretation that there is a new climate in JR-Government 
relations is predicated upon the changing balance of power since 
the 1987 division and privatisation of the JNR, between the JR 
companies, the Ministry of Transport, and the government. The 
essential point in provoking changes in national railway transport 
policy has been that, to paraphrase Ishihara Shintaro’s collection 
of essays^e, the new national railway operators have become ‘The  
JRs That Can Say No’.
The public stance of the JR operating companies is that the level 
of control by the Ministry of Transport is unacceptably high, and 
that the flotation of their shares is necessary to give them the 
position of management independence commensurate with their 
private company status. The other major objective of the listing of 
the JR stock is, of course, to give the companies access to the 
private sector capital markets which will facilitate the raising of 
funds for future investments.
In certain respects, the claim by the JRs of unreasonable control 
by the bureaucracy and by Government has some validity. Under the
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Privatisation Laws, the appointment of the Presidents of the 
operating companies, for example, remains a Ministry of Transport 
prerogative. This leaves scope for adverse political Influence on 
the management policies of the JRs, although it is fair to say that 
the original appointees as JR Presidents did not raise any major 
objections to the Introduction of the new system created on their 
behalf in 1987.
The Law Concerning the Passenger Railway Companies and the 
Japan Freight Railway Company further provides for prior Ministry 
of Transport approval of the business plans of the companies, for 
the disposal of significant assets, and for the issuing of stocks, 
bonds and other long term borrowing instruments-^/, it is In the 
latter context that the JR management would like the share 
listings to be accomplished as soon as practicable.
The remaining controls, on the activities o f the JR’s are offset, 
however, by the inclusion of an automatic right of approval from 
the Ministry of Transport for the operation of businesses other 
than railways unless it is deemed that such investments hinder the 
mainstream services provided by the companies. This has
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facilitated the decision by the JRs to begin to divert capital 
investment away from their railway services into a wide range of 
other business activities such as hotels, shopping centres, and 
travel agencies^e. The freedom to invest in non-railway 
businesses was not one granted to the JNR until such a time 
(1977), when it had no financial resources to undertake such a 
programme of diversification.
Representative of the JR operating companies, the long term aim of 
JR East in relation to diversification is to expand its non-railway 
activities - still accounting for under 10% of revenues - “to a 
level comparable to that of the railway passenger operatlons”49. 
This target of around half of its business comprising diversified 
activities was reiterated in the 1992 Annual Report of JR East In 
which it was also stated that it was consistent with the 
management policy in the private railway sector^o.
The private railways have long had the freedom to develop non­
railway operations (see Table 49 later in this Chapter), and the 
average percentage of revenues still coming from railway business 
in the “Big Fifteen” private rail operators is now lower than 50%.
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The long established diversification policies of the major private 
railway companies have, however, provoked criticism of the lack 
of Investment devoted to improvements in the rail networksi, 
contributing to an overall level of capital spending on the railways 
in Japan which compares unfavourably with the ten year period 
from 1975 to 1985. Chart 22 highlights the massive capital 
investment programme begun in the mid 1970s, and borne 
substantially by the JNR. Although there has been a steady 
increase since the low figure in the year immediately following 
the JNR’s dissolution, the total amount Invested in the railway 
network presently remains well below the peak reached around 
1980.
The newfound freedom to invest In, and promote businesses other 
than railway operations is an asset greatly coveted by the JR 
companies. Abe Seiji, who otherwise has been a critic of much of 
the JNR restructuring policies, was even moved to say that “The 
elimination of this prohibition (on the management of subsidiary 
businesses) might be the only true advantage of p riva tiza tio n .”52 
The concomitant power to base management and, therefore, 
investment decisions, on potential financial return has, however.
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put the JRs in the position of being able to influence decisions on 
railway projects put forward as part of national transport policy 
in a way which was not possible in the JNR era. This can be best 
seen in the proposals for extensions to the Shinkansen network 
which have been an integral part of the activities of the Railway 
Development Fund since its inception in October 199153.
The transaction which resulted in the dissolving of the Shinkansen 
Holding Corporation and its replacement by the Railway 
Development Fund was, as already stated, the sale of the existing 
Shinkansen facilities to the Three Honshu JR companies. The main 
urging for an end to the leasing arrangements established as part 
of the privatisation process, came from JR Central which had the 
greatest imbalance between the lease financing burden and its  
ability to offset this by depreciatlon54. it was therefore a 
response to a JR initiative, the terms of the deal being the 
purchase by JR East, JR Central and JR West of the four Shinkansen 
and their related assets for the total sum of 9.1 trillion Yen.
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Of this amount, 8 trillion Yen represented the original figure of 
replacement costs on which the 30 year leases had been based.
This was converted into an instalment repayment plan for the 26 
years remaining on the lease arrangements. The extra 1.1 trillion  
Yen was established as an additional liability on the Honshu JRs, 
but repayable over 60 years. This excess over replacement value - 
a notional profit on the sale of the Shinkansen assets to the 
Honshu JRs - became the basis of the Railway Development Fund 
{Tetsudô Seibi Kikin ), representing a special fund to meet the cost 
of construction of the planned ‘new’ Shinkansen (Seibi 
S h in k a n s e n ) . 55 The arrangements therefore had a dual purpose: 
firstly of enabling the JR Companies to acquire assets which could 
be depreciated and so create a cash flow for their eventual 
replacement; and secondly of providing the resources for the 
resumption of the Shinkansen construction programme postponed 
since 1982.
The need to find a new method of funding the Investment costs of 
the proposed Shinkansen was dictated by the refusal by the J R 
companies, in the expectation of the negative Investment returns, 
to bear the construction costs themselves. There would thus, for
549




In the case of the JR companies the three Honshu JRs paid a total 
of 710 billion Yen annually (the division being shown in Table 44) 
when the financing arrangements were on the basis of a leasing 
agreement. Since the Shinkansen purchase deal was established in 
1991, the annual instalments have risen to just over 750 billion 
Yen, the extra 40 billion Yen per annum being the annual servicing 
costs of the portion relating to the 1.1 trillion Yen additional 
purchase price over the replacement value of the acquired assets. 
For this excess payment of only 40 billion Yen per annum - which 
compares to annual combined profits of the three Honshu JRs in the 
year to March 1992 of 293 billion Yen - the JR companies are 
credited with the ownership of the existing Shinkansen assets to 
which they can now apply depreciation against their assessment 
for corporate taxationS7.
The annual instalments presently being made by the Honshu JR 
Companies for the four in-service Shinkansen which they are 
buying through the Railway Development Fund (RDF) do not, 
however, simply count towards the total purchase cost of these 
existing Shinkansen assets. The system of financing the ‘new’ 
Shinkansen currently under construction (Seibi Shinkansen) has
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been structured by the RDF to take account of the notional 
contribution made by the management of the JR operating 
companies to the - equally notional - increase in market value of 
the Shinkansen which they inherited from the JNR. When the JRs’ 
Shinkansen leasing arrangement was replaced by the purchase 
contract in 1991, the calculation of the amount which the JR 
companies would have to pay included a sum of 1.1 trillion Yen 
deemed to represent an excess ‘asset value’ created in the four 
years of their operation of the existing Shinkansen so acquired^B.
As previously discussed, this excess of 1.1 trillion Yen is now the 
capital of the RDF, out of which its future obligations to finance 
national and local railway Investment will be metS9. The 
calculation of this sum bore absolutely no relation to the supposed 
increase in asset value of the existing Shinkansen 60; it was rather 
based on what the RDF required for its Investment funding, and on 
what the Honshu JRs could reasonably be expected to pay over and 
above their previous leasing instalments.
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As a quid pro quo for the extra cost of the new purchase 
arrangements, and justified by attributing to the JRs a substantial 
role in creating the hypothetical added asset value of the 
Shinkansen network, the additional payments by the three Honshu 
JR companies - ostensibly for buying the existing Shinkansen - are 
thus also counting towards their obligation to fund the new 
Shinkansen . In the accounts of the Railway Development Fund the 
added annual commitment of 40 billion Yen per annum shared by JR 
East, JR Central and JR West is actually credited as the equivalent 
of a 30% contribution by the JRs to the overall Seibi Shinkansen 
costs6i.
The JR companies are. In fact, responsible for only half of the total 
outlays for the construction of the Seibi Shinkansen , as opposed to 
the 100%borne by the JNR as a public corporation; the balance is 
being provided by central and local government.The RDF system has 
thus resulted in 50% of the costs of building the new Shinkansen 
being removed from the JRs’ orbit.
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The JRs’ share of the cost of the new lines is, moreover, presently 
being funded not by new additional liabilities but, in effect, by the 
proceeds from the annual sums already being paid by the three 
Honshu JRs for the purchase of the ‘old’ Shinkansen. Such a 
system would not have been countenanced in the JNR era, and its  
adoption clearly reflects the power of the JRs to say no to 
projects which are likely to result in the operation of lossmaking
servlces62.
The 50% of the cost of the Seibi Shinkansen borne by the public 
sector is split broadly into a 35% contribution by central 
government, and 15%by the relevant local authorities. This 
resulted In a public sector subsidy towards Shinkansen planning 
and construction costs including in the government’s contribution 
to the RDF which for fiscal 1992 was budgeted at 116 billion
Yen63.
Running alongside the Railway Development Fund, the operation o f 
the Three Islands Management Stabilisation Fund (Keiei Antei 
Kikin) will be a further important factor in the shaping of 
relations between the JR companies and the government. The
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setting up of this fund, and the argument that it represents an 
additional, if oblique form of public sector subsidy, has already 
been depicted in this Chapter; Table 45 now shows the pattern of 
income generated by this Fund since 1987, and the impact on the 
Profit and Loss Accounts of the Three Island JRs.
The operation of the Antei Kikin has been broadly successful to 
date. In that It has met the original objective of offsetting the 
operating losses made by the JRs on Kyushu , Shikoku and Hokkaido. 
Since 1989, the year In which the JNRSC began the repayment of 
the loan principal to the Three Island JRs, however, the yield on 
the fund has started to decline. The original target of a 7.3% 
annual investment return has fallen to 7.1% In fiscal 1991, 
coinciding with the period in which the recipient JR companies 
have taken over the responsibility for the Investment of an 
increasing position of the fund’s assets. Although the fall in the 
investment yield is, as yet, with the exception of JR Shikoku, 
relatively small, it confirms that any material and sustained 
reduction in interest rates in Japan will make the achievement of 
the required 7.3% annual return increasingly difficult64.
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In the short term, any shortfall in the required 7.3%interest yield 
will be made up by a simple expedient ie. the JNR Settlement 
Corporation will have to bear the loss between the interest rate i t  
receives on its own ‘real’ investments and the amount (7.3% per 
annum on the remainder of the 1.3 trillion Yen Fund) it is obliged to 
pay the Three Island JRs. The resultant losses so incurred by the 
JNRSC will merely add to its debt levels, and further reduce the 
likelihood of it ever being able to repay the indebtedness it took 
over from the dissolved JNR.
As the payment of the principal of the Fund takes effect (over 
eight years of equal annual instalments which began in 1991), 
however, the onus will increasingly be on the Three Island JRs 
themselves to find a way of bridging the gap between actual 
interest rates - currently around 3% - and the 7.3% needed on the 
Keiei Antei Kikin to offset their operating losses. The amounts of 
the ‘Fund’ already transferred to the Three Island JRs is shown in 
Table 45 under the heading “Liquid Assets and Investments etc.
In this regard, despite the increasing divergence between 
investment returns in the real world and the required (7.3%)yield
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on the Fund, it is somewhat surprising to note from this Table that 
JR Kyushu and JR Hokkaido have been able to maintain the monetary 
value of the interest returns on the portion of the Antei Kikin 
which they now manage. JR Kyushu was, in fact, one of a list of 
companies which had so-called Hoten agreements with stock 
market securities houses, which helps to  explain why it was able 
to obtain a higher return on its portion of the Anti Kikin than was 
available to ordinary investors65.
In the late 1980s, at which time the Japanese economy was 
growing strongly, and the stock market buoyant, the unofficial 
practice - known as ‘Hoten’ - by securities companies was 
widespread. \n Hoten agreements, a securities company would 
guarantee to the investing institution a minimum return on its  
investment, even if the actual interest generated from the real 
amount invested in the financial market was below that figure.
This practice has since been deemed inequitable in Japan and its  
use discouraged66. Therefore, even if it were the reason for the 
extraordinarily high financial return on the investment funds of JR 
Kyushu and JR Hokkaido up to fiscal 1991, it will not easily serve 
the same purpose in future years.
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A further point of issue is that, given the freedom of the JRs to 
invest in non-rail businesses, the income from the Management 
Stabilisation Fund could conceivably become a form of subsidy to 
cover losses made outside the mainstream operation of providing 
railway services. This fear has already become reality in the case 
of JR Kyushu where its non railway operations are unprofitable^/; 
the operating deficit of its associate companies is therefore, i n 
addition to that in the rail division, being offset by income from 
the Fund. It is not likely that the original proposal for the setting 
up of such a Stabilisation Fund envisaged that its use might 
encompass the effective payment of subsidies to cover losses i n 
non railway investments made by the management of the Three 
Island JR Companies.
What the procedure should be if a shortfall on the Keiei Antei Kikin 
at some point in the future takes the Three island JRs back into 
losses is an unanswered question from the JNR privatisation 
process. The original target of flotation of the shares of the Three 
Islands JR companies is an unrealistic one, and it is much more 
likely that they will remain 100% publicly owned. If they begin to
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incur losses on a regular basis, therefore, the method of their 
financing may, of necessity, return to the basis adopted in the JNR 
era of increasing indebtedness.
One alternative would be for the unprofitable operations of the 
socially advantageous services provided in the less populous areas 
of Japan to be subsidised from the profits made by the larger JR 
companies. Such an option will not be practical to implement, 
however, if by that time, the capital of the companies with the 
resources to provide the required subsidies to the lossmakers has 
already been sold to the investing public. Given the flotation plans 
for JR Central and JR West, as well as for the remainder of JR 
East68, that scenario is eminently feasible. Central government. In 
conjunction with the local authorities in the islands involved, 
would therefore be left with the obligation of increasing the public 
subsidy to the rail operators to avoid the closure of services.
In summary, to properly evaluate the post privatisation 
relationships between the JRs and government funding of railway 
investment69, the public sector contribution to the Shinkansen 
programme must thus be added to the payments made to support
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the JNR Settlement Corporation, and to the Three Island Companies 
through the Management Stabilisation Fund. Taking the Fiscal 1991 
subsidies paid to the JNRSC, and the return on the Keiei Antei 
Kikin, together with the new subsidies for the first year of the 
RDF, the total overall government subsidy to the national railway 
would amount to 307 billion Yen. As shown in Table 46 the net 
outlay by government, even after deducting the taxation paid by the 
JR Companies, is running at the annual level of some 157 billion 
Yen. As per the earlier Table 42, this figure for 1991/2 remains 
consistent with the average annual public sector outlay for the 
first three years (1987 - 1990) of the JR Group’s existence. The 
overall subsidy figures therefore provide further evidence of the 
increasing strength of the JR Companies to negotiate for 
substantial government contributions towards the financing of 
what is, ostensibly, a ‘privatised’ national railway operation.
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T a b l e  46 GOVERNMENT F I N A N C I A L  SUPPORT FOR RAILWAY  
OPERATIO NS
¥ billion
JNR Settlement Corporation 
SubsidiesCFiscal 1991) 100
Management Stabilisation Fund 
Investment Income (Fiscal 1991) 91
Railway Development Fund 
SubsidiesCBudgeted Figure for 
Fiscal 1992)
116
Total Subsidies Received 307
Corporate Ta.xation Paid 150
Net Public Sector Burden 157
Note : The RDF was established in October 1991. The government 
subsidy shown is that budgeted for the first full year of the 
Fund's operation, fiscal 1992.
Source : Adapted from data in Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudd Seisan Jigy5dan(Japanese National Railways
Settlement Corporation). Helsei 3 Nendo Kessan HOkokushoCFinancial Results for Fiscal 1991) 
1992. HokkaidS Ryokaku TetsudS Kabushiklgaisha(Hokkaido Railway Company). Heisei 3 Nendo 
Kessan Hokokusho (Financial Results for Fiscal 1991). 1992. Shikoku Ryokaku TetsudO 
Kabushikigalsha(Shikoku Rai Iway Company). Helsei 3 Nendo Kessan HOkokusho(Financial Results 
for Fiscal 1991). 1992. Kyushu Ryokaku TetsudS Kabushikigaisha(Kyushu Railway Company). 
Heisei 3 Nendo Kessan H8kokusho(FinanciaI Results for Fiscal 1991). 1992. TetsudS Selbi 
Kikin(Rai Iway Development Fund). Heisei 4 Nendo Kessan HokokushsCFinancial Results for 
Fiscal 1992). 1993.
Management:Labour Relations in the JR Group
In a consumer oriented business, the outward manifestation of the 
state of staff relations is the assessment made by its customers 
of the quality of the service provided. With this in mind, the 
privatised JR companies emphasised from the outset a marketing 
strategy of ‘service to the consumer’. A JR East publication (This 
is JR East) typified the JR group’s wish to contrast the railway 
operations of ‘private enterprises’ with those of the JNR run as a 
public corporation, this publicity material setting out the 
following corporate philosophy:
After privatization, JR East set out to prove that it was a 
new company, and that it would put the customer first. After 
all, service is the basic purpose of a passenger railway.
We asked our employees what we should be doing to improve 
customer services. Their insights, drawn from daily contact 
with JR East’s 16 million passengers, provided the key to 
upgrading services, strengthening competitiveness and 
building customer confidence in JR East. Central to our 
service orientation is the concept “high-quality service and 
reasonable fares.” The revision of timetables each spring 
allows us to meet changing demand trends and offer 
customers more convenient and appropriate rail services.^o
The emphasis on customer service which comes out clearly in the 
JR East business strategy has been mirrored in the policies of the 
other JR operating companies. Such attainment of better service
562
to the travelling public should, of course, be the intrinsic aim of 
the national railway companies. It is here argued, however, that 
in practice, the concept of ‘customer service’ in the post- 
privatisation era has also reflected the public relations 
justification of business decisions actually taken on straight 
profitability grounds by the JR companies.
In this regard the subtle shift in the balance of power between 
bureaucratic control and the ‘independence’ of the JR railway  
management has been a crucial factor. The JRs now operate in a 
climate in which their role in the national transport system has 
been modified to reduce the onerous burden of having to maintain a 
nationwide service whether profitable or not. Capital Investment 
decisions by the JR companies no longer must reflect a duty by the 
national railway that its resources must be devoted to the 
maintenance of lossmaking services on the basis of some notion of 
national interest; nor is there any such duty to champion capital 
investment in railway as opposed to diversified activities.
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Thus, while ‘customer interest’ is the ostensible basis for 
business decisions by the JRs, in reality it is because management 
believe that the services to which the resources will be applied 
will be capable of justifying the required capital investment in 
terms of potential profit.
It is this new freedom of management action which has enabled the 
JR companies to turn down proposed investments in areas which 
might well have broader social or national benefits - such as the 
construction of new Shinkansen or commuter lines - on the 
pragmatic basis that they could not be Justified on the basis of the 
likely return on capital. Improvements in ‘customer service’ by the 
JRs have not been the result of some sort of post privatisation 
altruism but, in reality, the identification by JR management of 
potentially profitable areas for investment^!.
As implied in the above quotes from JR East, the principle of 
improved relations between customers and the staff of the JR 
Companies has been considered a crucial factor in the process of 
service enhancement. Compared with the impression lingering 
from the JNR era of national railway staff insensitive to the needs
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of the travelling public, the intention has been to generate an 
image of service given by JR employees which is positive and co­
operative.
Behind the policy aim of improvements in personnel service, 
however, lies the changed composition of the workforce of the J R 
Companies. Reference has already been made to the method 
devised of recruiting staff for the new JRs by dismissing all of the 
former JNR's employees, and then rehiring those personnel who met 
the managements’ set criteria for employment. Whether wholly 
ethical or not, this policy enabled the JR Companies to select only 
those who were likely to support the new management philosophies 
which were to be introduced post-privatisation. Thus, personnel 
lacking empathy with the customer could be, and were, rejected 
and those chosen were more likely to react positively to policies 
which were consumer-led72.
The increased spirit of co-operation between the management of 
the JRs and their labour force which this unity of approach 
towards the outward aims of the business would imply, further 
suggests that internal labour:management relations should also
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have improved. In this regard the immediate ‘favourable’ impact of 
the pre-arranged ‘no strike’ deals in 1986 between management 
and two of the main railway labour unions (Tetsurô and Dôrô) has 
already been mentioned in Chapter 5 of this study, these 
agreements being part of the essential nature of the preparatory 
process which made the privatisation effective, and which 
contributed to the success of the JNR reconstruction policy i n 
bringing about the final break-up of the main anti-management 
union, Kokurô.
Proper consideration of the issue of labour relations in the JR era 
can therefore not be undertaken unless it is borne in mind that 
built-in to the JNR privatisation was a policy of discrimination 
against one union (Kokurô) and in favour of those unions (Tetsurô 
and Dôrô) which had given their support to the reforms. The 
following analysis73 of the state of post-privatisation 
management:labour relations takes that issue as its starting point.
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Table 47  shows the dramatic effect on the membership of Kokurô , 
the once dominant JNR labour union, of the implementation of the 
privatisation policies. By the time that the JNR became the J R 
group of companies in April 1987, Kokurô’s membership had 
dwindled to a figure no more than 1 5% of the peak level which had 
pertained ten years before. As the JR companies took over the 
operation of the national rail network, moreover, Kokurô was in a 
negligible position vis a vis the other railway labour unions. 
Following the completion of their Joint ManagementiLabour 
Agreements (Rôshi Kyodo Sengen) in late 1986, Dôrô and Tetsurô 
merged their operations in February 1 987 to form a combined 
affiliation, Tetsudô Rôren which, in turn, became the JR Sôren 
union affiliation on the JNR’s privatisation two months Iater74.
Also established in February 1987 was another labour union 
affiliation formed as a ‘right wing’ splinter group from Kokurô. 
The latter grouping, Tessan Sôren , took sufficient of the old 
Kokurô members to leave the latter with less than 20% of the 
total membership of the national railway unions at the 
privatisation date, 1 April 198775.
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F i g u r e  II T R A N S I T I O N  O F  M A J O R  L A B O U R  U N I O N S  W I T H I N  J R
Kokuro —
(SOHYO)
Tetsurinkai
Nittetsuro
Shainro
(DOMED
Tetsuro
(SOHYO)
Doro
Tessan
Soren
' 87. 2. 28
(RENCO)
Tetsudo
Roren
’ 87. 2. 2
(ZENROREN)
Zendoro
Doro Soren
(As Of ’87.4. D
(SOHYO)
(As Of ’87.4. D
(As Of ’87.4. D
(As Of ’87.4. D
(As Of ’87.4. D
(RENCO)
Kokuro 35. 942
(RENCO)
Tessan Soren
Hokkaido Tessanro 2. 760
East Tessanro 7, 200
Tokai Tessanro 4. 240
West Tessanro 9, 460
Shikoku Tessanro 258
Kyushu Tessanro 2. 750
Freight Tessanro 1,700
TOTAL 28, 368
(RENCO)
JR Soren
JR Hokkaido Roso 7,760
JR East Roso 50, 300
JR Tokai Roso 13. 200
JR West Roso 32. 870
JR Shikoku Roso 2.154
JR Kyushu Roso 10, 450
JR Freight Roso 6. 800
TOTAL 123. 534
Division 
(’91. 8. 11) 
(’ 91. 5. 23)
(’91. 12.21)
Zendoro 1,247
Doro Soren 736
-Hokkaido 
-East less 
Tokai TeJ 
West Tes4 
-Shikoku 
Kyushu 
-Freight 
TOTAL
(RENCO)I
JR Hokk 
JR East 
JR Toka 
JR West 
JR Shik 
JR Kyus 
JR Freil 
TOTA
^  Union members employed in JR related corporations are excluded from this chart.
Source ; Adapted from data in Kotsu Kyoryoku Kai(Traffic Cooperation Association). K5tsu Nenkan(Transp
J  R
(RENCO)
Tessan Soren
-Hokkaido Tessanro 2, 500
-East Tessanro 4. 300
Tokai Tessanro 
West Tessanro
2. 600 -  
6. 500 -
-Shikoku Tessanro 220
Kyushu Tessanro 2. 900 -  -
-Freight Tessanm 1,500
TOTAL 20. 520
(RENGO)
JR Soren
JR Hokkaido Roso 
JR East Roso 
JR Tokaj Roso 
JR West Roso 
JR Shikoku Roso 
JR Kyushu Roso
JR Freight Roso______
TOTAL 130,500
7,600 
54. 300 
15. 800 
33, 000 
3, 200 
9.800 
6. 800
(ZENROKYO)
- 29, 600 
(As Of ' 94. 9. 1)
(RENCO)
Integration 
■ 91. 12. 6
JR Rengo
■“Hokkaido Tessanro2.400 
-“East Tessanro 3.800 
JR Tokai Union 17,600 
JR West Roso 35.200 
■*JR Shikoku Roso 3.400 
JR Kyushu Roso 11,100 
“Freight Tessanro 1,500 
JR East Shinro inn—  
TOTAL 75.100
(RENGO)
JR Hokkaido Roso 7.600 
JR East Roso 54.800 
•JR Tokairo 1,200 
•JR Nishiro 3.700- 
JR Kyushuro 1.300 
JR Freight Roso 7.100 
total 75,700
(Division)
1.200
(As Of ’94.9.1)
—  ■ 93. 6.12 -
’ 93. 7. 5 —  Jl
670
(As Of *94. 1. 1)
^Transport Yearbook). 1988-1995 Editions. JR KakushaCJapan Railway Con,pani
es).

The transformation of the railway labour union structure i s 
exhibited in Figure II, which sets out the revised groupings as at 
the time of the JNR’s division and privatisation and as later 
developments in the labour movement further altered the 
composition of the unions in the JR companies. The position i n 
April 1987, with the vanquished ‘militant’ Kokurô in an 
insignificant minority amongst the railway unions, supported the 
view that privatisation had accomplished a reduction in the 
potential for labour disputes in the operation of the JRs. This 
‘potential’, moreover, became an automatic reality because the 
new union groupings were bound by their pre-privatisation no­
strike deals, thus helping to sustain the impression that, with its  
privatisation, relations between workers and management in the 
national railway had become significantly better.
Below this favourable surface view, however, analysis of the real 
state of affairs in the JR companies reveals the contrived nature 
of this ‘improvement’ in labour relations. Not only was there an 
artificiality about the situation in managementJabour relations at 
the time of the JNR privatisation because of the prior jo in t 
agreements to avoid strikes and other disputes but, as the ‘real
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world’ problems of achieving the efficient operation of the 
national rail system have since manifested themselves, so have 
tensions again increased between the JR company managements 
and their labour unions^e, in reality, these tensions were there at 
the time of the JNR privatisation but were, for a time, masked both 
by the managementrunion anti-strike pacts and by the satisfaction 
felt by the leadership of the former Tetsurô and Dôrô unions that 
they had attained a strong bargaining position at the expense of 
Kokurô.
In relation to the latter point it should be recalled - as discussed 
in Chapter 5 - that Tetsurô was highly motivated in its support 
for the break-up and privatisation of the JNR in the aim to secure 
victory in its inter-JNR union struggle with Kokurô. The key 
factor in Dôrô’s conversion from a position of militant opposition 
to privatisation to that of wholehearted support was, similarly, 
the protection of the union’s organisation and thus the ensuring of 
its continued existence^?. The early stages of the JR’s operation 
thus brought stability to labounmanagement relations in the 
national railway, but it was achieved only through the means of
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‘buying’ labour docility by guaranteeing the ascendency of certain 
unions (notably Tetsurô and Dôrô ) at the expense of others 
(specifically Kokurô ).
That there were cracks in the facade of this contrived stability  
was not particularly apparent in the first two years after 
privatisation, but elements of the problems which were to come in 
the form of the resumption of labour disputes were actually there 
from the outset of the JR’s operation. In this regard there were 
two main aspects; first, that contrary to the wishes of the 
management, the railway labour side did not establish a single 
union for each JR company but instead (as Figure II attests) set up 
a multiplicity of union groupings; and secondly, that the ‘victory’ 
of Tetsurô/Dôrô In the Inter-union strife was an unequal one, with  
the latter (Dôrô) soon emerging in a considerably stronger position 
in the post-privatisation labour union hierarchy's.
The first of these factors, the establishment of a complicated web 
of unions across the JR Group, has resulted in a high degree of 
complexity in managementJabour negotiations. In the second case, 
the real ‘victory’ of Dôrô has led to an imbalance in the level of
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bargaining power amongst the new groupings, such that it provoked 
a further destabilising reorganisation of the railway unions in 
1991. Initially the JR Sôren union affiliation had been formed 
from a fairly equal amalgamation of Tetsurô and Dorò (the former 
actually supplying more members than Dôrô ) but the latter union’s 
membership contained a greater proportion of activists with 
labour negotiations experience; this disparity was reflected in 
Dôrô officials quickly obtaining the majority of influential 
positions in the new union hierarchy including, very significantly, 
its senior leadership's.
Dôrô’s domination of the new JR Sôren grouping has been 
epitomised by the role of Matsuzaki Akira, the architect of his 
union’s ‘U-turn’ in 1986 to a position in favour of the JNR reform 
proposals. Matsuzaki’s conversion to a pro-division and 
privatisation stance, and his apparent position of favouring the J R 
Ideal of “enlightened cap ita lism ”80 are somewhat at odds with his 
radical background of connections with the extreme left wing 
militant political group, Kakumaru. Whatever his real motives, 
however, Matsuzaki’s tactic of building a power base in the J R 
empire for his Dôrô faction has been extremely successful. He I s
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currently Chairman of the biggest single JR labour union, JR East’s 
Higashi Rósó (with 55,000 members), and therefore is the most 
influential individual on the labour side in the entire JR GroupSi.
In addition, his build-up of affiliated unions particularly in JR 
Hokkaido and In JR West has enabled the former Dóró faction to 
destabilise managementrlabour relations In these two JR 
companies.
It was the Imbalance of power between the Dóró and Tetsuró 
groups which led to the further restructuring of the railway unions 
in 1991, as also depicted in Figure II. With tacit encouragement 
from the JR management, notably in JR Central and JR West, the 
former Tetsuró faction within the JR Sóren union affiliation set 
up a new grouping, JR Rengó into which, moreover, the Tessan 
Sóren (formerly right wing Kokuró ) unions also merged. Figure 11 
shows that the establishment of JR Rengó - in December 1991 - 
achieved a broad numerical balance of union members between this 
new affiliation and JR Sóren , with Kokuró making up a forlorn 
third place.
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There is, however, a more complicated split amongst the JR 
operating companies such that (as shown in Figure II, adjoining p. 
543) JR East, JR Hokkaido and JR Freight remain Dorò led, while JR 
Central, JR Kyushu, JR Shikoku, and JR West are ostensibly 
answerable on labour matters to the Tetsurô Iine82. The 
complexity which the 1991 split brought to the negotiating table 
has not been lessened, moreover, by the fact that the JR Sôren 
affiliation remains a highly integrated organisation (under the 
direct control of Matsuzaki) while JR Rengó is a much more 
decentralised grouping with the affiliated unions dealing 
separately with each JR company. Thus, although numerically not 
particularly strong, Matsuzaki’s unions within JR West or JR 
Central, for example, are able to make a greater impact on labour 
relations than their JR Rengó counterparts can in, say, JR EastS3,
The incidence of labour disputes in the JR companies since 1991 is 
shown in Figure III. Although nothing approaching a ‘national’ 
strike has occurred, the regularity of local disputes across the 
range of JR operating companies gives the lie to the notion that 
privatisation of the national railway provided a lasting solution to 
the area of management:labour relations.
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F i g u r e  HI L A B O U R  D I S P U T E S  W I T H I N  JR
No. Date Company Union Objective &Characteristic
1
«,ji
91. 2. 23. JR EAST CHIBA DORO Opposition To Change In L<
To New Train ScheduIeCMar.
1 2 91. 11. 9. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Decision To Hold a Voting
Of The Right To Strike (6
91. 11. 20. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Establishment Of The RighI
1 91. 11. 26. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Several Demands, Safety, I
Notification Of StrikeClf
1  ^ 91. 11. 26. JR EAST CHIBA DORO Opposition To Change In Lc
Drivers 4 Guards '
J  ® 91. 12. 3. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Postponement Of Strike (1
1 ^ 91. 12. 10. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Postponement Of Strike (t I
1  ^ 92. 2. 19. JR IN HONSHU KOKURO Fulfillment Of Regional Li
Order, Improvement In Labe
1 ^ 92. 2. 21. JR EAST CHIBA DORO Opposition To New Labour 5
New Train Schedule
1 10 92. 3. 16. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Postponement Of Strike (t J
1 92. 3. 25 1--- JR KYUSHU KOKURO KYUSHU Drivers 4 Guards j
JR FREIGHT Members Not On Trains ]
1 92. 3. 30. JR WEST JR NISHIRO —  Wage Hikes ( .8 . 5% Av. ), j
1 92. 3. 30. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO Labour Parctices, Cancal
1 92. 3. 30. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Training University Graj
1 92. 3. 31. -4. 1. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO —  Holding Of Safety Councj
1 92. 3. 31. -4. 1. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO (Same As Above) I
1 92. 3. 31. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO (Same As Above) 1
1 92. 3. 31. -4. 1. JR WEST JR NISHIRO (Same As Above) I
1 92. 12. 8. -12. 11 JR WEST JR NISHIRO Opposition To Change In Li
Drivers 4 Guards (Pay Forj
1  20 93. 2. 16. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Establishment Of The Righj
1 93. 2. 18. -2. 20. JR FREIGHT KOKURO. ZENDORO 1—  Correction Of Disparil
1  22 93. 2. 19. (-2. 20. ?)JR FREIGHT DORO SOREN '—  Bonuses(Compared With!
1  23 93. 3. 17. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO 1—  Opposition To Change I
1 93. 3. 17. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO '—  Wage Hikes (Shunto), I
1  25 93. 3. 18. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO (Same As Above) 1
aracteristics Time Period
Change In Labour System Due 12 hrs. 
cheduleCMar. 16)
Id a Voting On Establishment 
D Strike (6 Days From Nov. 14)
)f The Right To Strike(94. ST'S In Favour) 
s, Safety, Labour Relations, Management, 
f StrikeClf Collective Bargaining Fails)
Change In Labour System Of 1st Train-15:00 (540) 
Is
f Strike (1 wk. )
Participants 
(Approx. 750)
(1,270) 
(1. 280)
Train Stoppage People Affectec
All Lines Except For 
JR Kururi Line 4 Isumi LineOrd Sect!
Parts Of Uchibo, 
Sotobo Lines, Etc.
42, 000
f Strike (To At Least Next Jan.)
Regional Labour Committee’s 4 hrs. 
ment In Labour Conditions (Basically) 
New Labour System Due To 6 hrs. 
du 1 e
f Strike (To At Least 27th) 
ds
Trains
8.5^ Av. ), Cease Of Unfair 
ices, Cancallation Of 
versity Graduates To Drive, 
afety Council, Etc.
(1. 280) 
(1. 280)
)
24 hrs.
8 hrs. 
Midnight- 
Early Morning 
12:00-  
48 hrs.
48 hrs.
- 12:00 
26 hrs.
Approx. 1,900 
(Members Not On Trains)
All Drivers, Uchibo, Sotobo, Togane, Kashima, Kururi 
Excluding Freight
100
ITO None
Certain Members 
Certain Members 
Certain Members None
1, 860
Approx. 500(Drivers) None 
Approx. 300(Car Maintenance) None
Change In Labour System Of 
is (Pay For Non-working Hours)
Of The Right To Strike For ’93 Shunto 
Of Disparity In Year-end 48 hrs.
«pared With Other JR Companies) 24 hrs. 
To Change In Labour System, 24 hrs. 
(Shunto), Etc.
)
(Approx. 4,600) 
(Approx. 4,400)
(1, 250)
23(Drivers) 
Approx. 30 
Approx. 250
Approx. 2, 100 
13. 698
353, 000
Approx. 1 mi 111 
Approx. 5.32
C Container 140 Wagon Load 500

No. Date Company Union Objective &Characterist
26 93. 3. 18. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO [—  Opposition To Change
27 93. 3. 18. JR WEST JR NISHIRO '—  Wage Hikes (Shunto),
28 93. 3. 18. -8. 11. JR WEST JR NISHIRO Opposition To One Driver
1 Blue Train (Hiroshima -
1 29
k
93. 3. 19. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO 1—  Opposition To Change
s 30i 93. 3. 25. JR WEST JR NISHIRO '—  Wage Hikes (Shunto),
i 31 93. 3. 25. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO (Same As Above)
i 32 93. 3. 25. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO (Same As Above)
\ 33 93. 4. 27. JR WEST JR NISHIRO Opposition To One Driver
1
\ Blue Train (Hiroshima -
 ^ 34 93. 6. 10. -6. 11. JR KYUSHU JR KYUSHURO Opposition To Change In
35 93. 9. 27. -9. 28. JR TOKAI JR TOKAIRO Opposition To Punishment
36 93. 12. 12. JR EAST JR EAST SHINRO Newly Formed (From JR Ea
37 93. 12. 24. JR HOKKAIDO KOKURO Central Labour Committee
JR FREIGHT HOKKAIDO, FREIGHT: Rec
JR WEST WEST: No Recognition
Notes : 1. The incidents are all taken from KOTSU SHINBUN.
2. For the number of participants, the numbers in ( ) are the t<
participated.
Source : Adapted from data in Kotsu Shinbunsha. Kotsu Shinbun. 1991-1993J
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aiour System,
Participants 
Certain Regions 
(4, 300)
Train Stoppage 
37
(AM: 32)
I [61 On
iwiseki) r System t. 20)
Half Day 
24 hrs.
12 hrs. 
24 hrs.
24 hrs.
48 hrs.
In Shimonoseki Region 
Certain Regions None
Hiroshima Region 28
Drivers 4 Guards. 85
Car Maintenance, Etc. 
Drivers 4 Guards 
Hiroshima Region 574
Approx. 600
ISO In Sendai Region; Formerly In Tetsuro)
Is Orders
lion Of Unfair Labour Practice On Some Aspects
People Affecte 
Approx. 7,000 
(AM: 30,000)
9, 000
Approx. 7,000 
None
Approx. 214, 600 
Approx. 13,900
annber of union members at that time: thus, it may not be the exact number that
One further manifestation, moreover, of the real instability  
within the JR companies on labour issues was the incident, as 
reported in the Mainichi Shinbun 84 on 26 November 1992, that JR 
Central (JR Tôkai) had been allowing management trainees to drive 
passenger trains in contravention of safety regulations. The 
explanation for this course of action was that the JR Central 
Executive had taken a decision to provide driving instruction to its  
management recruits as a precaution “...in case of revived union 
militancy”. A key factor in this dispute, and a theme running 
through the list of stoppages cited in Figure III has been the 
continuing presence of former Dôrô activists, their lack of 
numerical strength being transcended by the simple fact that, as 
employed train drivers, the Dôrô faction can stop trains running 
more easily than can station workers or ticket clerks.
The myth of harmonious managementilabour relations as a result of 
privatisation has also been highlighted by a substantial number of 
cases for unfair labour practicesss which have subsequently come 
before the Regional and Central Labour Relations Committees. I n 
those few cases In which judgements have been made by the 
Committees the rulings have been in favour of the unions.
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supporting the view that the re-employment policy of the J R 
Companies involved an element of deliberate suppression of Kokurô 
members. The great majority of the complaints have, not yet, 
however, been resolved.
A compromise plan proposed in May 1992 by the Central Labour 
Relations Committee that the JR companies accept a decision of 
unfair labour practices - but would not then suffer any severe 
penalties - was not accepted by JR Eastse. This company’s attitude 
has been influenced by the strong former Dorò faction in its labour 
union organisation, the Dôrô position being that it does not wish 
to see any Kokurô revival In the Tokyo area. Despite offers of 
mediation by both the Ministries of Labour and Transport, JR East 
has decided to enter an administrative lawsuit to the Japanese 
Court of Justice. The issue of unfair labour practices arising out 
of the employment practices of the JR companies at the outset of 
their operations thus remains unresolved seven years after the 
event.
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In conclusion, the aim of improving on the JNR’s record of 
management:labour relations has been achieved more by a 
legislative process than by one in which the fundamental 
conditions within which these relations exist has been reformed. 
The judgement that the privatisation of the national railway has 
achieved a level of stability In labour relations not found in the 
JNR era must be viewed in relation to the fact that this 
improvement has been manufactured rather than earned.
The recent cracks in the facade of the apparent stability may 
indicate that the measures taken to weaken the unions in the 
national railway have swung the pendulum too far in the direction 
of the JR management. Thus, while the public perception has been 
of improved service and better employee attitudes as a 
consequence of the privatisation, the outward appearance of these 
gains masks tensions between management and labour which have 
already resurfaced in the form of regular disputes throughout the 
JR Group of companies.
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The Place of the JR Companies in the P o s t-P r iv a tis a tio n  
Railway S ector
The establishment of ‘better’ labour relations by statute is a prime 
example of the fulfilment of the JNR privatisation policy through 
the implementation of the pre-conditions set out as an integral 
part of its enactment. The enduring theme of the policies of 
dissolving and privatising the JNR has been the achievement of 
putting in place a structure for the operation of the national 
railway which would guarantee favourable comparison with its  
predecessor. This process was completed with the legislative 
package for the JNR privatisation, which established a framework 
for the new JR Group with built-in safeguards against failure. 
Previously discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the measures in the 
JNR Privatisation Acts dealt successfully with the issues of the 
disposition of the national railway’s long term liabilities; the 
reduced employment levels of the new JR Companies; and the 
subsidisation of the activities of the smaller JRs in order that the 
overall JR operating Group could declare profits to contrast with  
the losses of the former JNR.
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The removal from the JRs of the social obligation which had 
existed in the JNR era to provide sufficient capital investment to 
maintain a fully nationwide service was an additional factor which 
facilitated the achievement of profit figures from the JR Group 
which reinforced the favourable impression of the benefits from 
the JNR’s privatisation. The epitome of such a positive view of the 
state of the Japanese railway system in the post-privatisation era 
may be represented by that of the BBC television series on world 
railways, Locomotion, which stated that “Japan’s railways are the 
envy of the world. Fast, clean, frequent and punctual, they are a 
daunting example to other nations of what can be achieved when 
government, business and science cooperate for the benefit of 
a ll.”87
This BBC quote, however, views Japan’s railways as a sing^e 
system, and makes no differentiation between the national railway 
of Japan and Its network of private railway companies. 11 
therefore requires that attention be drawn to the reality that the 
JRs are but part of the Japanese railway system, within which the 
private rail companies are another major constituent part. It  
might further be said, moreover, that the JNR privatisation policy.
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itself, through the reorganisation of the former, unified Japanese 
state railway into separate, ‘private’ railway companies w ill, 
when the process is finalised by the complete flotation of the 
shares of the Honshu JRs, further break down the barriers between 
the JR group which operates the national rail services, and the 
private railways which continue to run the nation’s main commuter 
lines.
Implicitly at least, thus, the “envy of the world” tag which the 
BBC’s world railway survey. Locomotion, gave to Japan must have 
been aimed to encompass the private rail companies in Japan, 
those which were established in the early years of the 
development of the railways, and which have remained the 
country’s predominant mode of commuter transport. Their 
important presence was further recognised, indeed, in another 
previously cited reference by the UK Ministry of Transport, which 
acknowledged that “Already 40% of Japan’s railways are 
private ...”88 it is alongside these ‘real’ private railway companies 
that the JR companies now operate, the structure of which, and of 
their relations with the JR group in the operation of the country s 
rail network, is now the subject of further analysis.
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T a b l e  4 8  THE MAJOR PRIVATE R A IL W A Y S  IN JAPAN
(As of March 1992)
Company
Date of 
Establishment
Date of Startup 
of Operations
Capital 
(Million Yen)
Distance Covered 
(kilometres)
Number of 
Stations
Tobu 1897 11. 1 1899 8. 27 64. 388 464.1 202
Seibu 1912 5. 7 1915 4.15 21. 665 178.4 93
Keisei 1909 6. 30 1912 11. 3 13. 583 91.6 58
Keio 1910 9.21 1913 4.15 50. 069 84.8 69
Odakyu 1923 5. 1 1927 4. 1 59. 883 121.6 71
Tokyu 1922 9. 2 1911 10. 6 107. 335 100.7 99
Keikyu 1898 2. 25 1899 1.21 31. 847 83.6 71
Sotetsu 1917 12.18 1921 9. 28 27. 400 35.0 25
Meitetsu 1894 6. 25 1898 5. 6 66. 315 539.3 359
Kintetsu 1910 9.16 1914 4. 30 90.779 595.2 346
Nankai 1884 6.16 1885 12. 29 41. 266 164.7 118
Keihan 1906 11.19 1910 4.15 47.097 91.9 90
Hankyu 1907 10.19 1910 3.10 69. 899 146.8 90
Hanshin 1899 6.12 1905 4.12 28. 467 45.1 48
Nishitetsu 1908 12.17 1911 6. 5 25.889 133.8 112
Total 803. 982 3. 038. 8 1.999
Source : Adapted from data in Japan International Cooperation Agency. Overview of Private Railways And 
Their Business. 1993. p. 3.
C h a r t  2 3  AVERAGE NUMBER OF PASSENGERS PER DAY BY MODE OF 
TRAN SPO RTATIO N : F I S C A L  YEAR 1 9 9 0
Ordinary
Passengers
Season
Ticket
Passengers
Private 
RaiIways
J R Subways
Source : Adapted from data in UnyushoCMinistry of Transport). Heisei 4 Nenban Toshi 
Kotsu NenpodJrban Transportation Yearbook for 1992). 1992. p. 122-125.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. Reproduce in Overview of Private 
Railways And Their Business. 1993.
C h a r t  24 AVERAGE NUMBER OF PASSENGERS PER DAY IN
THE THREE MAJOR URBAN AREAS: FI SCAL YEAR 19 90
Total 
Passengers
Metropoli tan Tokyo 
Transport Area
ChQbu
Transport Area
3. 070, 000
yrj.va^te'::-----
^^railMys. 44
Subways'" 
.31.5X
3X.
1, 730. 000
Kansai
Transport Area
13. 970. 000
8. 560. 000
1. 330. 000
Source ; Adapted from data in UnyushQtMinistry of Transport). Heisei 4 Nenban Toshi Kdtsu Nenp5 
(Urban Transportation Yearbook for 1992). 1992. p. 122.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. Reproduce in Overview of Private Railways And 
Their Business. 1993.
T a b l e  49 PRIVATE RAILW AYS OPERATING INCOME BREAKDOWN
Company F i sea 1 Total RaiIways Bus Othersiii
Year ¥ m % V  m % ¥ m % ¥  m %
Kanto
Tobu 87 23.880 100 11.693 49. 0 105 0. 4 12,082 50. 6
88 27,582 100 19,314 70. 0 55 0. 2 8, 212 29. 8
89 29.843 100 18,479 61. 9 -303 -1. 0 11,667 39. 1
90 32,580 100 18,267 56. 0 -1. 283 -3. 9 15,596 47. 9
91 37,268 100 19.930 53. 4 -610 -1. 6 17,948 48. 2
Se i bu 87 15.941 100 8. 693 54. 5 -- -- 7, 248 45. 5
88 18,235 100 12,260 67. 2 -- -- 5, 975 32. 8
89 20,842 100 12,543 60. 2 — - - 8, 299 39. 8
90 27,811 100 11.049 39. 7 -- -- 16,762 60. 3
91 32.028 100 12.305 38. 4 -- -- 19,723 61. 6
Tokyu 87 29,710 100 11, 341 38. 2 -982 -3. 3 19,351 65. 1
88 31,757 100 14.967 47. 1 -2,777 -8. 7 19,567 61. 6
89 30,794 100 15.012 48. 8 -3.282 -10. 7 19,064 61. 9
90 41.202 100 14.927 36. 2 -2,206 -5. 3 28,481 69. 1
91 47,741 100 16,013 33. 5 -712 -1. 5 32,440 68. 0
Keihin 87 15.866 100 6. 447 40. 6 815 5. 1 8, 604 54. 3
88 17,092 100 8, 361 48. 9 -213 -1. 2 8, 945 52. 3
89 14,055 100 7, 468 53. 1 51 0. 4 6, 536 46. 5
90 15.636 100 6. 539 41. 8 222 1. 4 8, 875 56. 8
91 19,521 100 8, 372 42. 9 -174 -0. 9 11,323 58. 0
Odakyu 87 17,601 100 6, 998 39. 8 0. 2 0. 001 10,603 60. 2
88 21.939 100 11,064 50. 4 -39 -0. 2 10,914 49. 7
89 20.224 100 10,022 49. 6 -75 -0. 4 10,277 50. 8
90 22.692 100 9, 089 40. 1 -64 -0. 3 13,667 60. 2
91 24,616 100 12,207 49. 6 -90 -0. 4 12,499 50. 8
Ke i 0 87 16,259 100 9, 168 56. 4 808 5. 0 6, 283 38. 6
88 16,671 100 10.999 66. 0 144 0. 9 5, 528 33. 2
89 15.774 100 9, 640 61. 1 -270 -1. 7 6, 404 40. 6
90 14,452 100 8. 803 60. 9 -455 -3. 1 6, 104 42. 2
91 14.767 100 8, 984 60. 8 -222 -1. 5 6, 005 40. 7
Ke i se i 87 12,892 100 8. 535 66. 2 1, 649 12. 8 2, 708 21. 0
88 13,244 100 8. 205 62. 0 955 7. 2 4, 083 30. 8
89 12,501 100 8, 523 68. 2 661 5. 3 3, 317 26. 5
90 13,369 100 8. 084 60. 5 -102 -0. 8 5, 387 40. 3
91 12.462 100 9. 315 74. 7 147 1. 2 3, 000 24. 1


The Private Railway Companies in Japan 
1 .The Business Activities of the Private R ailw ays
As shown in Table 48, the present major railway companies in the 
private sector in Japan are widely diversified groupings within 
which their railway businesses are but a part of their overall 
operations. Those railway activities, however, remain of a very 
significant scale, and the private railways continue to perform a 
vital role in the country’s commuter transport network. In fiscal 
1990, the number of passengers carried daily by the private 
railways in the country’s three major urban areas, those around 
Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka, was 22.4 million. As can be seen in 
Chart 23, this accounted for 43% of the total number of people 
transported89 by the three modes of private railways, the JR 
companies, and the metropolitan subways.
While the growth In passenger volume achieved recently by the JRs 
has surpassed that of the private rail companies (see the earlier 
Table 37), the private rail sector still provides a crucial service in 
the country’s large metropolitan areas. This point Is reinforced i n 
Chart 24, which shows the split of commuter transport amongst 
the three competing modes In each of Japan’s three major centres
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of population. In one of these areas, Kansai, (defined here as a 
fifty mile radius of Osaka Station), the private railways actually 
carried over 53% of the total number of passengers in fiscal 1990.
2 .Diversification in the Railway S ector
A measure of the extent of the diversification policies by the 
private railways can be made by judging the percentage of Income 
from and the scale of capital investment on rail activities against 
the levels pertaining to non-rail operations. The former can be 
seen in Table 49, which shows that, even looking only at the 
private companies’ parent accounts (ie. not on a fully consolidated 
group basis), non-railway businesses account on average for around 
55%of the revenues of the major 1 5 private railway companies.
The current position on capital spending is also illustrated by the 
figures in Table 50 which contains the planned investment by the 
large private companies In fiscal 1993. The average percentage of 
planned capital spending on railway operations out of the total 
investment of the 8 railway companies shown In this Table Is 50%, 
so half of their resources are being employed outside of the 
mainstream business of the provision of rail services.
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The private railway sector, left behind as unimportant in the 
nationalisation policyso of 1906, has developed into a major 
transport mode in Japan. Without the services which the private 
railway companies provide in short haul transport, the country’s 
urban communications network truly could not exist. It is the fact, 
however, that they also provide a wide range of other services, 
such as real estate, retail, tourism and leisure that has been the 
real engine of the growth of the private railway groups. It is this 
model of the development of diversified businesses within a 
cohesive group structure that was adopted as a management 
strategy by the new JR companiessi.
Whether or not the JRs are able to emulate the pattern of 
diversified activities such as that epitomised by the private 
railway groups will depend on the attitude of the Ministry of 
Transport. In this regard, the official standpoint of the MoT, as the 
transport regulatory authority, is that It continues to regulate the 
JR Companies In their role as operators of the national railway 
network92. Therefore, In the light of the difficult experience of 
the private railway sector in balancing its investment resources in 
the railway infrastructure vis a vis its non-rail activities, future
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MoT regulatory policy towards the JRs must require a balance 
between liberalisation on diversification plans with the 
recognition that it remains the prime duty of the JR operating 
companies to place the highest priority on measures to enhance 
their railway services.
Privatisation notwithstanding, the function of both the JR and 
private railway companies within the framework of national 
transport strategy is thus still the provision of efficient rail 
services to the Japanese nation. Continuing MoT regulation of the 
activities of the railway operators - both JR and private - w ill 
therefore, Inevitably involve the evaluation, from a national policy 
standpoint, of the extent of the companies’ diversification 
measured against the quality of the railway services which they 
offer to the travelling public.
Remaining Post Privatisation Issues
The final stage of the JNR privatisation process is that of 
flotation of the shares of the JR companies on the Stock Market. 
The listing programme has begun with the first tranche of JR East 
stock but the JRs have objected to Its tardy lmplementation93.
583
The wish of the Honshu JRs to increase their independence from 
governmental and bureaucratic control through the sale of stock to 
private investors, however, masks the fact that the gains they 
have made in the first five years since ‘privatisation’ were 
achieved while under continuing public sector ownership. The 
remaining share flotations, when permitted by Stock Market 
conditions, might then be viewed in the context that change of 
ownership has not been necessary for the achievement of increased 
profitability by the JR Companies.
When the JR flotation schedule is resumed, one further policy 
matter with which the legislation will have to  deal is that of the 
‘subsidies’ provided to JR Freight and to the Three Island JRs. The 
principle of profit adjustment, brilliantly carried out in the JNR 
reconstruction process, has left an element of imbalance in the 
system with the JR passenger companies subsidising JR Freight to 
the extent that if full costing was applied, the freight operations 
would become heavily lossmaking^" .^ The imbalance is accentuated 
by the operation of the Three Islands Management Stabilisation 
Fund which, as here argued, subsidises the operation of lossmaking 
services. Should the Income from this Fund become insufficient to
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offset the operating losses of the Three Island JRs, it is not clear 
from which source would come the necessary financial support for 
the maintenance of the national network.
The requirement on publicly listed companies to produce profits 
adequate to fund the payment of dividends to shareholders w ill 
also put pressure on the JR operating companies to review their 
policy on tariffs. In order to achieve the standards of profitability  
dictated by their wished-for status as Independent, privately 
owned companies, the carefully structured policy of avoiding fare 
increases will come under threat.
The delays in effecting the share flotations have had, as previously 
outlined, an adverse Impact on the proposed programme of JNR debt 
repayment. The failure to deal with the issue has no direct bearing 
on the JR operating companies, and is not their direct 
responsibility. The removal from the JRs, in the privatisation 
process, of the main burden of paying off the long term liab ilities  
of the JNR, however, does not alter the fact that a massive level of 
debt still exists. It exists as a burden on the Japanese people 
which the privatisation of the JNR has not resolved. It exists as a
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testament to the lack, in the past, of effective government 
responsibility in the financing and operation of the public sector 
railway system.
The forthcoming Stock Exchange listings of the shares of the 
Honshu JR companies, the programme having been eased by the 
implementation of stage one of the JR East flotation, could 
conceivably lead to further changes in the relationship between the 
eventually fully private operators and the government and 
bureaucracy. Indeed, the Honshu JRs are still hopeful that the 
flotations will be accompanied by the easing of what they view as 
restrictive bureaucratic controls95, and thereby that there will be 
a reduction In the degree of Ministry of Transport regulation of 
their activities.
The privatisation process has not actually, however, resolved the 
issue of the appropriate degree of public control over the operation 
of the national railway network. The brilliantly conceived new 
structure for the Japanese National Railway provided no final 
solution to the question of the definitive function of the JR 
operating companies with the overall context of national transport
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policy. The final resolution of the issue of what role the JRs 
should play in the Japanese transport market will determine the 
extent to which the JR companies are able to diversify into non­
railway activities, and the level of capital investment which w ill 
therefore be available to maintain their rail services. Only with  
the long term evidence of the effects of the new JR management 
policies on the national rail network will a final judgement be 
possible on the question of whether or not privatisation has 
resulted in a better rail service than the preceding methods of 
administering the national railway in Japan.
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CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES
1. As in Chapter 6, in which a financial analysis of the JR group of 
companies was undertaken at the end of their first year of 
operation, this Chapter focuses on a detailed evaluation of the 
financial results of the national railway In its privatised form.
The analysis of the results of the JR group for the five years since 
the privatisation of the JNR is the individual work of the author, 
utilising data from the JR Companies’ annual financial statements 
(Kessan Hôkuku Sho) , the annual financial returns of the JNR 
Settlement Corporation (Nihon Tetsudô Seisan Jigyô Dan), and of 
the Shinkansen Holding Corporation (Shinkansen Hoyû Kikô), and 
statistics obtained from the library of the Institute of Transport 
Statistics (Kôtsû Tôkei Kenkyujo) , Tokyo. Jh\s material is  
presented in tabular form, with accompanying analysis in the text.
2. JR Go Nen no Kiseki to Kadai (Five Years’ Progress of JR and Its  
Future Tasks) Unvu to Keizai (1992) (Transportation and 
Economy), Vol. 52, No. 1 2, December, pp. 4 - 81.
3. Since, up to October 1993, there was only one shareholder in the 
JR companies - the Government, which held a 100% shareholding 
through the JNR Settlement Corporation - this comment i s 
inexplicable.
4. Unvu to Keizai (1992), December, p.18 and p. 20.
5. Ibid, p. 27.
6. Ibid, pp.38-40.
7. Ibid, pp.12-13.
8. It should be noted that the Seto Ohashi was constructed during 
the public corporation era, and can not be taken as a benefit arising 
from the division and privatisation of the JNR.
9. Unvu to Keizai (1992), December, pp.45 - 46.
10. Ibid, pp. 54 - 57.
588
11. Ibid, pp.62 - 65.
12. As shown in Tables 37 and 38, adjoining p. 510.
1 3. In his assessment of the efficiency benefits derived from the 
JNR privatisation process, Fukui Kbichiro’s Japanese National 
Railways Privatisation Study also makes this assumption “...we 
define the contribution made by economic expansion as the 
increase in transport volume which equals the increase i n 
transport volume of private railway companies over the same 
period.” Fukui Kbichiro (1992) (The World Bank), Japanese 
National Railway Privatisation Study. The Experience of Japan and 
Lessons for Developing Countries. Washington, p.110.
14. The national railway tariff has increased since the 
privatisation of the JNR only to the extent of incorporation into 
railway fares of the 3% Consumption Tax Introduced in 1989.
1 5. See discussion in this Chapter, p. 536 and pp. 548 - 555.
16. Fukui (1992), p. 109.
17. Ibid.
18. This was the conclusion of the analysis of the reform of the 
JNR in Chapter 5, particularly derived from the material on pp. 399 
- 428.
19. The only other financial analysis on similar principles known 
to the author is that undertaken by a Ministry of Transport official, 
Kurono Tadahiko (Vice-Director of the Ministry of Transport 
Railways Bureau). Kurono states in his work that the calculations 
were made using “...bold assumptions” but, as these are not 
explained, the accuracy of his data Is difficult to verify. 
Nevertheless, his analysis concludes that - as was found in the 
present study - the consolidated JR Group made a profit in only one 
out of the five years In the period 1987-1992. Kurono Tadahiko 
(1993), “Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni Tsuite" (On JNR Reform), Han Kdtsu, 
Vol. 93, Issue 5, May, pp. 2 - 5 .
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20. This point is further discussed on pp. 522 - 535, and the 
relevant figures shown in Table 41, adjoining p. 523.
21. As listed in Table 35 (adjoining p. 494) in Chapter 6.
22. The process of transfer of lossmaking small lines either to 
Third Sector operation or to bus services was discussed earlier i n 
Chapter 3, pp. 223 - 225. The policy removed any obligation from 
the new JR Group to run 83 unprofitable services which, as later 
shown in Appendix 4, were spread across ail of the six JR 
passenger companies.
23. "... On April 1, 1987 the Japanese Railways were drastically 
restructured. Thousands of workers were dismissed, and over 80 
lines were closed." Salvesen, Paul (1989). British Rail - the 
Radical Alternative to Privatisation. Manchester, p.56.
24. Shinkansen Tetsudd ni Kakawaru Tetsudd Shisetsu noJdto to ni 
Kan Suru Hdritsu (Shikorei) (Law Concerning the Transfer of 
Shinkansen Facilities - Supplement) in Chukai Tetsudd Roppo 
(Compendium of Railway Laws) (1993), p.2535.
25. As shown in Table 41, adjoining p. 523.
26. See Table 32, adjoining p. 469.
27. Nikkei Shinbun (Evening Edition), 16 October 1987. See also 
JNR Settlement Corporation ‘91 (1991), Tokyo, p.4.
28. The Land Trusts were established to take over parcels of 
JNRSC land for the purpose of constructing and letting buildings to 
third parties. Shares in the Land Trusts were sold to investing 
institutions In Japan. JNR Settlement Corporation (1991), JNR 
Settlement Corporation *91. p.12 and Supplementary Page 
(unnumbered). Confirmed also in Ishizuki Sh6jl 09 SZ) ,  ‘’Kokutetsu 
Seisan Jigyo Dan no Genjd to Kadaf' ( The Present Situation and 
Issues faced by Our Business), Han KdtsO. Vol.92, No.11, November, 
pp. 19-21.
29. Nikkei Shinbun (1991), 18 September, and Kdtsu Shinbun 
(1991), 19 September. See also JNR Settlement Corporation *91
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(1991), p.5.
30, As shown in Table 41, adjoining p. 523,
31, JNR Settlement Corporation (Fiscal 1991), Annual Report, p, 6,
32, Ibid, p,6,
33, This conclusion was drawn from the foregoing analysis of the 
JR flotation plans on pp, 528-529, taking particular account of the 
‘artificial’ contribution made to the profits of JR Freight by the 
operation of an Avoidable Cost system of accounting (as discussed 
on p,462).
34, Quoted from The Tokyo Stock Exchange, Listing Standards ,
35, “On the 25th August (1992) Transport Minister Okuda told 
reporters that the Ministry had given up hopes of selling and 
listing the shares of JR East within the current financial year. The 
Finance Ministry had demanded the postponement of the sale and 
listing of JR East shares because they feared the impact this might 
have on The Stock Market, and the Transport Ministry finally 
agreed. This is the third time since 1990 that the sale of JR East 
shares has been put off. It now looks as though the plan to repay 
the long-term debts inherited from the defunct Japanese National 
Railways by selling the shares of the JR companies Is not working 
out as first hoped,” Nihon Keizai Shinbun (1992), 26 August.
36, Originally issued at 1.5m Yen, the NTT share price rose in 1987 
to a peak of 3.18m Yen. The shares of NTT then fell substantially 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
Evaluation of the JNR Privatisation P o lic ies
It has been a major objective of this thesis to evaluate the 
success of the policies of division and privatisation of the 
Japanese National Railways. In this exercise it has been found that 
evaluation of the privatisation of the JNR purely from a political 
standpoint could legitimately conclude that it has been eminently 
‘successful’.
The conclusion of a successful privatisation process was the 
achievement of a policy initiative in which its advocates overcame 
public indifference and opposition from both the entrenched JNR 
Board of Directors, and the rank and file within the party of 
government, the LDP. The accomplishment of the division and 
privatisation of the JNR - against the odds - was an end in itself*, 
the culmination of a determined political campaign, one which 
conferred to the administration of PM Nakasone Yasuhiro plaudits 
akin to those which were addressed to the Thatcher government i n 
the UK for its privatisation policies. To a right wing regime, the 
execution of its manifesto of dissolution and privatisation of the
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former national railway public corporation represented a clear 
‘success’ in that the government which implemented the proposals 
could claim that it had put a stop to the escalation of operating 
losses by the JNR; had dealt with the indebtedness built up by the 
JNR; and had vanquished the hitherto ‘militant’ JNR labour unions.
Judging the privatisation of the JNR as a political exercise must 
produce a favourable verdict, but it is here argued that this sole 
parameter is not a sufficient basis on which to judge the results 
of the process by which the Japanese National Railway was 
dissolved, broken up, and recreated as a group of private 
enterprises. A comprehensive evaluation of the JNR privatisation 
must surely take into account wider considerations, those of the 
operational efficiency of the national rail service in Its post­
privatisation mode, and of the financial consequences of the 
privatisation process. It Is particularly because the objectives of 
the policies of division and privatisation of the JNR addressed 
these issues that they must be taken into account In their 
judgement.
602
It is, essentially, because an objective evaluation of the JNR 
privatisation requires that its ‘achievements’ be subject to 
independent assessment that this thesis has, in fact, adopted the 
technique of testing conventional hypotheses of the results of 
government policy on the railways in Japan. Such a method of 
analysis has been utilised throughout the study to examine the 
consequences of government policy on the JNR since its inception, 
in order to Judge whether the perceptions of the national railway 
in its various phases of operation have been Justified by events.
The state railway organisation has been identified as operating in 
three broad phases, initially, as a national asset with a high 
status in the government service (1872 - 1964); then as a national 
financial l ia b i l i t y ,  its status diminishing as its losses and 
indebtedness increased (1964 - 1987); and, finally, as an operation 
which achieved re h a b ilita t io n  under privatisation, its status in 
Japanese public life consequently restored (1 9 8 7 - 1992).
In the most recent phase of the national railway’s operation - that 
since its division and privatisation In 1987 - the conventional 
image has been of an organisation resurrected by the successful 
implementation of policies achieved through the political process.
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While it is accepted that this image is fully warranted as a 
reflection of the political accomplishment of carrying through the 
privatisation policies it is the view of this study that a balanced 
judgement of the privatisation of the JNR must incorporate an 
evaluation of its financial and operational consequences.
In examining the wider implications of the JNR privatisation 
process, key questions which have arisen from the research in this 
study have thus included the following: the extent to which the 
positive image of the post-privatisation Japanese railways i s 
Justified in reality; even if so warranted, has this image been 
earned as a direct result of the privatisation policies, or could an 
outside observer have made essentially the same judgement about 
the state of the Japanese railway system as it existed In the pre­
privatisation era; does the existence of eulogistic quotes from 
commentators in and outside Japan validate the privatisation 
process; and to what extent does the image of the Japanese 
railway system which the rest of the world holds up as an icon 
owe its position to the stage management of the policies which led 
up to the break-up and privatisation of the JNR.
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To address these points, this study has undertaken to examine 
both the legislative process of the privatisation of the Japanese 
National Railways and, critically, its financial results. The 
conclusions borne out by this critique support the positive view 
epitomised by the BBC that the railways of Japan are, indeed, 
worthy of their reputation of being "... the envy of the world”2. it  
is the view of this author, however, that the degree to which the 
privatisation of the JNR has enhanced this reputation is, however, 
more easily discernable at this uncritical ‘image’ level than in 
detailed analysis.
Thus, it is contended that the aura of success - attached to the JNR 
privatisation by commentators making facile comparison with the 
public corporation which previously operated the national railway 
network of services - is due, in reality, as much to the prior 
conditions applied to  the privatisation process as it is to the 
tangible results of the new policy for managing the national 
railway. This was the conclusion to the examination of the 
following hypotheses on the JNR privatisation as set out in the 
Introduction;
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- that the division and privatisation of the Japanese 
National Railways has produced defin itive solutions to  
the problems inherent in the operation of the JNR as a 
public corporation
- that the JNR privatisation has, in itse lf, resulted in a 
sea-change in the management performance of the  
national ra ilw a y
- that the reorganisation of the JNR into a group o f  
private enterprises has meant a significant and durable  
reduction in the level of public subsidies for the national 
railway operations.
As outlined above it has been possible, by setting the financial 
results of the JR companies against the above hypotheses, to draw 
the following conclusions from the privatisation process;
- massive operating losses under JNR management have been 
replaced by profits achieved by the privatised JR companies
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- the privatisation process has removed the problem of the JNR’s 
indebtedness
- the cost of labour disputes has shown a significant decrease.
It can, indeed, be said that these ‘results’ are incontrovertible, and 
it is therefore hardly surprising that a limited assessment of the 
privatisation of the Japanese National Railways would evince the 
conclusion that its implementation has been not only a political 
but also a financial success. The key to understanding the creation 
of this aura is, however, to be found in the analysis of the pre­
conditions established as an integral part of the legislative 
process by which the JNR’s division and privatisation was enacted. 
The procedures introduced to shelve the bulk of the JNR’s debt and 
thereby to remove the massive interest burden, to cut drastically 
the labour force of the national railway and to neutralise any union 
opposition, were the essential elements of a policy initiative  
designed to conceive an instantly profitable JR Group of operating 
companies. The implementation of these measures need not have 
been accompanied by the policies of division and privatisation of 
the JNR; they could have been initiated as a means of financial
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reconstruction of the national railway in its continuing form as a 
public corporation. Their execution, moreover, did not solve the 
financial problems; it merely ensured that they were not inherited 
by the new ‘profitable’ privatised JR Companies and, instead, that 
the real financing burden remained in the public domain.
The meticulous planning of the JNR privatisation process reflects 
the fact that the reconstruction of the Japanese National Railway 
became the focus of the policy for administrative reform in Japan 
in the 1980s. For the administrative reform movement to be 
deemed successful one significant, tangible result had to be 
achieved, and the privatisation of the JNR was that ‘glittering  
prize’. As such. It was essential that the reorganisation of the 
national railway, its division and privatisation, be subject to 
exacting standards of preparation prior to the completion of the 
legislative mechanism.
The preparatory steps for the JNR’s privatisation^, thereby set In 
position under the auspices of PM Nakasone and his administrative 
reform policies, were what produced the Immediate aura of 
success, and were what produced the financial ‘results’ as outlined
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above. Without the pre-conditions which ensured the instant 
profitability of the JR Companies, the privatisation of the national 
railway would have evoked a very different reaction from 
interested onlookers and, more importantly, from the Japanese 
public in whose name the administrative reform policies were 
carried out.
The pre-condition in the labour area, namely the major reduction in 
the labour force inherited from the JNR by the JR companies, and 
its selective nature ie. the filtering out of the JNR ‘left wing’ 
union members, substantially bolstered the initial operating 
performance of the JRs. It Is pertinent to observe that this 
rationalisation of the workforce was not an option available to the 
management of the JNR when ‘public’ considerations were more to 
the fore.
Similarly, the hiving off of the vast proportion of the JNR’s 
indebtedness to a separate public body, the introduction of a 
subsidy system for the unprofitable JR companies on the three 
smaller islands of Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku, and the 
‘Avoidable Cost’ system adopted for JR Freight were other factors
609
which augmented the financial results of the new JR group. The 
effect was the creation of the illusion of an immediate 
transformation of massive losses by the JNR public corporation 
into sizeable profits from the privatised JRs. As with the labour 
provisions, the shelving of debt and the establishment of a subsidy 
system for the lossmaking passenger and freight operations were 
not options previously open to the JNR management in its public 
corporation guise.
In each case, the reason why these policies - introduced instead 
only as part of the privatisation package - were not open to the 
existing JNR in the 1980s is that In the Second Rinchô’s 
administrative reform proposals it was the case that dissolution 
of the public corporation structure would Itself be a necessary pre­
condition to the reorganisation of the national railway operation. 
While the management of the JNR pressed (as they did through the 
1970s) for a review of government policy on subsidies towards the 
financing of unprofitable but socially valuable rail services, and 
for the autonomy to run the national railway with a labour force 
appropriate to its real needs, consideration of these requests by 
the Ministry of Transport and ultimately by the JNR’s paymasters
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in the National Diet was only granted in the context of the 
forthcoming privatisation of the JNR and its break-up into 
separate operating units.
The key point on the prerequisites for privatisation which reduced 
the debt burden, cut the labour force, transformed operating losses 
into profits, and obviated the need for fare increases - in addition 
to giving the privatisation its required gloss - is that all of this 
could have been achieved in the JNR era had the political will then 
existed so to do.
The Motivation for the JNR Privatisation Proposals
The fact that decisions were made, and policies implemented on 
issues such as government subsidies to the national railway, the 
JNR’s position on employment, and the handling of its accumulated 
debt only In the context of how these new approaches would affect 
the national railway in its post-privatised form raises questions 
about the real motivation for the JNR privatisation. It was the 
context in this study for examination of the hypothesis:
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- that the m otivation for the JNR privatisation p o lic ies  
was solely to solve the national railway’s financing  
d iffic u ltie s S .
At first sight an appraisal of the grounds for the proposals to 
reorganise the national railway supports the above hypothesis. By 
the early 1980s, if not long before that point, the JNR was 
completely insolvent, its continuing operation supported only by 
the incurring of additional debt. Commentators vied with each 
other to find superlatives to describe the scale of the JNR’s 
accumulated losses and indebtedness6 and, in a climate of 
government financial stringency, it was clear that ‘something had 
to be done’ with Japan’s national railway. If justification was 
then required for a policy initiative to reform the JNR, it could be 
provided on the straightforward basis that a financial 
reconstruction of the national railway operation was long overdue.
In contrast with this singular explanation for the alms of 
privatising the JNR, however, in the view of this study the specific 
proposals to restructure the state railway operation, which 
symbolised the administrative reform movement, and which were
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embodied in the division and privatisation of the JNR in 1987 do 
not stand up to close scrutiny in respect of the singular aim of 
solving its financial problems. The financial difficulties of the 
national railway were not solved by the JNR’s privatisation per se. 
There was, of course, no realistic hope of finding a real solution to 
the repayment of the debts built up by the JNR over a period of over 
twenty years of operating losses. The method adopted in the 
privatisation package was for the bulk of the accumulated debt to 
be transferred to a separate public body, the JNR Settlement 
Corporation, and for that indebtedness to be offset eventually by 
the sale of real estate assets inherited from the JNR, and by the 
flotation of the equity of the new JR companies.
It is fair to say that the collapse In the property market which 
occurred in the late 1980s, and the depressed condition of the 
Japanese stock market which accompanied it could not have been 
predicted by the proponents of the JNR privatisation. The fact 
remains, however, that these market factors have resulted I n 
substantial delays in the JNR Settlement Corporation’s programme 
of asset sales, throwing Into question the ultimate amount which
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the disposals will raise to offset the debts acquired from the 
former Japanese National Railways.
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Calculations made in the evaluation of the post-privatisation 
Japanese railways (in Chapter 7) suggest that, eventually, the 
sums achieved by the sale of real estate and of shares in the JRs 
may well exceed the amounts envisaged in the JNR privatisation  
proposals. The share flotations have, however, only recently 
begun7, some three years behind schedule, and the timetable for 
the sale of former JNR assets has similarly had to be rewritten. 
While the aggregate sums amassed from the asset and share 
disposals may finally exceed the figures on which the JNR 
privatisation was based, the length of time before the amounts are 
so received will be a multiple of the period originally forecast.
The accumulation of interest on the inherited debt had resulted in 
the JNR Settlement Corporation’s indebtedness In fiscal 1992 
actually exceeding the amount it took over from the JNR five years 
previously. The continuation of a heavy interest burden on the JNR 
Settlement Corporation until the receipt of the final JNR asset 
sale proceeds will, moreover, offset any amounts raised by these
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disposals in excess of the initial forecasts. It is impossible to 
make an exact estimation of the ultimate net figure of debt which 
will remain after the completion of the share and real estate 
sales. Whatever precise net obligation is left In the JNR 
Settlement Corporation, however, it will be very substantial by 
any standards and the critical factor is that it will be a public 
sector debt for which the JNR division and privatisation could 
provide no resolution.
In terms of understanding the motivation for the break-up of the 
JNR, it is therefore essential to emphasise that all of the financial 
measures which comprised the national railway privatisation 
policy could have been implemented at any time during the public 
corporation’s long history of operating losses and could equally 
well have eliminated these deficits.
In the process of privatising the national railway in the 1980s 
there was thus also a crucial political component which served to 
reconcile the differing viewpoints on what to do with the JNR, and 
converted them into a cohesive set of policy objectives. This 
political dimension was personified by Nakasone Yasuhiro who, in
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taking up the mantle of champion of the administrative reform  
programme, identified the achievement of a fundamental 
restructuring of the JNR as a potential prize which would gain him 
substantial reward in terms of a stronger domestic political power 
base, and greater international recognition. Building on the lead 
shown by DokôToshio as Chairman of the Second Rinchô, and on an 
embryonic pro-reform movement within the national railw ay  
management itself, Nakasone thus set out to orchestrate the JNR 
privatisation proposals and to turn them into decisive action.
Even before becoming Prime Minister in November 1982, Nakasone 
had astutely sensed that much could be gained by fostering a 
changing political mood in Japan, away from centralised 
government and nationalised bureaucratic organisations as 
epitomised in the public mind by the JNR. In this process, his 
views were shaped by observation of similar trends in the USA, 
under President Reagan and, absolutely critically, by those in 
Thatcherite Britain. It is perhaps ironic that the privatisation of 
British Rail was not one of the achievements of the Thatcher 
administration In the UK8, but the extensive programme of 
privatisation carried out by the UK government was undoubtedly a
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role model for the policies taken up by Nakasone in Japan.
Integral to the philosophy adopted by Nakasone as new-found 
advocate of reform of Japanese bureaucratic organisations, which 
also mirrored developments In Britain, was the aim to ‘break’ the 
labour unions in the public sector. The destruction of union 
influence in government was a very useful demonstration of the 
Nakasone administration’s will to eliminate the inefficiencies 
considered endemic In the Japanese public service; the ‘radical’ 
labour unions in the JNR thus became a direct target for a 
government policy stance which, as had been proven in the UK, had 
immediate appeal with the electorate.
The JNR unions, particularly the supposedly militant Kokuró , 
failed to observe that evidence of a sharp fall in labour action 
within the national railway - easily demonstrable as set out in 
Chapter 3 - would not be sufficient to counter a well orchestrated 
campaign purporting to show the dangers to Japanese public life of 
a ‘strong’ labour movement. If the left wing labour unions and the 
mainstream JNR Board had anything in common in the early 1 980s, 
it was an inability to see the changing political climate in which 
the national railway’s dissolution was carried through.
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The ‘success’ of the JNR privatisation process, and its position as 
the embodiment of the movement for administrative reform of 
Japanese public sector organisations, should therefore be viewed 
in the context of it being taken up as a political issue with  
motives not restricted to the simple desire to improve the 
financial efficiency of the national railway operation.
The National Railway in its Public Corporation Mode
The recollection that the role of the public sector in the financing 
of transport infrastructure investment was only properly 
addressed when there was a need to produce proposals to ensure 
profitable ‘privatised’ national railway operating companies, 
should also stand as a basis for judging the function of government 
in the running of the national railway as a public corporation.
Comparison was therefore made in this study, of the national 
railway between its post-privatisation state and the public 
corporation mode of operation which preceded it. Examination of 
the JNR as a public corporation involved the testing of the 
following hypotheses on the post-War reorganisation of the 
national railway:
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In response to these hypotheses, detailed study was made of the 
JNR period, from its establishment as a public corporation to 
manage the Japanese national rail network in 1949, and as it  
continued so to do until its dissolution and replacement by the JR 
group of companies in 1987. It was critical that this analysis be 
undertaken here because the ‘Inefficiencies’ of a public corporation 
structure and, indeed, its supposedly ‘alien’ nature In the Japanese 
public sector were held against the JNR, and used as an argument 
in favour of its dismantling as part of the administrative reform  
process. The final decision to end Its 37 year existence, and to  
replace it with a series of operating companies on a private 
enterprise basis was all the easier because it could be argued that 
the establishment of a public corporation to administer the 
national railways was not a Japanese initiative but one ‘imposed’ 
by the foreign powers of the Allied Occupation.
Faults in the running of the state railways, the years of 
lossmaking operation, and the build up of a very un-Japanese level 
of indebtedness^o could thus be attributed to the foisting of an 
unfamiliar organisational structure on the government service in 
Japan. The attribution of blame for the national railway’s ills to
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the SCAP administration and its supposed imposition of the JNR as 
a public corporation on to an unwilling Japanese national 
administration in legislation enacted in 1948 undoubtedly made i t 
more acceptable, psychologically, to bear the existence of a public 
sector organisation whose financial performance was 
unsatisfactory.
The political context for the proposals to reorganise the operating 
structure of the national railway was, indeed, the incoming 
Occupation administration in 1945. It was clear, however, that 
both the SCAP authorities and the national administration in Japan 
put great emphasis on the need to restructure the national railway 
to provide efficient services and aid the economic recovery. The 
early identification of the pressing requirement to establish an 
efficient business structure for the state railway was embodied i n 
the SCAP policy initiative to separate the operating functions of 
the national railway enterprise from those of its administration! i.
The definitive SCAP proposals for the Kokutetsu which followed - 
that it should be established as a public corporation - were, 
however, regarded by the transport bureaucracy and by politicians
621
in the National Diet as a distinct threat to their privileged position 
of influence on national railway affairs. Under the guise of a 
spurious argument that the public corporation was a concept alien 
to Japani2, the SCAP proposals for the setting up of a quasi­
private enterprise with a high degree of operating autonomy were 
reshaped to preserve the traditional Japanese system of 
bureaucratic and political manipulation of the national railway to 
suit vested interests. The alterations to the structure originally 
recommended by General MacArthur resulted in specific provisions 
with regard to the remit of the new public corporation, its  
management and freedom of operation, as embodied in the JNR Law, 
at major variance with SCAP’s initial intentions.
It was precisely the introduction of the ‘Japanised ’ version, rather 
than the SCAP public corporation model, that led to the future 
difficulties in managing the national railway enterprise. This was 
particularly apparent in the area of managementilabour relations, 
whose supposedly imperfect state the later JNR privatisation 
proposals were designed to 'cure'. Both the JNR management and 
the labour unions knew from the outset that there would be no 
autonomy In reaching agreements on labour matters. Since the
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legal procedures were found wanting, the railway unions adopted a 
new set of disruptive tactics which set the tone for a troublesome 
period of internal labour disputes within the JNR which lasted 
until the mid 1970s. It was this climate - of apparently militant, 
politicised labour unions in the JNR - which, moreover, provided 
the opportunity for the proponents of the administrative reform 
policies to identify the national railway operation as a target for 
its initiatives aimed at destroying the power of organised labour 
in the Japanese public sector. As set out above and as analysed i n 
Chapter 3, the Incidence of labour disputes in the JNR had fallen to 
negligible levels in the last decade of its operation, but the image 
which prevailed - and which was exploited by politicians intent on 
gaining the kudos from ‘breaking the unions’ - was of the 
unsatisfactory managementilabour relations which the 1949 
legislation had helped to create.
The lack of management autonomy in the national railway 
structure, as ensured by the JNR Law, also established the basis on 
which major railway policy decisions were taken. This basis was 
related less to the real needs of the national railway than to the 
benefits which could be gained through the orchestration of JNR
623
strategy by the civil service bureaucracy and by Diet politicians. 
The problems so caused by the imperfect implementation of the 
SCAP public corporation proposals were masked only by the period 
of rapid growth in demand for rail services which continued up to 
the early 1960s. The favourable market conditions allowed the 
JNR to remain in the black until fiscal year 1 964. The use of the 
JNR as a political vehicle - for the construction of new lines and 
for railway related contracts - came unstuck only when 
competition from other forms of transport grew strongly from the 
mid 1960s. The weaknesses In the JNR management, accustomed 
to a bureaucratic style of operation, and ill-equipped to take a line 
independent of their political masters, were then revealed in their 
inability to alter the railway’s strategy to meet changing market 
conditions.
Even the construction of the Shinkansen network of high speed 
lines, to the outside world at least the symbol of the JNR’s 
technological achievements, must be related to the politicisation 
of JNR policy decisions. In reality, the Shinkansen formed part of 
a twenty year period of intensive capital investment in the 
national rail infrastructure, the benefits of which are now being
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enjoyed by the privatised JR companies. Since, moreover, the later 
Shinkansen - the Tôhoku and Jôetsu - were built in the knowledge 
that they would, from the outset, be lossmaking, they comprised 
capital investments in projects of national interest and not those 
which the national railway could justify on grounds of 
profitability. As such, the political decision to decline the 
provision of specific public sector funding for the operation of the 
unprofitable Shinkansen I3was at major variance with the 
expectation that the JNR should remain ‘in the black’.
The national rail network which was the product of the public 
corporation era was impressively comprehensive, and one which 
provided a nationwide passenger and freight service ranging from 
local lines serving rural communities to the high speed Shinkansen 
linking the country’s major centres of population. The financial 
performance of the JNR was the subject of much criticism but the 
quality of service it offered to the Japanese public much less so. 
There were, to be sure, sporadic protests by the travelling public 
against disruptions to services as a result of labour disputes, but 
the standard of service remained throughout the JNR era at a level 
of which any other national railway would have been justifiably
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proud. It is this service quality which was before described as 
“...fast, clean, frequent and punctuaTi^ jn the words of the BBC 
television series Locomotion, and which was provided and 
maintained by the much pilloried Japanese National Railways. I f 
the attainment of service quality standards which are the “envy of 
the world” was at a monetary cost greater than outside observers 
might have deemed reasonable, it was only because the national 
railway was run in the JNR era for the benefit of politicians and 
transport bureaucrats who were not directly accountable for the 
operating losses incurred, in reality, in their name by the Japanese 
National Railway.
It might therefore be said that this was the price to be paid for the 
achievement of building and operating a world-class railway 
system. The Japanese national railway network which is envied 
the world over was in place long before the establishment of the 
JR operating companies, and therefore its creation can not be 
claimed as an achievement of the privatisation process. As such, 
the debt which remained after the dissolution of the JNR might be 
viewed as the sum of the necessary capital Investment on the 
national rail Infrastructure which was created in the JNR era. If a
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portion of the funding was on services which would be 
unprofitable, and which were justifiable only on social grounds - 
as much of it undoubtedly was - the blame should not be put on the 
JNR management but on the shoulders of Diet politicians and 
Transport Ministry bureaucrats responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of railway investment policy.
The National Railway as a Government Department
Further implicit in the JNR privatisation proposals was the 
assumption that such political interference as evidenced by the 
Seijisen (political lines) phenomenon was synonymous with the 
public corporation, that supposed ‘alien’ concept introduced by a 
foreign administration. Such conjecture provided the opportunity 
to evaluate the facts of the matter against the final hypothesis 
listed in the Introduction to this study:
- th a t  the concept of a ‘ p o l i t ic is e d ’ national ra ilw ay o n ly  
m ater ia lised  w i th  the adoption of a public c o r p o ra t io n  
s tru c tu re  in 19-4915.
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In examination of this hypothesis through analysis of the original 
establishment and subsequent development of the Japanese 
national railway, it has instead been established here that the 
operation of the national railway, from its earliest inception, had 
been party to political manipulation. The experience in the period 
after the Second World War of a state railway run to suit 
politicians and civil servants Irrespective of the financial 
consequences was thus by no means novel, and was In no way one 
which could be equated with the public corporation structure.
As it existed as a government agency from Its foundation in the 
1870s up to its conversion Into a public corporation in 1949, the 
national railway of Japan was operated as an instrument of 
political policy, its function being redefined according to the 
national priorities at each stage of Its development. It was, 
indeed, the excess of political influence In the running of the state 
railway to which the Incoming SCAP administration drew 
attention, the epitome of which was the usurping of the rail 
network by the national administration in the 1930s to support its  
expansionist policies.
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Political influence in the railways’ operation was therefore 
nothing new in the late 1940s and It was certainly not something 
created by the ‘foreign’ concept of a public corporation as 
introduced by the SCAP administration. Considerations of national 
politics, in fact, were also strongly evident in the national 
railway’s earliest times and, manifesting themselves In that 
period as ‘national security’, were the driving force behind the 
policy of nationalising the major private trunk line railway 
companies as carried out in 1 906/7.
The nationalisation of the main private railways created, at a 
stroke, the nucleus of a national rail network and its  
accomplishment served to enhance the feeling amongst its  
administrators of the state railway as a unique and ail powerful 
organisation within the Japanese public sector. The principle of 
Kokutetsu Ikka (National Railway Family) advocated as a 
management policy by Got6 Shinpel, one of the 'greats’ in the 
annals of the state railway, further helped to maintain the image 
of the Kokutetsu being at the pinnacle of the government service 
in Japan, it was , indeed, the bureaucratic mentality fostered by 
the Kokutetsu Ikka , reinforced by the accompanying reflected
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glory of having the national railway run as a key element of 
national policy in the 1930s, which was a major contributory 
factor in the failure to implement the original SCAP proposals to 
end political interference in the affairs of the state rail operation.
Final O bservations
The issues of management autonomy and of accountability, 
important factors throughout the JNR’s history, are still very 
relevant to the operation of the national railway in its present day 
post-privatisation form. The management of the JR companies 
crave such autonomy of operation and have already - in the form of 
their forcing a government decision to subsidise the construction 
of the ‘new’ Shinkansen - demonstrated that there had been a 
distinct shift in the balance of power between the regulators in 
the Ministry of Transport and the operators of the national ra il 
service. On the subject of accountability, however, the 
privatisation process has not completely resolved the issue of 
what should be, in the future, the appropriate degree of public 
sector control over the operation of the national railway network. 
The key area In which this matter will be debated is one 
fundamental to the outlook for the railways in Japan, that of the
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financing of infrastructure investment. The JNR privatisation did 
not address this problem directly and the establishment of a 
coherent national policy for the funding of railway investment 
remains an outstanding issue.
In summary, it has been the contention of this thesis that the 
success of the process of the division and privatisation of the 
Japanese National Railway must be judged in the context of the 
historical background of its development and operation as a 
government department and then as a public corporation. The 
difficulties encountered in the public corporation era were those 
inherent in the State railway’s previous incarnation as a 
government agency, and were endemic to the long-established 
system of using the national railway for the promotion of 
interests other than those of its operation for the public good.
This judgement has been made on the basis that there are real 
limitations on the extent of the economic or financial benefits 
which can be claimed to have resulted directly from the JNR 
privatisation process. Its success can therefore most easily be 
assessed in political terms. Involving the dissolution of the
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national railway hitherto run for the benefit of bureaucrats and 
politicians. It remains a major irony, however, that the credit for 
the implementation of the privatisation strategy may be claimed 
on behalf of a domestic political system in Japan, which, by its  
dereliction of duty to the general public In allowing the 
mismanagement of the national railway over a long period, was 
itself responsible for the necessity of putting the new policies 
into operation.
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CHAPTER 8 ENDNOTES
1. Several independent commentators on the JNR privatisation, 
listed in the Introduction to this study, have given credit to the 
proponents of the national railway privatisation policies In Japan 
for their successful implementation in the face of entrenched 
opposition to change.
The associated question of whether a similar political process I s 
possible in other countries seeking to reorganise their national 
railway operations has also interested a number of observers of 
the Japanese experience. As the title would suggest this was, 
indeed, the theme of the World Bank Study authored by Fukui 
Kôichirô (1992). Japanese National Railways Privatisation Study- 
The Experience of Japan and Lessons for Developing Countries , 
Washington. Fukui’s objective of a comparative evaluation of the 
restructuring of the Japanese national railway was, moreover, 
shared by the UK observers quoted at length in the Introduction (pp. 
18 - 22) to this thesis. While they had different views on the 
subject, these commentators (such as Gourvish, Irvine, Salvesen 
and Adley) all addressed the question of whether or not the 
experience of Japan could be utilised to provide ‘answers’ to the 
problems of operating a national public sector rail network i n 
Britain.
2. Quote from the Commentary to the BBC Television Series. 
Locomotion (1993), Programme 6, “Track to the Future”, 12 
December.
3. These hypotheses were examined in Chapters 6 and 7, in 
discussion of the status of the national railway one and five years 
after its privatisation.
4. The preparatory measures ( ‘pre-conditions’) for the 
privatisation process are set out In detail in Chapter 6 (pp. 487 - 
490) in assessment of the immediate financial results of the JNR 
reform.
5. As examined in Chapter 5 in the evaluation of the JNR reform 
programme as a central theme In the administrative reform
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movement.
6. Such as ...“Long term debts outstanding amounted to 14 trillion  
Yen (about US$62 billion in FY 1980, or 5.8% of GNP in that year.
JNR was in a virtual bankruptcy.” Taniuchi Mitsuru (1991),” 
Privatisation and Deregulation in Japan”, Outlook. Summer, p. 34; 
and "... the company running the largest losses in the world, the 
Japan National Railways.” van Wolferen , Karel (1990), The 
Enigma of Japanese Power. London, p.32; and “The long-term debt 
in FY 1986 ...was more than 25 trillion Yen, and if the obligation 
for JNR mutual aid pension and other expenses are added to this, 
the total amount exceeded 30 trillion Yen (slightly more than US$ 
210 billion). To see how enormous this sum was, note that it was 
nearly ten percent of Japanese GNP In FY 1987 and over 60 percent 
of the government’s budget in that year.” Tanahashi Yasushi 
(1992), Reform of Railways in Japan. Tokyo, p. 3.
7. The first tranche of the equity capital of JR East was sold to 
the investing public In October 1993. This issue Is covered in 
Chapter 7 (pp. 528 - 532).
8. At the time of writing, the initial stages of the restructuring of 
British Rail, its split into infrastructure (a track authority), and 
operating companies (franchises), are being put Into operation. The 
Major administration which succeeded Mrs, now Lady Thatcher’s, 
has, however, abandoned its original proposal to sell off an 
integrated British Rail to outside investors and instead is planning 
the flotation of Railtrack, the railway track authority.
9. Consideration of these hypotheses was the basis of the 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 on the operation of the JNR in its  
public corporation nr>ode.
10. Described thus in Horsley, William and Buckley, Roger (1990), 
Nippon. New Superpower - Japan Since 1945. London. “...Its  
(JNR’s) accumulated debt was even larger than those of Brazil and 
Mexico, the two biggest debtor nations, combined.” pi 97.
11. The analysis in this study of the Occupation phase, and of the 
proposals to reorganise the national railway, would have been 
considerably more difficult to accomplish without the substantial
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interview material from Japanese experts on this period such as 
Kakumoto Rydhei, Ishikawa Tatsujir6 and Kanematsu Manabu. The 
library of Kotsu Tokei Kenkyujo , and the unpublished papers made 
available from the Abiko Bunko at Unyu Chosa Kyoku (both i n 
Tokyo) were also invaluable in this respect.
1 2. As expounded by Choi, Eunbong (1 991), The Break-up and 
Privatization Policy of The Japan National Railways. 19 80 - 87: A 
Case Study of Japanese Public Policy-making Structure and 
Process. Ann Arbor, Michigan, p. 250.
1 3. The ‘new’ Shinkansen construction programme is further 
discussed in Appendix 5.
14. Commentary to Locomotion (1993). Programme 6, “Track to 
the Future”, 1 2 December.
1 5. As discussed in Chapter 1 on the establishment and 
development of the Japanese national railway network.
16. Cited in this study as an indication of the quest by JR company 
management for independent operation. This issue was covered 
under the topic of ‘The JRs That Can Say No’ in Chapter 7 (pp. 544 - 
546).
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APPENDIX 1
LIST OF RESEARCH INTERVIEWS ON THE JAPANESE 
RAILWAYS1
Source and O rganisation
Universities
Professor Imashiro Mitsuhide, Institute of Business Research,
Daito Bunka University .Tokyo.
Professor Okano Yukihide, Formerly Professor of Economics, Tokyo 
University. Now Professor of Economics, Söka University, Tokyo.
Associate Professor, Yamauchi HirotakaZ, Faculty of Commerce, 
Hitosubashi University, Tokyo.
Associate Professor Yamamoto Tetsuzo^, School of Commerce, 
Waseda University, Tokyo.
Professor Yuzawa Takeshi, Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin 
University, Tokyo.
Transport Institutes
Aoki Mami, Senior Researcher, Unyu Chosa Kyoku (Institute of 
Transport Economics), Tokyo.
Maeda Kiyoji, Director General, Unyu Chösa Kyoku (Institute of 
Transport Economics), Tokyo.
Ishii Naoki, Managing Director, Kotsu Tdkei Kenkyujo (Institute of 
Transport Statistics), Tokyo.
Ishikawa Tatsujirö, Chairman, Kotsu Tokei Kenkyujo (Institute of 
Transport Statistics), Tokyo.
Izumi Nobuhisa, Executive Director, Railway Technical Research 
Institute, Tokyo.
Dr Kakumoto Ryòhei, Director, Unyu Keizai Kenkyu Sentà 
(Transport Economics Research Centre), Tokyo.
Wakuda Yasuo, Director, Unyu Keizai Kenkyù Sentà (Transport 
Economics Research Centre), Tokyo.
Misaka Takeyasu, President, Tetsudó Kòsaikai (Japan Railway 
Association), Tokyo.
Ministries
Katò Shinichi, Archivist, Okurashó (Ministry of Finance).
Dr Kanematsu Manabu, Barrister at Law, Formerly Unyushó 
(Ministry of Transport) - later Managing Director of the JNR.
Nakashima Mirò, Formerly Executive Vice President, Nihon Unyu 
Soko (Japan Transportation Warehouse Company). Now Director 
General, Research Office of the Standing Committee on Transport, 
House of Councillors(Sang//n) .
Labour Unions
Mutò Hisashi, Former Secretary General, Kokuró (Japan Railway 
Workers Union).
Kitsutaka Hiromasa, Former Staff Relations Department, Advisory 
Director to the JNR President.
Shinkansen
Takamatsu Masanobu, Deputy Director, Shinkansen Department 
Japan Railway Construction Public Corporation.
NIshio Gentarò, Former Chief Engineer, JNR Rolling Stock, JNR.
JR and Private Railway Companies 
Visits to the Corporate Headquarters of:
Eidan Chikatetsu (Teito Rapid Transit Authority)
Keio Teito (Keio Railway Company)
Tokyu Corporation.
Ito Tadashi, Director, Meitetsu (Nagoya Railroad).
Dr Takahashi K6ji, President, Tekken Construction Company, 
(Former Director of JNR).
Fukushima Toru, Manager, International Section, JR Tokai (JR 
Central).
Ito Naohiko, then Director of Planning , JR Kamotsu (JR Freight ).
Suga Tatsuhiko, Director - International and Cultural Affairs, JR 
Higashi Nihon (JR East).
Tao Norio, General Manager, JR Systems (Railway Information 
Systems Company).
a p p e n d ix  1 ENDNOTES
1. Meetings on more than one single occasion were held w ith  
several of the interviewees, notably Imashiro Mitsuhide, Ishii 
Naoki, Maeda Kiyoji, Aoki Mami, Ishikawa Tatsujiro, Kakumoto 
Ryohei, Wakuda Yasuo, Kitsutaka Hiromasa, Takamatsu Masanobu, 
and Suga Tatsuhiko. The interviews were conducted in Tokyo, 
between July 1991 and May 1992, and in September 1994. The 
total number of Interviews in which research material was 
obtained was in excess of one hundred.
2. The author also took part with Associate Professor Yamauchi 
Hirotaki in a Forum on the privatisation of British state-owned 
organisations. The findings were published in Unvu to Keizaj 
(1993) (Transportation and Economy), Vol. 53, No. 12, December.
3. Associate Professor Yamamoto Tetsuzo was another participant 
in the Forum cited in Endnote 2.
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THE JAPANESE NATIONAL RAILWAYS - A CHRONOLOGY OF 
m ajor  r e la te d  e v e n t s  1872 - 1992
1872
1870s & 
1880s
1883
Late 1 880s
1892
1894 - 5
1895
Early 1 900s
The opening of the first railway line in Japan, 
from Shinbashi Station in Tokyo to Yokohama.
Construction of important trunk lines linking the 
country’s main centres of population.
The commencement of services by the Nihon 
Railway Company, the country’s first private 
railway enterprise.
A period of substantial investment in the 
railways of Japan, particularly for the 
construction of privately funded trunk lines.
Formation of the Ministry of Communications, 
with jurisdiction over the Railways Bureau.
Enactment of the Railway Construction Law, 
establishing the principle of the Government 
designating which lines should be built in the 
future, and giving the authorisation for the State 
to acquire the private railways.
The Sino-Japanese war, which set off a second 
railway investment boom in which a large number 
of branch lines were constructed by private 
railway companies.
Establishment of the Kyoto Electric Railway 
Company as the country’s first electric tramway.
Completion, with the exception of services on the 
Island of Hokkaido, of the nationwide network of 
trunk railway lines.
1904 - 5 The Russo-Japanese War, in the course of which
the railway network was used intensively for the 
movement of troops and materials.
1906 The passing of the Railway Nationalisation Act
(Tetsudd Kokuyu H6) in which 17 trunk line 
railway companies were acquired by the State.
1908 Creation of the Railways Agency (Tetsudoin)
under direct Cabinet control, to administer the 
national railways.
Late 1900s Initiation of a programme of conversion of the 
national rail network from steam to electricity. 
This policy was also promoted rapidly by the 
remaining private railway companies.
1920 The establishment o f a separate Ministry of
Railways (Tetsuddsho) .
1922 The promulgation of the Railway Construction Act
(Tetsudd Fusetsu Ho) which laid the foundation 
for the construction of a nationwide network of 
local lines to be built by the national railway.
1 928 The ceding of control over the automotive sector
by the Ministry of Communications to the 
Railways Ministry
1930s The earning of substantial profits by the state
railway, which funded improvements to the main 
trunk line services, subsidies to the local private 
railways, the repayment of the fund provided for 
the nationalisaton o f the major private companies 
In 1906, and the substantial construction of rural 
lines.
Late 1930s Adoption of expansionist national policies which
led to the administration of the state railway to 
serve the interests of the country’s m ilitary  
objectives.
1941 - 1945
1945
1946
Substantial dannage inflicted on the national ra il 
network by Allied bombings In major cities, and 
by the Intensive use of rail facilities for m ilitary  
purposes.
Establishment of the Ministry of Transport to 
centralise control over all forms of transport, the 
railways being administered by a newly formed 
Railways General Bureau (Tetsudô Sôkyoku) .
The Japanese surrender at the end of the Second 
World War and the beginning of the Allied 
Occupation (SCAP), headed by General Douglas 
MacArthur.
Promotion by SCAP of policies aimed at the 
‘démocratisation’ of Japan, and at aiding its  
economic recovery.
Enactment of the Trade Union Law (Rôdô Kumiai 
HÔ) providing for the establishment of 
democratically organised labour unions (including 
those in the national railway).
Initiation by the SCAP administration of ‘The 
Purge’, designed to remove from Japanese public 
life those elements which had been responsible 
for the promotion of the militaristic policies of 
the 1930’s.
The enactment of the Labour Relations 
Adjustment Law (Rôchô Hô) establishing 
mediation and conciliation procedures for 
employees in the public sector, but also lim iting  
their right to strike.
The US Personnel and Advisory Mission to Japan 
headed by Blaine Hoover, the President of the 
Civil Service Assembly of the US and Canada. The 
Hoover Mission’s brief was to effect a thorough 
reform of the Japanese public service.
1947
1948
A proposal to hold a General Strike (on 1 February 
1947), subsequently forbidden in a statement by 
General MacArthur on the grounds that it would 
threaten public welfare.
Enactment of the Labour Standards Law (Rôki Hô) 
setting standards for conditions of work.
Establishment of the state railway labour union 
as a national organisation, the National Railway 
Workers Union (Kokutetsu Ródo Kumiai or 
Kokurô).
Enactment of the National Public Service Law 
(Kokkô HÔ) which sought to reform the 
administration of the civil service, and to impose 
restrictions on the rights of public service 
workers.
The letter from General MacArthur to PM Ashida 
(commonly known a t the Mashokan ) calling for 
the revision of the National Public Service Law, 
and for the establishment of public corporations 
to administer the government’s tobacco and salt 
enterprise and the national railway. The le tter  
marked the formal confirmation of the reversal of 
SCAP policy away from démocratisation and 
towards economic growth and the suppression of 
the perceived Communist threat to Japan’s 
political stability.
The passing of a Cabinet Order Implementing the 
Mashokan proposals, which were enacted in the 
Revised National Public Service Law, the 
Japanese National Railway Law, (Nihon Kokuyû 
Tetsudô Hô) , the Public Corporations Labour 
Relations Law (Kôrô Hô) , and the Revised Labour 
Relations Adjustment Law. The revised National 
Public Service Law removed the right to strike 
from all public sector workers but collective 
bargaining procedures were established for those
employees covered by the Public Corporations 
Labour Relations Law.
1949
1950
The Dodge Mission to Japan headed by Joseph M. 
Dodge, then a Detroit Bank President. The 
subsequent enactment of the Law for the Fixed 
Level of Personnel in Administrative 
Organisations (Teiin Hô) , setting ceilings on the 
number of workers in the public service which led 
to cutbacks in government employment levels.
Establishment of the JNR Public Corporation 
(Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô) on 1 July 1949 to operate 
the national railway network.
The occurrence of ‘incidents’ related to the 
running of the state railway. In particular the 
death of the first JNR President, Shimoyama 
Sadanori, the Mitaka train crash (Mitaka Jiken) , 
and the Matsukawa train crash (Matsukawa Jiken).
The overturning by the Government of the firs t  
decision on a JNR matter of the National 
Enterprises Labour Relations Committee (Kôrôi) , 
which had been set up to administer the 
conciliation procedures for the national railway 
public corporation.
General MacArthur’s letter to PM Yoshida, which 
initiated a Purge of left wing ‘extremists’ in 
Japan designed to limit the influence of 
Communists in the public service.
Establishment of the Railway Construction 
Council (Tetsudô Kensetsu Shingikai) to 
authorise - independently from the Board of 
Directors of the JNR - capital spending on the 
railway network.
1950s
1951
1955
1957
Strong growth in the demand for rail passenger 
and freight services, necessitating high levels of 
investment to modernise the network and to 
extend its capacity.
Formation of the National Railway Locomotive 
Crew Union (later to become known as Dorò ).
The appointment as JNR President of Sogô Shinji, 
later the promoter o f the construction of the 
Tôkaidô Shinkansen .
The first JNR Expansion Plan, which sought to 
replace obsolescent facilities, and to extend the 
electrification of the track network.
1959
1960s
Announcement of the proposal by the JNR Railway 
Technical Research Institute for the construction 
of a standard gauge line from Tokyo to Osaka 
which would take only three hours (the Tôkaidô 
Shinkansen ) .
The introduction of a decentralised management 
structure in the JNR through the establishment of 
a branch office system.
Formation of the Japan Railway Workers Union 
(Tetsurô) .
Approval by the Ministry of Transport for the 
building of the Tôkaidô Shinkansen (The New 
Tôkaidô Line) from Tokyo to Osaka, and the 
commencement of construction work on the 
project.
Rapid growth in road transport in Japan, resulting 
in a dramatic loss of market share by the national 
railway In both passenger and freight services. 
This trend continued and, indeed, accelerated 
through the 1970’s,
1961
1964
1965
1966
1968
1969
The second JNR Expansion Plan, aimed at 
increasing transport capacity, the completion of 
the New Tôkaidô Line, large scale conversion to 
diesel locomotives, and further line 
electrification.
Commencement of services on the Tôkaidô 
Shinkansen just prior to the opening of the Tokyo 
Olympics.
The first substantial operating loss by the JNR 
since Its establishment as a public corporation in 
1949.
Establishment of the Japan Railway Construction 
Public Corporation (Nihon Tetsudô Kensetsu 
Kôdan) to provide funding for railway 
construction projects in both the national and 
private sectors.
The third JNR Expansion Plan which sought to 
increase capacity in commuter services and trunk 
routes, to extend the New Tôkaidô Line by building 
the Sanyô Shinkansen , and to continue with the 
programme of track electrification.
Announcement of an operating loss of 123 billion 
Yen by the JNR. This completely eliminated the 
corporation’s capital reserves, thus effectively  
rendering it insolvent.
The Introduction of government subsidies to the 
JNR.
Adoption by the JNR of the policy of Yôin Gôrika 
(Rationalisation of the Essential Workforce).
The first JNR Reconstruction Plan aimed at 
maintaining the corporation’s capital Investment 
programme. This was to be financed by cutting 
back on employment levels, by the closure of
1970
1972
1973
1975
1976
many lossmaking lines, and by initiating a system 
of four yearly fare increases.
Introduction of the policy of Marusei Undo 
(Increasing Productivity Movement) by the JNR 
administration, designed in principle to improve 
the operating efficiency of the national railway 
enterprise.
The opening of the Sanyo Shinkansen from Shin 
Osaka to Okayama.
Tanaka Kakuei’s election as Prime Minister, on a 
manifesto based on his Plan for Building a New 
Japan (Nihon Rettd Kaizo Ron) .
The planned introduction of a further JNR 
Reconstruction Plan, abandoned without being 
implemented.
Implementation of a further JNR Reconstruction 
Plan which envisaged a high level of new capital 
expenditure, to be offset by three-yearly ta r if f  
increases.
The first ‘Oil Shock’, which resulted in the 1973 
Reconstruction Plan being shelved after only one 
year.
An extension to the Sanyo Shinkansen , from 
Okayama to Hakata, opened for service.
The Sutokensuto, an illegal eight day strike by 
JNR workers for the reinstatement of the legal 
right to strike.
The first JNR Rehabilitation Plan, maintaining 
capital spending but reducing employment levels 
and initiating substantial increases in fares. The 
1976 Plan also saw the introduction of interest 
subsidies (Mago no Rishi) to the JNR.
8
1977
1980
1981
1982
Implementation of revisions to the 1976 
Rehabilitation Plan through the enactment of the 
reform of the Fare Law and the revised Japan 
National Railways Law. These changes, embodied 
in the JNR Management Improvement Plan (Keiei 
Kaizen Keikaku) , provided for diversified 
investment by the JNR in areas not directly linked 
to the provision of railway services, and gave i t 
the authority to raise tariffs without prior Diet 
approval.
Enactment of a Special Act for the Promotion of 
JNR Reconstruction {Kokuyû Tetsudô Keiei Saiken 
Sokushin Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) . The JNR 
Reconstruction Act implemented the 
rationalisation of unprofitable lines proposed 
some twelve years previously.
Inauguration of the Second Commission on 
Administrative Reform (Daini Rinji Gyôsei 
Chôsakai or Rinchô) . Chaired by Dokô Toshio, its  
brief was to find means of reducing the public 
sector financing deficit, and to recommend 
policies by which the administration of the 
government service could be restructured.
Publication of the initial findings of the 
Commission on Administrative Reform (Rinchô) 
recommending retrenchment in government 
expenditure.
The opening of the Tôhoku Shinkansen (Omiya to 
Morioka) and the Jôetsu Shinkansen (Omiya to 
Niigata).
Cabinet ratification of the shelving of plans for 
the further expansion of the Shinkansen network.
Publication of the Third Report of the Commission 
on Administrative Reform (Rinchô) , outlining its  
formal recommendation that the JNR should be
1983
1984
1985
divided into separate operating units and 
privatised. Subsequently, the Emergency 
Measures for the Rehabilitation of the JNR 
Business Operations were approved by the 
Cabinet.
The appointment as Prime Minister of Nakasone 
Yasuhiro, signalling the promotion of the policies 
of administrative reform.
Enactment of the Special Law for the Promotion 
of JNR Business Rehabilitation (Kokutetsu Saiken 
Kanri linkai Sechi HÔ) .
The inauguration of the JNR Reform Supervisory 
Commission (Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri linkai) and 
the delivery of its first Emergency 
Recommendations for the restructuring of the 
national railway.
Implementation of the JNR Plan for the New 
Management of Goods Transportation (Atarashii 
Tetsudô Kamotsu Eigyô ni Tsuite) . This involved 
the abolition of the freight marshalling yard 
system and the rationalisation of the JNR’s goods 
transport operation into a direct station to 
station service.
Publication of the Second Emergency Report of 
the JNR Reform Commission, formalising its  
proposals to break-up and privatise the JNR.
The opening of the extension of the Tôhoku and 
Jôetsu Shinkansen from Omiya to Ueno Station i n 
Tokyo.
PM Nakasone’s dismissal of JNR President Nisugi 
and his replacement by the pro-privatisation 
Sugiura Takaya, former Vice Minister of Finance.
10
1986
1987
Delivery of the JNR Restructuring Commission’s 
Opinions Regarding JNR Reform (Kokutetsu 
Kaikaku ni Kan Sum Iken) . The Commission’s 
findings that the JNR should be divided into six 
regional passenger companies and one nationwide 
freight operation, that its manning levels should 
be substantially reduced, and that its  
privatisation should be preceded by the 
disposition of its long term debts were 
immediately endorsed by the Cabinet.
The peaking of the JNR’s annual operating losses - 
which had continued unabated since 1964- at 
1 847.8 billion Yen.
Landslide election victories by the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party , giving impetus to
the implementation of the government’s 
privatisation policies.
Enactment of the JNR Restructuring Law (Kokuyû 
Tetsudô Kaikaku Hô) and the associated Acts for 
the dissolution of the JNR Public Corporation and 
its replacement by seven joint stock operating 
companies and new public bodies responsible for 
debt disposal.
The termination of the Japanese National Railway 
(JNR), being succeeded on 1 April 1987 by the JR 
Group of operating companies. Two new public 
bodies were created , the JNR Settlement 
Corporation (Kokutetsu Seisan Jigyô Dan) and the 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation (Shinkansen Hoyû 
Kikô) , respectively to manage the disposal of the 
JNR’s long term indebtedness, and to acquire the 
existing Shinkansen facilities which would then 
be leased to the JR Honshu companies. The new 
structure also incorporated the creation of a 
fund, the Keiei Antei Kikin (Management 
Stabilisation Fund) to subsidise the operations of
11
1988
1989
1990
1991
the lossmaking Three Islands JRs (Hokkaido, 
Shikoku, and Kyushu).
The opening of the Seikan Tunnel linking rail 
traffic between the islands of Honshu and 
Hokkaido.
The opening of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge System, 
linking road and rail transport between the 
islands of Honshu and Shikoku.
Publication of the first year’s results of the JR 
operating companies, showing profits from all 
7 JRs in excess of the forecasts contained in the 
privatisation proposals.
Approval for a new system of financing the 
construction of extensions to the Shinkansen 
network. In contrast to the Shinkansen built i n 
the JNR era, the ‘new’ Shinkansen construction 
costs were to be divided as to 50% from 
local/national governments and 50% from the 
Honshu JR companies.
Announcement of a third consecutive year of 
transport volume increases - both passenger and 
freight - by the JR companies, in excess of those 
achieved by the private railway sector.
The opening of the Narita Express, linking 
stations in Yokohama and Tokyo with Narita 
Airport.
The opening of the extension of the Tôhoku and 
Jôetsu Shinkansen between Ueno and Tokyo 
Stations.
Formal announcement by the Ministry of Finance 
of a postponement In the plan to float the shares 
of the Honshu JRs on the stock market.
12
1992
The dissolution of the Shinkansen Holding 
Corporation, and its reorganisation as the 
Railway Development Fund. Under the new 
arrangements, the leasing system for the existing 
Shinkansen was terminated, and replaced by a 
long term purchase contract in which the Honshu 
JRs would acquire the facilities of the Tôkaidô, 
Sanyo, Tôhoku and Jôetsu Shinkansen .
The introduction by JR East of the Nozomi service 
on the Tôkaidô Shinkansen , reducing the time 
taken between Tokyo and Shin Osaka to two hours, 
thirty minutes.
The opening by JR East of the Yamagata 
Shinkansen from Fukushima to Yamagata.
The announcement of a further postponement - 
despite the fact that JR East, JR Central and J R 
West had met the Stock Exchange requirements i n 
full - in the proposals for their share flotations.
Publication of the fifth year’s results of the JNR 
Settlement Corporation, confirming that the 
programme of disposing of the JNR’s long term  
indebtedness remained behind schedule. The level 
of debt held by the JNR Settlement corporation i n 
fiscal 1992 was still higher than the amount 
inherited from the JNR five years previously.
Announcement of the fifth year’s results of the 
JR operating companies, showing a slowdown i n 
the overall rate of profits growth, and 
accompanied by forecasts of profit declines for 
the forthcoming fiscal year.
13









t i m e t a b l e  o f  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  f o r  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  s p e c i a l  
l o c a l  l i n e s
First Stage Second Stage Third Stage
Line Date Line Date 1 Line Date Line Date 1 Line Date
Kohinhoku 1981. 9.18 Kami oka 1981. 9. 18 j Nayoro 1981. 8. 2 Canni chi 1981. 6. 22 Magai 1983.11.28
Biko // Akechi "  1 Yumo 1981. 6. 22 Urushio
tt Noto 1983. 5.27
Kohinnan // Tarumi it Shibetsu 1981. 8. 2 kamiyamada tt Okata
tt
Shokotsu it Shigaraki it Chihoku tt Takachiho tt Miyazu 1984. 2. 3
Aioi it Miki it Shihoro 1981. 6.22 Matsuura tt kajiya
tt
Shiranuka it Houjo if Hiroo tt Saga tt Talsha
tt
Manj i it Takasago it Tomiuchi tt Yamano tt Nakamura 1983. 5.27
iMnai it Wakasa it Iburi tt Miyanojo tt Miyata 1984. 2. 3
Ohata it Kurayoshi tt Matsumae tt Osumioshi tt Ita
tt
Kuj i it Matsushima tt Se tana tt Shibushi tt Itoda
tt
Miyako it Katsuki tt Horonai tt Tagawa
tt
Sakari it Muroki tt Utashinai tt Yunomae
tt
Kuroisi it Soeda tt Haboro tt
Kakunodate it Katsuta tt Tenhoku 1981. 8.2
Yaj ima it Amaki "  jAniai 1981. 6. 22
Marumori it Yabe "  [Aizu tt
Nichu it Miyahara tt Ash io tt
Akatani it Takamori tt Moka tt
Uonuma it Tsuma "  lEtsuminan tt
Kihara it " iFutamata tt 1
Shimizuko it "  1 Ise tt
Source : Institute of Transport Statistics (Kotsu Tokei Kenkyujo).




APPENDIX 6
OUTLINE OF THE JAPANESE RAILWAY SUBSIDY SYSTEM: FISCAL 
YEAR 1992
Name of the System Outlines of Subsidies
I. Improvement of trunk line 
railways
1. Measures for Shinkansen-network 
improvement projects
(1) Shinkansen-raiIway-network 
improvement project
O  Subsidies for Shinkansen- 
rai Iway-network improvement 
project
Subsidies for Shinkansen construction works undertaken 
by Japan Railway Construction Public Corporation 
(JRCC)
O  Grants-in-aid of Shinkansen 
construction promotion project
Grants-in-aid of Shinkansen construction expenses 
undertaken by JRCC
[Reference]
Takasaki— • Nagano ( Standard size )
Morioka ~  Acraori (. Standard sizOr
Mini-Shinkansen ) Project cost 
Yatsushiro~ Nishi-Kagoshima 1,036 
( Super-Express )
Takaoka ~  Kanazawa • • • Works starting
adjustment cost 40
(2) Subsidies for Shinkansen- 
ne twork- improvement-promot ion- 
preparation project
Subsidies for Shinkansen-network-improvement- 
promotion-preparation project, such as environmental 
impact assessment on the sections of Shinkansen 
construction works to be started by JRCC
-  1 -

Name of the System Outlines of Subsidies
2. Measures for the main-trunk- 
1 ine-raiIway-network improvement
(1) Subsidies for trunk-line- 
railway-activiation project
Subsidies for Shinkansen-through-operation works 
between Fukushima and Yamagata on Ou Line, and for higher 
standardized works between Muikamachi and Saigata on 
Hokuetsu-Hokusen Line
(2) Interest-free loans for trunk-
l i n e - r a i l w a y - n e t w o r k
improvement
• Interest-free loans from RDF for higher standard­
ization. Shinkansen-through-operation. and freight 
transport capacity improvement works on main trunk 
line railways
-
•Deposit of necessary amount from RDF to The Japan 
Development Bank CJDB) which provides low-interest 
loans for the expenses of transport capacity 
improvement works of Tokaido Shinkansen
(3) Subsidies for the construction 
of local development lines and 
local trunk lines
Subsidies for JRCC construction expenses of local 
development lines and local trunk lines ( AB lines ). 
and JRCC new line survey expenses
-  2 -
Contents of Subsidies Budget for FY 1992
Ratio of subsidies: 1/5 of the cost of works 
to be subsidized
♦ Local governments invest money proportional to 
the expenses borne by the central government
( ratio of loans )
• Higher standardization and Shinkansen 
through operations
* Local governments contribute in proportion to 
the central government
•Main trunk line freight transport 
capacity improvement 30%
( financing ratio )
•Transport capacity improvement of 
Tokaido Shinkansen 50%
RDF deposits interest-free fund in JDB in order for 
lend at the special interest rale for public works
• AB lines ( 5 lines ) 
Ratio of subsidies: 10/10 of the construction 
expenses
New line surveys ( topographical 
and geological surveys of Chuo 
Shinkansen and Shikoku Shinkansen )
Ratio of subsidies: 10/10 of the survey
expenses
General source of revenue 
of the Government
11
Loan from RDF 65
General source of revenue 
of the Government
General source of revenue 
of the Government
150
- 2 -

Contents of Subsidies
-scale 'Ratio of subsidies: 10% of the expenses of const-
rtaken ruction works to be subsidized
'ansit (1/2 by the central government,
1/2 by local governments)
Time to begin granting subsidies:
For the construction up to FY 1989
Following FY of the constructions 
For the construction from FY 1990 onward
••• The FY of the construction
■ Ratio of grants:
For lines adopted in or before FY 1990 
rFor the construction up to FY 1989
(10-year installments)"-^ 5. 4. 3. 3, 3, 3. 3. 3. 2 Oi) 
For the construction from FY 1990 onward 
■ (10-year installments)---!. 2.3.4.4.5.5,4. 4. 3 (X) 
For newly adopted lines in FY 1991 and 1992 
•For the construction on FY 1991 
(2-year installments) ---7.28 (X)
For the construction on FY 1992 
" ( l u m p  p a y m e n  t) ---35 (X)
:rtaken 'Ratio of subsidies: 36X of the expenses of const-
;rs ruction works to be subsidized
(1/2 by the central government. 
1/2 by local governments)
Time to begin granting subsidies:
Following FY of business operation started 
• Ratio of grants:
6-year installment---3,3.3. 3.3.3 (X)
Budget for FY 1992
General source of revenue 
of the Government
568
General source of revenue 
of the Government
- 3 -

:apital 
les and 
:CC and 
ines )
I
ovement 
lines 
a iI way
Contents of Subsidies
Rental 1 ines ( CD 1ines )
Subsidies for interest expenses for the part of 
interest over 5 . on the required capital 
( Period of time to provide subsidy
-•-for 40 years after inauguration ) 
■Transfer lines ( P lines )
Subsidies for interest expenses for the part of 
interest over 5 . on the required capital 
( 1/2 of subsidies are borne by the central 
government and local governments respectively ) 
( Period of time to provide subsidy
•■■for 25 years after inauguration, as 
for new-town railway, for 15 years)
• Ratio of loan;
* Local governments contribute in proportion to 
the central government
Budget for FY 1992
General source of revenue 
of the Government
148
Loan from RDF 251
-  4 -
Name of the System Out 1ines of Subsidies
DI. Technical development of Linear 
Motor-car and others
1. Subsidies for the development 
of superconductive magnetic 
levitation railway technology
2. Subsidies for other technical 
development
Subsidies to Railway Technical Research Institute (RTRl) 
for the basic technical development work utilizing 
Miyazaki Test Line and the app 1 ¡cational technical 
development work such as the construction of Yamanashi 
Test Line, with a view to promoting the technical 
development to put the superconductive magnetic 
levitation railway in practical use
Subsidies for advanced and basic technical development 
for railway safety, disaster.-prevention and environ­
mental measures undertaken by RTRl
- 5
Contents of Subsidies
( Ratio of subsidies )
(1) Basic technical development expenses
on Miyazaki Test Line and in RTRI 1/2
(2) Technical development expenses on 
Yamanashi Test Line to put the 
technology to practical use
• Investment for practical use test: 1/4
( Yamanashi Test Line construction expenses )
( 7-year installment )
• Expenses for practical use test: 1/4
( Development of test vehicles for the new
test line and others )
(3) Equivalent in value of interest on
technical development expenses 1/
financed by The Japan Development Bank
Railway technical development:
( Technical development for comprehensive 
disaster-prevention system )
1/2
Budget for FY 1992
General source of revenue 
of the Government
55
General source of revenue 
of the Government
- 5  -
Name of the System Outlines of Subsidies
IV. Measures for safety, disaster 
prevention and medium/smal1 
sized rural private railways
1. Subsidies for railway disaster 
prevention project
2. Subsidies for railway modern­
ization and others
(1) S u b s id ie s for railway 
modernization
(2) Subsidies for natural disaster 
restoration project
3. Subsidies for level crossing 
safety facilities improvement
Subsidies for disaster prevention projects, such as 
those against falling rocks and snowslides on railway 
facilities and river improvements, undertaken by JR
Subsidies for improvement of facilities which is 
instrumental in promoting safety and improving 
transport services and business performances of 
medium/sraall sized rural private railways which are 
under difficult financial circumstances
Subsidies for disaster restoration works of the railway 
enterprise which has suffered from large-scale natural 
disasters and is placed under difficult financial 
circumstances
Subsidies for improvement of level crossing safety 
facilities, for the purpose of preventing accidents 
on the level crossing, undertaken by the railwayj 
enterprise which is under difficult financial 
circumstances
- 6 -

of Subsidies Budget
inary loss of the railway 
(•ay facilities are becoming 
fficulties in maintenance, and 
service might cause a serious 
e local residents
e ordinary loss of the railway 
the railway converted from 
or new local railway lines
yee training for the promotion 
the railway enterprises such as 
corporations
and repair expenses (railway 
-kyo Bridge, undertaken by 
,g Bridge Public Corporation
Ratio of subsidies:
Converted railways 
Ratio of subsidies:
10/10 of the ordinary loss of 
the lines to be subsidized 
(1/2 by the central government. 
1/2 by local governments)
5/10 of the ordinary loss
•New local railway lines 
Ratio of subsidies: 4/10 of the ordinary loss
*Period of time to be subsidized
•••for 5 years after inauguration
•Ratio of subsidies: 2/5 of the expenses
Subsidies for upkeep and repair expenses and the 
interest thereon ( railway portion )
Payment of the subsidies is made in the next FY
General soul 
of the Govel
General sourcel 
of the Governinl
General sourcel 
of the Govern
- 7 -

